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INTRODUCTION 
It is generally accepted that Richard B. Cheney was the most 
powerful Vice President in American history.1  His tenure marks 
the apogee of vice presidential influence, reflecting the gradual 
rise in importance of the office over the past several decades.2
 
1 See, e.g., BRUCE P. MONTGOMERY, RICHARD B. CHENEY AND THE RISE OF THE 
IMPERIAL VICE PRESIDENCY x (2009) (“Cheney . . . far surpassed any of his 
predecessors in power and influence.”); SHIRLEY ANNE WARSHAW, THE CO-
PRESIDENCY OF BUSH AND CHENEY 1 (2009) (“Cheney . . . exerted more influence 
than any vice president in history . . . .”). 
  
2 It is undeniable that the stature of the vice presidency has increased 
dramatically since the nineteenth century. When exactly the turning point took 
place is less clear. The leading scholar on the vice presidency sums up matters aptly:  
The metamorphosis of the vice presidency occurred over time. Although 
scholars differ on the length of the period, the key dates, and the weight to 
attach to particular events, it seems clear that the evolution began during 
the twentieth century and accelerated sometime after World War II. [In the 
first quarter of the twentieth century,] Vice presidents began to find some 
work in the executive branch. Wilson’s vice president Thomas Marshall, and 
his successor, Calvin Coolidge, attended some cabinet meetings. . . . [With a 
brief pause during the Charles Dawes vice presidency, this custom] has 
continued since that time. [John Nance] Garner and Henry Wallace 
assumed some executive duties as legislative liaison, foreign emissary, and 
commission head. These involvements . . . symbolized a migration of the 
office to the executive branch. . . . The vice presidency of Richard M. Nixon 
first illustrated the modern American vice presidency [as he] . . . functioned 
essentially as a member of the executive branch. 
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One of the issues that arose at several junctures during Cheney’s 
tenure was his determination to conduct his official activities 
confidentially.  This prompted a series of clashes with members 
of Congress and outside groups as they tried to gain access to 
Cheney’s internal deliberations.3  These conflicts, several of 
which were litigated,4 led many commentators to assert that 
Cheney was exercising what amounted to an illegitimate vice 
presidential privilege.5
While the President’s exercise of executive privilege has been 
covered exhaustively in the academic literature,
   
6 the question of 
whether the Vice President enjoys his own constitutional 
privilege has never been fully explored by scholars.7
 
 Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The Power 
of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND 
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 165, 177–79 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000); see also 
infra notes 309–15 and accompanying text. 
  This Article 
3 See infra Part VI.L. 
4 See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Walker v. Cheney, 
230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002).   
5 See infra note 7 (providing a number of examples of such commentary).   
6 See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 
(1974); ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (1974); LOUIS 
FISHER, THE POLITICS OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE (2004); DANIEL N. HOFFMAN, 
GOVERNMENTAL SECRECY AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS: A STUDY IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS (1981); PHILIP B. KURLAND, WATERGATE AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 34–74 (1978); MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA 
OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter ROZELL 
I]; Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974); Robert G. 
Dixon, Jr., Congress, Shared Administration, and Executive Privilege, in CONGRESS 
AGAINST THE PRESIDENT (Harvey C. Mansfield, Sr. ed., 1975); Randall K. Miller, 
Congressional Inquests: Suffocating the Constitutional Prerogative of Executive 
Privilege, 81 MINN. L. REV. 631 (1997); Gary J. Schmitt, Executive Privilege: 
Presidential Power To Withhold Information from Congress, in THE PRESIDENCY IN 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER (Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tulis eds., 1981); Peter 
M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government of Laws: The Case 
of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987); 
Abraham D. Sofaer, Book Review of Raoul Berger’s EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH, 88 HARV. L. REV. 281 (1974); Constitutional Law—
Executive Privilege—The President Does Not Have an Absolute Privilege To Withhold 
Evidence from a Grand Jury—Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973), 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1557 (1974); Judicial Review of Claims of Executive Privilege, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 50 (1974). 
7 The question has been briefly alluded to by a number of commentators. See, 
e.g., The Presidential Records Act Amendments of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 4187 Before 
the Subcomm. on Efficiency, Financial Management and Intergovernmental 
Relations, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform Concerning H.R. 4187, 107th Cong. (2002), in 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. 4187, THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT AMENDMENTS 
2002, at 6 [hereinafter Rosenberg Statement] (statement of Morton Rosenberg) 
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(“Section 11 of E.O. 13,233 appears to provide that a former Vice-President may 
assert an independent claim of executive privilege to bar access to his materials 
under the PRA, and that such a claim will be treated exactly the same as a privilege 
by a former President . . . .”); The Implementation of the Presidential Records Act: 
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Efficiency, Financial Management and 
Intergovernmental Relations, H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform Concerning, 107th Cong. 
(2001), in CONG. RESEARCH SERV., H.R. 4187, THE PRESIDENTIAL RECORDS ACT 
AMENDMENTS 2002, at 105 [hereinafter PRA Hearing] (testimony of Peter M. Shane) 
(“[The executive order states that] the Vice President shall be treated as the 
President [for purposes of executive privilege]. And if I may ask rhetorically, why in 
heaven’s name would that be?”); The Role of the Council on Competitiveness in 
Regulatory Review: Hearing on S. 1942 Before the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 102d 
Cong. 20, 24 (1991) [hereinafter Council Hearings] (testimony of Harold Bruff) 
(“How does the executive privilege apply to the vice presidency? . . . We do not want 
then to constrain executive privilege so much that the vice president is left attending 
funerals and cannot do anything useful at the center of the Federal Government.”); 
WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 199 (“Extending executive privilege to the vice 
president . . . was a novel concept.”); Vikram David Amar, The Cheney Decision—A 
Missed Chance To Straighten out Some Muddled Issues, 2004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 
185, 200 (stating that “the Cheney [v. U.S. District Court] ruling also missed a golden 
chance to explain how, or even why, executive privilege applies to the peculiar office 
of the vice presidency”); Hilary S. Cairnie & C. Ernest Edgar, IV, An Imperfect 
Shield: How Private Parties Can Attack and Defeat the Executive Privilege for 
Deliberative Process in Government Procurement Litigation, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 127, 
144 (1999) (“Presidential deliberations are to be accorded the most (but not absolute) 
deference in terms of privilege. Presumably, the vice president would also be 
accorded this degree of deference. Because these are the only two constitutionally 
created offices in the Executive Branch, they enjoy an explicit constitutional 
recognition that does not apply to any other members of the Executive Branch.”); 
Louis Klarevas, The Law: Can You Sue the White House? Opening the Door for 
Separation of Powers Immunity in Cheney v. District Court, 34 PRES. STUD. Q. 849, 
865 (2004) (“[T]he opinion implies that the vice president should enjoy the right to 
invoke presidential privileges and immunities (at least in civil suits). . . . Should vice 
presidents seize on this language in the future, it is likely that they will argue that 
they are shielded from a variety of legal proceedings because of the unique rights 
and responsibilities conferred to them by the Constitution. The fact that the 
Supreme Court did not expressly distinguish the vice president from the president in 
its ruling bodes well for vice presidents.”); Martha Joynt Kumar, Executive Order 
13233 Further Implementation of the Presidential Records Act, 32 PRES. STUD. Q. 
194, 205 (2002) (“The executive order implies a vice president may exercise executive 
privilege, an authority some question. . . . [I]t is unclear where his independent 
claim to executive privilege lies.”); Bruce P. Montgomery, Nixon’s Ghost Haunts the 
Presidential Records Act: The Reagan and George W. Bush Administrations, 32 
PRES. STUD. Q. 789, 805 (2002) (“One of the extraordinary features of the Bush 
[Executive Order No. 13,233] . . . was that it manufactured a nonexistent, 
independent, constitutionally based privilege for vice presidents[,] . . . asserting a 
vice presidential claim of privilege that has no basis in the Constitution . . . .”); 
Thomas O. Sargentich, Normative Tensions in the Theory of Presidential Oversight 
of Agency Rulemaking, 7 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 325, 328 (1993) (“The concept of 
executive privilege is based on Article II of the Constitution . . . . One should be 
especially careful to associate it directly with the President or the Vice President.”); 
Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Consequence of 
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attempts to fill the void and answer the novel constitutional 
question:  Does the Vice President have a constitutional privilege 
separate and distinct from that of the President?  This work 
concludes that indeed the Vice President should be recognized as 
possessing a constitutional privilege when acting pursuant to the 
narrow duties assigned him by the Constitution.   
Vice presidential privilege (“VPP”) will be considered the 
assertion, by the Vice President himself, of his own constitutional 
right to withhold certain information from Congress, private 
litigants, and the public—a right independent from the 
President’s constitutional authority and a right separate from the 
common-law deliberative process privilege that executive-branch 
 
Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of 
Presidential Records, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 651, 676 n.153 (2003) (stating that in 
executive order 13,233 “[t]here is also a suggestion that the vice president can 
independently assert executive privilege, . . . [which is] an extremely controversial 
position. . . . Such a ‘vice presidential privilege’ represents a significant departure 
from existing case [law] and statutory authority. It would also dramatically expand 
the concept of executive privilege that the Court has struggled to confine within the 
constitutional framework. It is difficult to see any textual or original intent basis for 
a ‘vice-presidential privilege.’ ”); Jeffrey P. Carlin, Note, Walker v. Cheney: Politics, 
Posturing, and Executive Privilege, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 235, 269 (2002) (“A more 
complicated question is whether Vice President Cheney may assert the privilege on 
his own behalf.”); Marcy Lynn Karin, Note, Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind: How 
Executive Order 13,233 Expands Executive Privilege While Simultaneously 
Preventing Access to Presidential Records, 55 STAN. L. REV. 529, 554 (2002) (“Bush’s 
Order is unambiguous in granting a former Vice President the authority to claim a 
vice-presidential privilege. While the President would have the authority to claim a 
privilege over a record of the Vice President, no precedent prior to this Order exists 
that expands to the Vice President a right to claim a privilege over a record of the 
Vice President, no precedent prior to this Order exists that expands to the Vice 
President a right to claim independently a privilege regardless of whether the 
President exerted one.” (citations omitted)); Michael C. Dorf, A Brief History of 
Executive Privilege, from George Washington Through Dick Cheney, FIND LAW’S 
LEGAL COMMENTARY, Feb. 6, 2002, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20020206.html 
(“Nor is it clear . . . that the Vice President can assert executive privilege.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Polarization of Extremes, CHRONICLE REV., Dec. 14, 2007, available at 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/sunstein121407 [hereinafter Sunstein] (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2010) (quoting an interview with Professor Sunstein discussing briefly 
the issue of a Vice President invoking executive privilege); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Defining Executive Privilege, BOSTON GLOBE, July 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2007/07/12/definin
g_executive_privilege [hereinafter Defining Executive Privilege] (“Is [executive 
privilege] . . . restricted to communications involving the president (and vice 
president) personally?”); see also MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER, SECRECY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 155 (2d ed. 2002) (1994) 
[hereinafter ROZELL II]. 
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officials may invoke regarding certain predecisional matters.8  As 
with executive privilege9 and judicial privilege,10 VPP includes 
within its ambit the authority to decline to appear in person 
before congressional committees.11
This Article will begin by providing proper context for 
discussion of VPP, reviewing as a structural matter the 
constitutional privileges enjoyed by other constitutional officers.  
As such, this segment will first demonstrate the premium that 
the Constitution places on encouraging effective decisionmaking.  
This emphasis is reflected in the authority of Presidents, 
members of Congress, and federal judges: (1) to collect the 
necessary information they need to make decisions—gathering 
information; (2) to reach decisions that will not leave them 
exposed to civil liability for their official actions—civil immunity; 
and (3) to deliberate over policy options in confidence—privilege.  
The lens will then narrow to focus on the third of these items, 
constitutional privileges writ large.  This includes an overview of 
  As with limitations on 
executive privilege, VPP would prove more difficult to invoke 
successfully in the context of a criminal investigation, 
particularly outside the Vice President’s legislative role.  On a 
broader level, evaluation of VPP provides a useful vehicle for 
analyzing the unique status of the vice presidency within 
American constitutional law and government.   
 
8 In this Article, mention of a vice presidential privilege will refer to a 
conception of the Vice President enjoying his own constitutional privilege but one 
distinct from vice presidential privilege as outlined in this piece.   
9 See infra Part II. 
10 See infra Part IV. 
11 See, e.g., infra Part VI; cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 
425, 523 n.19 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I see no distinction in Congress’ 
seeking to compel the appearance and testimony of a former President and in, 
alternatively, seeking to compel the production of Presidential papers over the 
former President’s objection.”). The two-pronged rationale is that: (1) the very act of 
appearing would place the Vice President, a constitutional officer, in a position 
subservient to that of Congress; and (2) it would necessarily place him in the 
position of having to answer privileged questions. Cf. HAROLD C. RELYEA & TODD B. 
TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS’ TESTIMONY BEFORE 
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: AN OVERVIEW 19 (2008). 
It is quite likely that in the context of a House impeachment investigation the Vice 
President would be required to turn over even privileged materials. Cf. FISHER, 
supra note 6, at 49–50 (quoting authorities, such as Presidents Washington and 
Polk, who implied the existence of enhanced investigatory power pursuant to an 
impeachment investigation); infra note 262 (discussing the likely surrender of 
judicial materials to an impeachment investigation).   
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executive privilege,12 legislative privilege,13 and judicial privilege, 
respectively.14
 
12 For purposes of this Article, unless otherwise noted, “executive privilege” will 
be defined as “the right of presidents to withhold information from those entities 
that have compulsory power, particularly Congress and the judicial branch.” Mark J. 
Rozell, Executive Privilege in an Era of Polarized Politics, in EXECUTING THE 
CONSTITUTION: PUTTING THE PRESIDENT BACK INTO THE CONSTITUTION 91, 91 
(Christopher S. Kelley ed., 2006). This definition is in keeping with others in the 
field. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 108-17, at 554 (2002), 
available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/constitution/pdf2002/012.pdf [hereinafter 
CRS] (“The doctrine of executive privilege defines the authority of the President to 
withhold documents or information in his possession or in the possession of the 
executive branch from compulsory process of the legislative or judicial branch of the 
government.”); DAVID E. KYVIG, THE AGE OF IMPEACHMENT: AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE SINCE 1960, at 163 (2008) (stating that “executive 
privilege, [is] the right of the president to withhold information from Congress and 
the courts”); DAVID SADOFSKY, KNOWLEDGE AS POWER: POLITICAL AND LEGAL 
CONTROL OF INFORMATION 74 (1990) (“Executive privilege is the presidential right to 
maintain secrecy against otherwise binding discovery.”). As will be discussed below, 
executive privilege includes both constitutional and common-law privileges. See 
infra notes 123–31 and accompanying text. Unless otherwise stated, “executive 
privilege” refers to the constitutional executive privilege, known as presidential 
communications privilege and not the common-law privilege known as the 
deliberative process privilege.   
  What these discussions reflect is that the 
13 For purposes of this Article, “legislative privilege” will be defined as the 
constitutional right of members of the legislative branch to withhold information 
from those entities that have compulsory power. Cf. Rozell, supra note 12. In this 
regard, the term legislative privilege is used in a more narrow sense than in other 
contexts, which sometimes include freedom of speech during debate and privilege 
from civil arrest. See, e.g., JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: 
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 3 (2007) (defining the term as “those special rights that individual 
Members or Houses of the legislature possess in order to facilitate their legislative 
duties”); see also id. at 87–110, 134–43 (discussing other aspects of the broader 
definition). Legislative privilege in this piece has two subcategories. The first is what 
will be called “Speech or Debate privilege,” which is a legislative privilege that is 
linked at least in part to the Speech or Debate Clause or other text. See infra Part 
III.A. The second is what will be called the “generalized legislative privilege,” which 
is a legislative privilege that is not tied specifically to the Speech or Debate Clause 
or other text. See infra Part III.B. The latter can be justified instead on structural 
comparisons to executive privilege and judicial privilege, as well as to past practice.   
This definition does not include the authority of the Senate to enforce the 
confidentiality of its secret sessions. This authority is exercised by the chamber as a 
whole and not by individual members. Unlike an assertion of privilege based on the 
Speech or Debate Clause or the generalized legislative privilege—both of which are 
exercised at the discretion of the individual lawmaker, see infra note 180—the Vice 
President and all Senators are obligated to withhold information revealed in closed 
session until released from that obligation by the entire Senate. See MILDRED AMER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SECRET SESSIONS OF THE HOUSE AND SENATE 2–3 (2008) 
[hereinafter SECRET SESSIONS]. In this vein, the upper chamber may permit the 
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President, members of Congress, and federal judges have the 
benefit of a recognized privilege to protect the confidentiality of 
their internal deliberations as they carry out their 
constitutionally-assigned responsibilities.  As a matter of 
constitutional structure and symmetry,15
 
release of information by passing a resolution. See id. at 3. This authority is drawn 
from Article I, Section 5 of the Constitution, which permits Congress to keep its 
journals secret. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. There is no judicial guidance on this 
provision. See CHAFETZ, supra at 13. That same section also authorizes each house 
of Congress to issue its own rules. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Based on these 
authorities, the Senate, from time to time, meets in secret session. See SECRET 
SESSIONS, supra, at 1–2. These sessions are authorized by Senate rules XX, XXI, 
XXIV, XXIX, and XXXI, see id. at 1, and may be chaired by the Vice President in his 
role as President of the Senate. The Vice President must ensure the confidentiality 
of these closed sessions. See RICHARD S. BETH, DANIEL STRICKLAND & PAUL DWYER, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VICE PRESIDENT OF 
THE UNITED STATES 23 (1981). Thus, this confidentiality provision is not so much a 
privilege as an obligation placed on the Vice President.   
 it would seem 
Thus, in light of Senate rules and the Vice President’s role as presiding officer, the 
Vice President would appear to be obligated to claim privilege over materials related 
to or communications engaged in during closed session. In this regard, Senate rules 
would seem to prevent the House from compelling the Vice President to turn over 
such Senate materials. See Letter from Kathryn L. Wheelbarger, Counsel to the Vice 
President, to Perry Apelbaum, Chief of Staff and Counsel, Comm. on the Judiciary, 
House of Representatives 2 (Apr. 18, 2008) [hereinafter April 18, 2008 Letter] (on file 
with author); cf. Molly K. Hooper, Young Cries Foul After Senate Calls for 
Investigation, CQ TODAY, Apr. 23, 2008 (criticizing the U.S. Senate for a vote 
requesting an investigation into alleged wrongdoing in the House of 
Representatives, by contending that: “What the Senate did was 
unconstitutional . . . . No other body can request an investigation on another body.” 
(quoting Representative Don Young)); infra notes 402–03 and accompanying text. 
But cf. 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 2665 (1907) (the Senate acquiescing to a House subpoena that the Senate 
turn over certain documents to the House).   
Unlike arguments related to the Speech or Debate Clause or the generalized 
legislative privilege, the authority to withhold such information in secret session has 
been explicitly cited by the Vice President’s office. During correspondence with the 
Senate Judiciary Committee over a subpoena it issued to the Vice President, Vice 
President Cheney’s counsel noted that “the Vice President respects the legal 
privileges afforded by the Constitution to the Senate, such as preservation of the 
confidentiality of a session of the Senate with closed doors over which a Vice 
President may preside.” Letter from Shannen W. Coffin, Counsel to the Vice 
President to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 1–2 
(Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter August 20, 2007 Letter] (on file with author).   
14 For purposes of this Article, “judicial privilege” will be defined as the 
constitutional right of federal judges to withhold information from those entities 
that have compulsory power. Cf. Rozell, supra note 12. 
15 Structural exegesis has proved an important means of interpreting aspects of 
separation of powers. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 
U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under 
our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of 
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anomalous for the Vice President to be the only one of the nearly 
1,400 constitutional officers not to hold such a privilege.16
 
any of its branches based on isolated clauses, or even single Articles torn from 
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government.” (emphasis added)). Absolute civil immunity for constitutional officers 
when carrying out their official duties provides an example of structural analysis 
when used in the context of separation of powers. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the Court 
noted that its “analysis must draw its evidence primarily from our constitutional 
heritage and structure.” 457 U.S. 731, 748 (1982) (emphasis added). The Court 
reasoned that since  
  It 
should therefore follow that the Vice President possesses a 
comparable privilege to the extent he is carrying out his own 
constitutional responsibilities, however modest they may be.  
This is because the rationale for the Vice President requiring a 
the Speech and [sic] Debate Clause provides a textual basis for 
congressional immunity, respondent argues that the Framers must be 
assumed to have rejected any similar grant of executive immunity. This 
argument is unpersuasive. First, a specific textual basis has not been 
considered a prerequisite to the recognition of immunity. No provision 
expressly confers judicial immunity. Yet the immunity . . . is well settled. 
Id. at 750 n.31 (1982); see also id. at 747–48 (in considering questions of civil 
immunity, the Supreme Court “necessarily . . . has weighed concerns of public policy, 
especially as illuminated by our history and the structure of our government” 
(emphasis added)); id. at 750 n.31 (“[T]he most compelling arguments [in favor of 
presidential immunity] arise from . . . reliance on constitutional structure and 
judicial precedent . . . .”); infra Part I.B. 
Another example of the courts concluding that the Constitution grants each branch 
similar authority involves constitutional interpretation by the political branches. 
Although the judiciary is the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, it is widely 
acknowledged that the political branches have their own parallel, if subordinate, 
authority to interpret the Constitution. This is particularly the case when the 
political branches interpret their own constitutional authority. See, e.g., United 
States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 681, 703 (1974) (“In the performance of assigned 
constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the 
Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect 
from the others.” (emphasis added)).  
In the academic realm, the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III have been 
analogized to one another. See generally Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, 
The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 
1153 (1992). Regarding the merits of structural interpretation more broadly, see, for 
example, CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 22 (1969); Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. 
REV. 747 (1999). 
16 This number includes 1 President, 100 Senators, 435 Representatives, 9 
Supreme Court Justices, 179 court of appeals judges, 9 international trade judges, 
and 678 district court judges. This total does not include bankruptcy judges or 
magistrate judges. See United States Courts, Judges & Judgeships, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/FederalJudgeships.aspx (last visited 
Oct. 8, 2010).   
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constitutional privilege—to encourage maximum candor during 
his internal deliberations in order to promote effective 
decisionmaking—is the same as it is for other constitutional 
officers.  While focusing on the Vice President and whether he 
holds his own privilege, it is hoped that this discussion of 
confidentiality among the three branches will add to the broader 
discourse on comparative constitutional privilege.17
This Article will then turn to an analysis of the vice 
presidency and its place in our constitutional system.  The Vice 
President has a unique status under the Constitution: part 
legislative and part executive, with his exact location in the 
constitutional order varying depending on the duties he is 
performing at the time.  The primary constitutional duties of the 
Vice President are to preside over the Senate and break ties, 
which are legislative duties; to prepare for and help make a 
determination of presidential inability,
   
18 and to prepare for 
succession, which are executive branch responsibilities.19
A historical analysis of investigations involving the vice 
presidency will follow.  This discussion—the first of its kind in 
the academic literature—will review several case studies to 
determine whether any Vice President has asserted his own 
constitutional privilege.  The vice presidencies of Daniel 
Tompkins, John C. Calhoun, Schuyler Colfax, Henry Wallace, 
Hubert Humphrey, Spiro Agnew, Gerald Ford, Nelson 
Rockefeller, George H.W. Bush, Dan Quayle, Al Gore, and 
Cheney will all be explored.
  In 
none of these roles is the Vice President legally—as opposed to 
politically—answerable to the President. 
20
 
17 Other earlier comparative discussions include: Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 
730–51 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080–84 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring); 
Cox, supra note 6, at 1391–407. 
 
18 The terms “disability” and “inability” often have been used interchangeably in 
the context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., JOHN D. FEERICK, THE 
TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND APPLICATIONS 270 (1992). 
For the sake of simplicity and consistency, the expression “inability” will be used 
throughout this Article.    
19 For purposes of this Article, the Vice President’s responsibilities under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment will be termed “executive branch duties” or “executive 
branch responsibilities” to distinguish them from “executive duties” or “executive 
responsibilities,” which imply presidential responsibility under Article II. 
20 A Senate committee investigation of Senate aide Bobby Baker at times drew 
close to Lyndon Johnson late in his vice presidency and early in his presidency. See, 
e.g., Cabell Phillips, Senators To Push Inquiry on Baker, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1963, 
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Particular attention in this Part will be placed on Cheney’s 
vice presidency, including an examination of Walker v. Cheney,21 
a federal district court decision involving the Vice President’s 
dispute over information with the General Accounting Office 
(“GAO”),22 and Cheney v. U.S. District Court,23
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, while Vice Presidents 
have become embroiled in ever more frequent contests over 
information, VPP has not been officially invoked.  Nonetheless, 
episodes involving Vice Presidents Humphrey, Agnew, 
Rockefeller, and Cheney all to varying degrees seem to have 
implicitly recognized that such a privilege exists; in this vein, 
they would appear to have “reserved the right” for future Vice 
Presidents to make such an assertion.  At a broader level, the 
growing frequency of these clashes over the past several decades 
demonstrates the growing significance of the vice presidency over 
time and the position’s greater involvement in the executive 
branch.  Should this overall trend toward enhanced vice 
presidential power continue, it is quite possible that Vice 
Presidents could build on these proto-VPP precedents and 
actually invoke the doctrine.   
 a suit stemming 
from attempts by private litigants to secure similar information 
from the Vice President.  While not involving executive privilege 
or VPP per se, both suits entailed closely related issues and 
culminated in the judiciary deferring to vice presidential 
concerns regarding confidentiality.  They also implicitly 
recognized the Vice President’s constitutional status as being 
roughly on par with that of the President.  In addition, the 
Cheney segment will discuss a 2001 executive order implying the 
existence of a privilege for the Vice President and several other 
conflicts over information involving Cheney and congressional 
committees.  It will also discuss Cheney’s interaction with the 
9/11 Commission.   
Next, the Article will turn to evaluating potential arguments 
in favor of VPP and possible counterarguments against it.  It will 
analyze constitutional structure as well as case law and past 
 
at 1. Ultimately, the investigation did not focus on potential links between Baker 
and Johnson. See generally BOBBY BAKER WITH LARRY L. KING, WHEELING AND 
DEALING: CONFESSIONS OF A CAPITOL HILL OPERATOR 175–96 (1978). The author 
would like to thank Joel Goldstein for raising this episode.   
21 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002). 
22 GAO is now called the Government Accountability Office. 
23 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
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practice.  While case law and past practice generally support 
VPP, theoretical arguments based on structural considerations 
are even more compelling, especially in light of other 
constitutional officers24 having comparable constitutional 
privileges.  After the pros and cons of VPP have been weighed, 
this Article concludes that the arguments in favor of a privilege 
of limited scope are more persuasive than those against 
recognition of such a power.  The doctrine, however, is likely to 
exist only to the extent it involves the Vice President’s narrow 
textual responsibilities: presiding over the Senate and breaking 
tie votes; preparing for and helping to make determinations 
about presidential inability; and preparing for succession.  As 
such, VPP is a composite privilege reflecting both the Vice 
President’s Article I duties and his responsibilities under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.25
 
24 For purposes of this Article, “constitutional officer” refers to those holding 
positions of high authority in the federal government as provided in constitutional 
text. Accordingly, the term does not include positions such as presidential electors. 
Nor should it be confused with “principal” or “inferior” officers of the executive 
branch, which have been created by statute. See, e.g., Letter from Brian A. 
Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. 
Henry A. Waxman (Jan. 18, 2008) [hereinafter Benczkowksi Jan. 18, 2008 Letter] (on 
file with author) (referring to the President and Vice President as “the two 
constitutional officers of the executive branch”); Memorandum from Walter 
Dellinger, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, on Whether the Office of the 
Vice President Is an “Agency” for Purposes of the Freedom of Information Act to 
Todd J. Campbell, Counsel & Dir. of Admin., Office of the Vice President (Feb. 14, 
1994), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/foiavp.htm [hereinafter FOIA Opinion] 
(stating that “the Vice President is also a constitutional officer”).    
  For the Vice President to invoke a 
constitutional privilege beyond these narrow confines runs the 
risk of creating a vice presidential executive privilege, which 
would undermine the President’s constitutional role as the head 
of the executive branch and the prevailing view that only the 
President may invoke executive privilege.   
25 A Vice President elect is also likely to enjoy a constitutional privilege under 
the Twentieth Amendment. See infra note 743. 
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CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND  
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE 
 
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL NORM OF ENCOURAGING EFFECTIVE 
DECISIONMAKING  
On a broad structural level, the Constitution places a 
premium on encouraging effective governmental decisionmaking.  
There are three components to this constitutional norm.  They 
are: (1) ensuring that constitutional officers can collect reliable 
and sufficient information with which to make their decisions—
the gathering of information; (2) ensuring that constitutional 
officers can consider policy options without fear that they will be 
held civilly liable for the decisions they make—immunity from 
civil suit; and (3) ensuring that they may consider their 
decisionmaking options confidentially—privilege.26
A. The Gathering of Information 
  While the 
focus of this Article is on the latter aspect of this norm, a brief 
discussion of the other two elements provides a useful backdrop, 
explaining the rationale behind why the Vice President should 
enjoy a constitutional privilege like those exercised by his fellow 
constitutional officers.   
The structural need for constitutional officers to secure 
reliable information in their internal decisionmaking is 
manifested in all three branches.  Regarding the President’s 
authority to collect the information necessary for him to 
effectively perform his duties, under Article II he “may require 
the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the 
executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties 
of their respective Offices.”27
 
26 Cf. Randall K. Miller, Presidential Sanctuaries After the Clinton Sex 
Scandals, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 647, 728–29 (1999); Louis S. Raveson, 
Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your 
Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879, 881–82 (1985).   
  Moreover, Article I provides him 
27 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; see also Brief for the Petitioners at 29–30, Cheney v. 
U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004) (No. 03-475) [hereinafter Cheney Supreme 
Court Brief] (“The Opinion Clause . . . explicitly confirms the President’s authority to 
gather information and opinions from his subordinates . . . . The Recommendations 
Clause (along with the State of the Union Clause) provides further textual evidence 
of the President’s powers to gather information . . . .”).   
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with ten days with which to familiarize himself with legislation 
in order to decide whether to sign a bill or veto it.28  More 
generally, Justices of the Supreme Court have recognized the 
importance of the President being able to gather information as 
needed to render decisions.29
Members of Congress are also empowered to secure 
information with which to legislate.  Two houses of Congress 
were created by the Framers in part to ensure that matters of 
public concern would be thoroughly considered before becoming 
law.
   
30
[t]he division of the Congress into two distinctive bodies assures 
that the legislative power would be exercised only after 
opportunity for full study and debate in separate settings . . . .  
Art. I, §§ 1, 7 represents the Framers’ decision that the 
legislative power of the Federal government be exercised in 
accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure.
  As the Supreme Court has noted  
31
The expectation behind this “exhaustively considered” procedure 
was that full information about the legislation in question could 
   
 
28 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2; see also 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 448 
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1937) [hereafter 2 ELLIOT] (“The President, sir, will not 
be a stranger to our country, to our laws, or to our wishes . . . . [When considering 
whether to sign legislation] [h]e will have before him the fullest information of our 
situation; he will avail himself not only of records and official communications, 
foreign and domestic, but he will have also the advice of the executive officers in the 
different departments of the general government.” (quoting James Wilson during the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Debate)); Akhil Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion 
Clause, 82 VA. L. REV. 647, 673 n.110 (1996) (“The Framers understood that, in 
weighing and wielding his veto pen, the President would often seek the ‘information 
and opinions’ of the executive underlings.”).   
29 See Public Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 488–89 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (concluding that a statute that “would regulate so as to 
interfere with the manner in which the President obtains information necessary to 
discharge his duty assigned under the Constitution to nominate federal judges is 
enough to invalidate the Act”); see also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy 
Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 50 (D.D.C. 2002), vacated on other grounds, Cheney, 
542 U.S. 367 (“While no clause of Article II expressly grants the President the power 
to acquire information or receive advice in confidence, the necessity of receiving 
confidential advice appears to flow from Article II. Several clauses of Article II 
reflect an understanding that the President will have access to information and the 
power to acquire it . . . .” (citations omitted)).   
30 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 754–55 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“ ‘The division of Congress into two distinctive bodies assures that the 
legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate 
in separate settings.’ ” (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983))).   
31 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
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come to light and be carefully weighed during congressional 
debate.  This emphasis on encouraging good decisionmaking by 
gathering appropriate information is further manifested through 
Congress’s investigative power.  The Supreme Court has 
concluded that  
[w]e are of the opinion that the power of inquiry—with process 
to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the 
legislative function. . . .  A legislative body cannot legislate 
wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the 
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; 
and where the legislative body does not itself possess the 
requisite information—which not infrequently is true—recourse 
must be had to others who do possess it.  Experience has taught 
that mere requests for such information often are unavailing, 
and also that information which is volunteered is not always 
accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are essential 
to obtain what is needed.32
Likewise, members of the judiciary possess authority to 
ensure that courts have sufficient information before them to 
make proper judgments.  In United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), the 
Supreme Court noted:  
 
The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is 
both fundamental and comprehensive.  The ends of criminal 
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a 
partial or speculative presentation of the facts.  The very 
integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the 
system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the 
framework of the rules of evidence.  To ensure that justice is 
done, it is imperative to the function of courts that compulsory 
process be available for the production of evidence needed either 
by the prosecution or by the defense.33
The Vice President is also granted authority to secure the 
information he needs to carry out his constitutional duties under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  Under Section 4, which governs 
situations involving presidential inability determinations, the 
Vice President, in conjunction with the Cabinet or other body 
created by Congress, has to make a “factual determination of 
whether or not inability exists. . . .  It is assumed that such 
decision would be made only after adequate consultation with 
  
 
32 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–75 (1927). 
33 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974) (emphasis added).   
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
440 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:423   
medical experts who were intricately familiar with the 
President’s physical and mental condition.”34
Thus, it seems clear that the Constitution envisions that its 
officers must be able to properly gather the information they 
need to effectively carry out their responsibilities.   
   
B. Immunity Against Civil Suit for Official Actions 
Constitutional protection of the decisionmaking function is 
also reflected in the granting to constitutional officers of absolute 
immunity from civil suit related to their official duties.  In the 
case of civil immunity, the risk to effective decisionmaking is 
twofold: (1) the threat of litigation is thought to discourage 
certain policy options from being seriously considered;35 and 
(2) discovery pursuant to a lawsuit may expose the internal 
deliberations themselves.36
For these reasons, the President benefits from absolute 
immunity from civil suit in the execution of his official duties—at 
least absent legislation to the contrary—so that he can make his 
   
 
34 S. REP. No. 89-66, at 13 (1965); see also John D. Feerick et al., Minority 
Opinion Regarding Recommendation IV, in JAMES F. TOOLE ET AL., DISABILITY IN 
U.S. PRESIDENTS: REPORT, RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMMENTARIES BY THE 
WORKING GROUP 26, 27 (1997) [hereinafter REPORT] (recommending that, under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, “[c]onstitutional decision-makers will generally require 
medical advice from appropriate medical experts . . . regarding the President’s 
condition in making decisions . . . [and] as to whether the President is able to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The legislative history surrounding the 
adoption of the Twenty-[F]ifth Amendment makes clear that its framers intended 
that constitutional decision-makers would solicit appropriate medical advice.”); 
Senator Birch E. Bayh, Jr., The Twenty–Fifth Amendment: Its History and Meaning, 
in 1 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 1, 
14 (Kenneth W. Thompson ed., 1991) (“In the real world . . . nothing [would be 
done] . . . until the vice president has a chance to consult with a lot of folks as to 
whether something needs to be done.”); Mortimer Caplin, Revisiting the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, in 2 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-
FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra, at 9, 22 (hypothesizing about a First Lady discussing the 
President’s health with the Vice President and Cabinet during an inability inquiry 
under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment). 
35 See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 n.32 (1982) (“Among the most 
persuasive reasons supporting official immunity is the prospect that damages 
liability may render an official unduly cautious in the discharge of his official 
duties.”). 
36 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 826 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) 
(“[E]xposure to civil liability [for presidential aides] for official acts will result in 
constant judicial questioning, through judicial proceedings and pretrial discovery, 
into the inner workings of the Presidential Office beyond that necessary to maintain 
the traditional checks and balances of our constitutional structure.”).   
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decisions undeterred by concerns about potential damage suits.  
It has been recognized that the threat of litigation “is compelling 
where the officeholder must make the most sensitive and far-
reaching decisions entrusted to any official under our 
constitutional system.”37  In Clinton v. Jones, the Supreme Court 
similarly observed “we have repeatedly explained that the 
immunity serves the public interest in enabling such officials to 
perform their designated functions effectively without fear that a 
particular decision may give rise to personal liability.”38
[t]he societal interest in providing such public officials with the 
maximum ability to deal fearlessly and impartially with the 
public at large has long been recognized as an acceptable 
justification for official immunity.  The point of immunity for 
such officials is to forestall an atmosphere of intimidation that 
would conflict with their resolve to perform their designated 
functions in a principled fashion.
  
Likewise, the Court concluded in Ferri v. Ackerman,  
39
Federal lawmakers are also shielded by absolute immunity 
from civil suit for their official actions.  This is reflected in the 
Speech or Debate Clause, which ensures that “for any Speech or 
Debate in either House, [federal lawmakers] shall not be 
questioned in any other Place.”
  
40  This has been reinforced in the 
caselaw.41
 
37 Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752; id. at 763 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that 
failure to provide civil immunity to the President for official acts “would also 
inevitably inhibit the processes of Executive Branch decisionmaking and impede the 
functioning of the Office of the President”); id. at 784 (White, J., dissenting) (“The 
Court’s response, until today, to this problem has been to apply the argument to 
individual functions, not offices, and to evaluate the effect of liability on 
governmental decisionmaking within that function in light of the substantive ends 
that are to be encouraged or discouraged.”); cf. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 527 
(1978) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating in the 
context of immunity that “vexatious constitutional litigation will interfere with his 
[Cabinet Secretary’s] decisionmaking process”); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 720 
(1997) (Breyer, J., concurring) (observing that the majority opinion centers around 
the view that “a President’s fear of civil lawsuits based upon his official duties could 
distort his official decisionmaking”). 
  For example, in Doe v. McMillan, the Supreme Court 
held that parents could not bring an action for civil damages 
38 520 U.S. at 693.   
39 444 U.S. 193, 203–04 (1979); see also Nixon, 457 U.S. at 752 n.32.   
40 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
41 See, e.g., Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 311–12 (1973). 
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against members of Congress and their employees for publishing 
information about the scholastic performance of their children.42
Judges are similarly protected by absolute immunity, albeit 
at common law.  In Randall v. Brigham, the Supreme Court 
concluded that “it is a general principle applicable to all judicial 
officers, that they are not liable to a civil action for any judicial 
act done within their jurisdiction.”
   
43  This rule has been 
reaffirmed on several occasions.44
While there is no case law directly on point,
   
45 dicta indicate 
that the Vice President would also be protected by a comparable 
immunity for his official acts.  In McCullough v. United States,46 
a federal court upheld a magistrate judge’s report and 
recommendation “in its entirety.”47
 
42 See id. 
  The magistrate judge’s 
opinion involved dismissal of a pro se suit against former Vice 
President Cheney, among others.  The judge wrote that “[w]hile 
case law does not appear to extend the protection of absolute 
43 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535 (1868). 
44 See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1871) (noting that if a judge 
carries out “a judicial act,” then “the defendant cannot be subjected to responsibility 
for it in a civil action”); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978) (“[C]ourts of 
superior or general jurisdiction are not liable to civil actions for their judicial 
acts . . . .”). 
45 The question of vice presidential civil immunity for official acts was raised in 
Wilson v. Libby, but the court declined to address the question. See 535 F.3d 697, 
713 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Because our decision, based on the grounds considered by 
the district court, results in the dismissal of all claims against the Vice President of 
the United States, we need not, and do not, consider his alternate claim for absolute 
Vice-Presidential immunity.”). For the limited literature on vice presidential 
immunity, see James D. Myers, Note, Bringing the Vice President into the Fold: 
Executive Immunity and the Vice Presidency, 50 B.C. L. REV. 897, 898 n.8 (2009); cf. 
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Executive Privileges and Immunities: The 
Nixon and Clinton Cases, 108 HARV. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995) (arguing that while “not 
a ‘Senator or Representative,’ strictly speaking,” the Arrest Clause would still 
protect the Vice President from civil incarceration). A comprehensive discussion of 
vice presidential immunity is beyond the scope of this Article. However, in addition 
to case law, persuasive structural considerations could also be marshalled in support 
of immunity. As with privilege, were the Vice President to be denied immunity he 
would stand alone in this regard among constitutional officers. It is, of course, highly 
doubtful that the Vice President would enjoy civil immunity for unofficial acts. See 
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 693 (1997); 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. 
NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 7.3(f)(i)–(ii) (4th ed. 2007) (noting that both Theodore Roosevelt and Harry Truman 
were defendants in civil lawsuits while they were Vice President, both for actions 
that occurred before they took office); infra note 348.  
46 C/A No. 8:08-4137-GRA-WMC, 2009 WL 367371, at *1 (D.S.C. Feb. 13, 2009).   
47 Id. at *2. 
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immunity to the Vice President, Plaintiff named [the Vice 
President] . . . [in his] role as President of the Senate.  Therefore, 
it is possible that Defendant Cheney may be protected by 
legislative immunity, or in the alternative, be entitled to 
qualified immunity.”48  The judge cautioned, “[h]owever, [that] as 
the complaint is subject to dismissal on other grounds, a detailed 
discussion regarding the possible scope of former Vice President 
Cheney’s immunity is unnecessary.”49
A few weeks later, the same federal court in Sykes v. Frank 
dismissed a similar suit on largely the same grounds against 
several officials, including the former Vice President.
   
50  Again, 
the court upheld the magistrate’s report and recommendation “in 
its entirety.”51  The magistrate judge noted that the “present 
action cannot proceed against Defendants Bush and Cheney 
because of the complete immunity enjoyed by the President and 
Vice-President of the United States in performing the duties of 
their respective offices.”52  Citing Nixon v. Fitzgerald, the 
magistrate judge explained that “[a]lthough the Nixon court did 
not specifically mention the office of Vice-President, it is clear 
from the Court’s analysis that the rationale for absolute 
immunity applies to that office as well.”53  Because the former 
Vice President was “protected by absolute immunity,” the suit 
was dismissed.54
This Article, of course, focuses on the third aspect of the 
emphasis the Constitution places on decisionmaking by 
constitutional officers: privilege.  In particular, it considers 
whether a Vice President has a constitutional privilege.  That the 
Vice President is granted the authority to gather the information 
he needs to fulfill his constitutional duties and that he is likely 
immune from civil suit for his official acts only serve to 
underscore the structural reasoning upon which VPP in large 
part rests:  That, like any other constitutional officer, he must 
have his decisionmaking process protected.   
  Thus, what dicta exist indicate that the Vice 
President would have the benefit of civil immunity.   
 
48 Id. at *4 n.4. 
49 Id. 
50 C/A No. 8:08-4049-GRA-BBH, 2009 WL 614806, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2009). 
51 See id. at *2.  
52 Id. at *8.  
53 Id. at *8 n.3 (emphasis added). 
54 Id. at *8.   
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C. Constitutional Privileges and Governmental Structure 
1. Separation of Powers and Constitutional Privileges 
Constitutional officers in each of the three branches of the 
federal government have the benefit of a constitutional privilege 
against disclosure of their internal deliberations.55  This is a 
concept which dates to the 1790s.56  During the first decade 
under the Constitution, Representative Nathaniel Smith noted 
“that each department of Government ought to be the sole judge 
when to make any part of its proceedings public.”57  This view 
was echoed in the early nineteenth century by Supreme Court 
Justice Thomas Johnson.  He wrote to Thomas Jefferson that “I 
do verily believe that there is no Body of Men, legislative, judicial 
or executive, who could preserve the public Respect for a single 
year, if the public Eye were permitted always to look behind the 
Curtain.”58  This view has prevailed up to the present day.59
For instance, the Supreme Court adopted the same rationale 
in Nixon I:  
 
[T]he valid need for protection of communications between high 
Government officials and those who advise and assist them in 
 
55 See also infra Parts II–IV; see also, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 51 
(“[E]xecutive privilege can be defended on the basis of the accepted practices of 
secrecy in the other branches of government.”); Dixon, supra note 6, at 133 
(“Executive privilege is a particular aspect of . . . government information 
policy . . . common to all three branches of the separation of powers system.”); 
Vikram David Amar, Executive Privilege: Often Valuable To Protect the Presidency, 
But Misunderstood by President Bush in the Condoleezza Rice Case, FINDLAW LEGAL 
COMMENTARY, Apr. 16, 2004, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/ 
20040416.html (“[T]he idea [executive privilege] . . . embodies is quite well accepted: 
the notion that each branch requires some internal privacy to deliberate free from 
the prying eyes and ears of the other two branches and of the American public.”). 
56 See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 155.   
57 Id. 
58 ALEXANDRA K. WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICES: A DESCRIPTIVE GUIDE 10 (1986). 
59 See, e.g., 9 CONG. REC. 680 (1879) (quoting a House Judiciary Committee 
study that determined the political branches lacked authority to compel production 
of documents from each other); see also Dixon, supra note 6, at 134; cf. United States 
v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941) (“We have explicitly held . . . that ‘it was not the 
function of the court to probe the mental processes of the Secretary [of Agriculture in 
arriving at his decision].’ Just as a judge cannot be subjected to such a scrutiny so 
the integrity of the administrative process must be equally respected. It will bear 
repeating that although the administrative process has had a different development 
and pursues somewhat different ways from those of the courts, they are to be 
deemed collaborative instrumentalities of justice and the appropriate independence 
of each should be respected by the other.” (citations omitted)).   
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the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this 
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion . . . .  
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of 
enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of 
Presidential communications has similar constitutional 
underpinnings . . . .60
Thus, the reason for such a privilege is that for the President to 
perform his duties ably he must receive candid advice from his 
aides.  It is thought that this type of counsel might not be 
forthcoming if internal deliberations are not protected from 
public view.  The concern is that embarrassing revelations might 
limit a full airing of policy options or rationales, which could 
therefore compromise the decisionmaking process.
 
61  The Court 
in Nixon I explained that the privilege was not unique to the 
President but “is fundamental to the operation of Government 
and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the 
Constitution.”62
The years since Nixon I have witnessed the high court 
reaffirming this stance, that constitutional privileges are integral 
to constitutional officers optimally performing their duties.  In 
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon II), the 
Supreme Court noted that Nixon I “recognized that there is a 
legitimate governmental interest in the confidentiality of 
  In this regard, the justification for the President 
would be applicable to other constitutional officers who also need 
candid advice from their peers and subordinates to sharpen the 
decisionmaking processes of their respective institutions.   
 
60 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974) (emphasis added); cf. id. at 708 n.17 
(“[G]overnment . . . needs open but protected channels for the kind of plain talk that 
is essential to the quality of its functioning.” (quoting Carl Zeiss Stiftung v. V.E.B. 
Carl Zeis, 40 F.R.D. 318, 325 (D.D.C. 1966)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
The Nixon I decision will be discussed in greater detail below. See infra Part II.B.1. 
61 See infra notes 79, 111, and 115 and accompanying text. In addition to the 
importance of promoting effective decisionmaking among constitutional officers, 
another justification provided in support of constitutional privilege is to preserve the 
independence of the three branches from each other. See, e.g., Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. 
Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 510–11 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“This 
independence of the three branches of Government, including control over the 
papers of each, lies at the heart of this Court’s broad holdings concerning the 
immunity of congressional papers from outside scrutiny. . . . [T]o preserve the 
constitutionally rooted independence of each branch of Government, each branch 
must be able to control its own papers.”). This same rationale is applicable in the 
case of VPP since it is important to preserve the independence of the vice presidency, 
especially in the context of determining presidential inability.   
62 418 U.S. at 708. 
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communications between high Government officials.”63  The 
Court elaborated that “[g]overnment confidentiality has been a 
concern from the time of the Constitutional Convention.”64
The view that all constitutional officers may exercise a 
privilege was made even more explicit by Chief Justice Warren 
Burger in his dissent in Nixon II.  In this vein, Burger wove 
considerations of constitutional structure and symmetry into his 
reasoning by pegging the legitimacy of executive privilege to 
legislative privilege.  The Chief Justice noted that “the 
President[’s] . . . power to control files, records, and papers of the 
office . . . are comparable to the internal workpapers of Members 
of the House and Senate.”
   
65
[t]he Constitution does not speak of Presidential papers, just as 
it does not speak of workpapers of Members of Congress or of 
judges.  But there can be no room for doubt that, up to now, it 
has been the implied prerogative of the President as of Members 
of Congress and of judges to . . . provide unilaterally for 
disposition of his work papers.  Control of Presidential papers 
is, obviously, a natural and necessary incident of the broad 
discretion vested in the President in order for him to discharge 
his duties.
  Burger reasoned further that 
66
He concluded broadly that “to preserve the constitutionally 
rooted independence of each branch of Government, each branch 
must be able to control its own papers.”
 
67  Then-Justice William 
Rehnquist drew much the same conclusion.  In his own dissent, 
Rehnquist wrote that “[p]rivileges, such as the executive 
privilege [are] embodied in the Constitution as a result of the 
separation of powers.”68
Three Supreme Court Justices followed the same reasoning 
in Houchins v. KQED, which involved whether journalists under 





63 433 U.S. 425, 447 n.10 (1977). For further structural reasoning in this 
decision, see id. at 448. This decision is discussed in greater detail in Part II.B.2.a. 
  There again, the Justices quoted from Nixon I and 
acknowledged “ ‘the valid need for protection of communications 
between high Government officials and those who advise and 
64 433 U.S. at 447 n.11. 
65 Id. at 514 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).    
66 Id. at 515 (citations omitted). 
67 Id. at 511. 
68 Id. at 545 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
69 438 U.S. 1 (1978). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 447 
assist them in the performance of their manifold duties.’ ”70  In 
University of Pennsylvania v. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission, a case involving a college’s assertion of a 
constitutional and common-law privilege against revealing peer-
review documents, the Court echoed on yet another occasion the 
language from Nixon I.71  Writing for the Court, Justice 
Blackmun reasoned that “the privilege we recognized in Nixon 
was grounded in the separation of powers between the branches 
of the Federal Government.”72
Other prominent judicial opinions have also noted that a 
privilege is vital to the work performed by constitutional officers.  
In 1971, the issue of privilege arose in Soucie v. David.
 
73  This 
case involved whether an Office of Science and Technology report 
could be made public pursuant to the Freedom of Information 
Act.74  In this case, Judge Malcolm Wilkey of the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit filed a concurring 
opinion.75
To put this question in perspective, it must be understood that 
the privilege against disclosure of the decision-making process 
is a tripartite privilege, because precisely the same privilege in 
conducting certain aspects of public business exists for the 
legislative and judicial branches as well as for the executive.  It 
arises from two sources, one common law and other 
constitutional.
  In it he emphasized that constitutional officers have a 
constitutional privilege.  He wrote:  
76
Wilkey continued:  “The constitutional part of the privilege [in 
question] arises from the principle of the separation of powers 





70 Id. at 35 n.27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Nixon (Nixon 
I), 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974)). 
 
71 493 U.S. 182, 195 (1990) (“[T]he privilege can be said to derive from the 
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. 
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers; the 
protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications has similar 
constitutional underpinnings.” (quoting Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705–06) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
72 Id. 
73 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971). 
74 See id. 
75 Id. at 1080 (Wilkey, J., concurring). 
76 Id.    
77 Id. at 1081. Wilkey relied on past practice to buttress his argument. See id. at 
1082 (“These examples of [past] recognition by all three branches of a constitutional 
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Two years later in Nixon v. Sirica, which involved President 
Nixon’s attempt to quash a subpoena duces tecum directing him 
to turn over audio recordings of White House conversations to the 
special prosecutor’s office, Judge Wilkey filed a dissent.78
public officials are entitled to the private advice of their 
subordinates and to confer among themselves freely and 
frankly, without fear of disclosure, otherwise the advice received 
and the exchange of views may not be as frank and honest as 
the public good requires. . . .  Government could not function if 
it was permissible to go behind judicial, legislative or executive 
action and to demand a full accounting from all subordinates 
who may have been called upon to make a recommendation in 
the matter.
  Here, 
he applied the same reasoning as in his earlier opinion.  Basing 
much of his argument on notions of constitutional structure and 
symmetry, he wrote that  
79
Wilkey noted that “the tripartite privilege has been asserted 
innumerable times in various alignments of conflict among the 
three Branches.”
 
80  At still another juncture in his opinion, 
Wilkey returned to the notion of the “tripartite privilege,” which 
he concluded was “universally derived from that principle of 
separation of powers.”81
Thus, as the courts have noted repeatedly, and as the next 
three Parts will further demonstrate, each of the constitutional 
officers of each of the federal government’s three branches may 
withhold certain materials from public view when exercising 
powers delegated to them under the Constitution.  In this regard, 
the Constitution has been interpreted to encourage effective and 
well-informed decisionmaking by promoting candor when 
constitutional officers are discussing official matters with their 
peers and aides.  If constitutional officers and their subordinates 
   
 
privilege to withhold certain documents under given circumstances . . . show the 
tripartite nature of the constitutional privilege.”). 
78 487 F.2d 700, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. at 764.  
80 Id. at 770; see also id. at 773–74 (“Every President, beginning with 
Washington and Jefferson, has asserted that the privilege and the scope and 
applicability are for him alone to decide. That is precisely what Congress does when 
it either grants or withholds documents in response to the request of a court for 
evidence in a criminal case. This is what no doubt this court would do if confronted 
with a demand by a Congressional committee for any of our internal documents. . . . 
We would do so on the Constitutional ground of separation of powers.”). 
81 Id. at 775.  
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believe their exchanges over policy matters are likely to be 
exposed, all concerned may sanitize their comments or decline to 
broach sensitive or novel options or rationales out of fear they 
will be revealed to the public.  Were the confidentiality of 
internal proceedings to be breached, authorities have concluded 
that the quality of decisionmaking by constitutional officers 
would suffer accordingly.   
2. Why the Vice President Should Be Treated Like Any Other 
Constitutional Officer 
Since the President exercises executive privilege, since 
members of Congress exercise legislative privilege and since 
federal judges exercise judicial privilege—all while acting 
pursuant to their respective constitutional powers—then as a 
structural matter, it should almost certainly follow that the Vice 
President would be able to exercise his own privilege to the 
extent he is carrying out his own enumerated powers.  These are: 
presiding over the Senate and breaking ties; preparing for and 
helping make determinations about presidential inability; and 
preparing for succession.  Otherwise, the Vice President would be 
the only constitutional officer in the entire federal government 
who would exercise his constitutional duties without the benefit 
of a privilege.   
The Vice President should not enjoy such a privilege based 
on abstract notions of constitutional tidiness, but because the 
rationale for him holding such a privilege is the same as has been 
applied by the courts to other constitutional officers.  In carrying 
out his constitutional duties, the Vice President—like any 
constitutional officer—needs to be able to benefit from an 
effective decisionmaking process.  This includes gathering the 
necessary data and opinions to make an informed decision; being 
civilly immune for official decisions made; and conducting 
internal deliberations in confidence in order to fully explore 
possible policy options and rationales.  Otherwise, the quality of 
his decisionmaking would suffer and the public could be ill 
served.  Much as it is vital that a lawmaker receive candid advice 
from his legislative aides on policy matters, so too the Vice 
President must receive unvarnished opinions from his staff as to 
his constitutional responsibilities, whether they involve: 
(1) parliamentary or legislative issues related to his presiding 
over, and voting in, the Senate; or (2) inability and succession 
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matters related to his responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.  The rationale for the Vice President holding his 
own privilege reflects this same overarching constitutional norm 
of encouraging high-quality, candid internal dialogue on policy 
options and rationales. 
Moreover, there is dicta in both Cheney v. U.S. District 
Court82 and Walker v. Cheney83
For these reasons, the fact that all other constitutional 
officers have a constitutional privilege is highly relevant to the 
question of whether the Vice President can wield a comparable 
power.   
 that point toward the Vice 
President being treated in the same manner as the President.  
Therefore, not only is the rationale underlying VPP the same as 
the rationale underlying privilege for any other constitutional 
officer, but the Vice President has been specifically compared to 
the President in a structural fashion by the courts.  The fact that 
both of these judicial decisions treat the two offices the same in 
the context of asserting confidentiality interests makes this 
structural linkage all the more relevant.  In this regard, the 
courts have already treated the Vice President in a manner 
similar to other constitutional officers when it comes to ensuring 
the confidentiality of deliberations.   
II. EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE 
The first of the constitutional privileges to be examined is 
the best known, that of executive privilege.  For purposes of this 
Article, an examination into executive privilege is necessary for 
two reasons.  First, it is important to discuss the legitimacy of 
executive privilege in order to demonstrate, by analogy, the 
legitimacy of VPP.  If the President can invoke a constitutional 
privilege pursuant to his enumerated powers, then the Vice 
President would seem to be able to do the same since the 
underlying rationale is the same.   
 
82 542 U.S. 367, 382 (2004) (“[S]eparation-of-powers considerations should 
inform a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President 
or the Vice President.”); see also infra Part VI.L.2. 
83 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[F]undamental separation of powers 
concerns relating to the restricted role of Article III courts . . . ordain the outcome 
here . . . . The parties agree that no court has ever before granted [what is sought 
here] . . . an order that the President (or Vice President) must produce information 
to Congress . . . .”); see also infra Part VI.L.1.  
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Second, a discussion of executive privilege is needed to 
demonstrate what VPP is not: it is not vice presidential executive 
privilege.  As will be shown below, the President and executive 
branch lawyers do not appear to have ever contended that the 
Vice President may exercise executive privilege.  Only the 
President, or a former President, has such authority.  That, 
however, does not prevent the Vice President from exercising his 
own privilege, which reflects his own unique constitutional 
position. 
A. Constitutional Structure 
The authority of the President to withhold materials from 
the public and other branches is not to be found in the text of the 
Constitution.  Nonetheless, there are several constitutional 
clauses that serve as potential bases for executive privilege.  
They include the Vesting Clause, the Opinion Clause, and the 
clauses governing the President’s military and diplomatic 
powers.  At the end of the day, the Supreme Court has not 
explicitly relied on any of them in justifying executive privilege. 
At first blush, the Vesting Clause would appear to be the 
most likely candidate for providing authority for the President to 
withhold information from Congress, the courts, and the public.84  
An argument could be put forward that the clause provides the 
President with some degree of implied authority,85 particularly in 
foreign and military affairs.86  Unlike Article I, which provides 
Congress with “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted,”87 Article 
II begins by stating more generally and without apparent 
limitation that the “executive Power shall be vested in a 
President of the United States of America.”88
 
84 See, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 24–26; Viet D. Dinh, Book Review, 13 
CONST. COMMENT. 346, 348 (1996) (reviewing MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE: THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY (1994)); 
cf. In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
  Thus, an argument 
can be made that the powers in Article II are unenumerated, 
85 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 137–38 (1926). But see Humphrey’s 
Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 632 (1935). 
86 See, e.g., Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power 
over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 234, 355 (2001). The argument that the 
Vesting Clause is a repository of foreign affairs powers is not airtight, however. See, 
e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and 
Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 546, 687–88 (2004). 
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).   
88 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
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much like those of Article III.89  It would seem to follow that the 
unstated but clearly recognized90
In addition to the Vesting Clause, those asserting executive 
privilege can point to the President’s power to obtain opinions 
from executive branch officials.
 authority of executive privilege 
could well flow from this clause. 
91  As noted above, Article II, 
Section 2 states that the President “may require the Opinion, in 
writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive 
Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their 
respective Offices.”92  The argument could be made that, since 
the President may request opinions from other executive officers, 
it is implicit that such advice as a general matter may not be 
provided to others and must remain confidential.  However, it is 
by no means clear that, simply because the President may ask for 
information from his Cabinet officers, Congress or the public 
therefore may not have access to the same data, particularly 
since Congress exercises a long-recognized power to investigate 
the executive branch.93
Case law has also made particular reference to the 
President’s authority to withhold information in defense and 
foreign affairs.
 
94  Thus, other textual grounds for executive 
privilege could be found in the President’s constitutional 
responsibilities as Commander in Chief95 and Chief Diplomat.96
 
89 See generally Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15. 
  
90 See infra Part II.B. 
91 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, Cheney, Enron, and the Constitution, TIME, Feb. 2, 
2002, available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,198829,00.html.  
92 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.     
93 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957) (“The power of 
the Congress to conduct investigations . . . is broad . . . . It comprehends probes into 
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or 
waste.”). 
94 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 706, 707, 710, 715 
(1974).   
95 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief 
of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, 
when called into the actual Service of the United States . . . .”); see also Chi. & S. Air 
Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (“The President, both as 
Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign affairs, has available 
intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not be published to the world. 
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review 
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held 
secret.”). But cf. BERGER, supra note 6, at 115–16, 161–62 (discussing and ultimately 
dismissing the view that the Commander in Chief Clause provides the President 
with authority to protect information from disclosure).    
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It is usually acknowledged that both of these roles require some 
degree of secrecy, which justifies the President withholding 
certain information in these areas.97
While the Vesting Clause, the Opinion Clause, the 
Commander in Chief Clause, and Article II’s diplomatic clauses 
would each appear to provide some possible textual support for 
executive privilege, the Supreme Court has never embraced any 
of these propositions.  In fact, the Court in Nixon I concluded that 
“[n]owhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference 
to a privilege of confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest [in 
confidentiality] relates to the effective discharge of a President’s 
powers, it is constitutionally based.”
   
98  Instead, it will be recalled 
that the Court expressly tied the privilege to “the nature of 
enumerated powers,”99 reasoning that “the protection of the 
confidentiality of Presidential communications 
has . . . constitutional underpinnings.”100
In binding executive privilege to the exercise of enumerated 
powers, the Supreme Court clearly tied executive privilege to 
broader structural features in the Constitution.  If, in fact, 
authority for executive privilege is drawn from structural 
considerations rather than an individual clause or clauses as laid 
out in Nixon I, then it would seem to bolster the case for VPP 
  Thus, according to the 
Supreme Court, executive privilege is implied from the 
President’s exercise of his constitutional powers, not explicit from 
specific textual grants. 
 
96 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by 
and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two 
thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the 
Advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors . . . .”). The term “Chief 
Diplomat” is Clinton Rossiter’s. See CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 
25 (2d ed. 1960). 
97 But see BERGER, supra note 6, at 115–16, 161–62. Exactly what the President 
can withhold from Congress in the realm of foreign and defense affairs is uncertain 
as Congress can make compelling claims to information in this context. See, e.g., id. 
at 108–16, 124–33; FISHER, supra note 6, at 10–11, 13–14, 30–39.   
98 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 711 (emphasis added); see also In re Certain Complaints 
Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council of the 
Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1519 (11th Cir. 1986) (“The Court [in Nixon I] 
discerned the constitutional foundation for the executive privilege—notwithstanding 
the lack of any express provision—in the constitutional scheme of separation of 
powers and in the very nature of a President’s duties . . . the same must be true of 
the judiciary.”).  
99 See Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705. 
100 Id. at 705–06. 
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since VPP has no express textual basis and instead relies on the 
same type of structural reasoning.101
B. Judicial Interpretation of the Doctrine 
   
Until the Nixon administration, the doctrine of executive 
privilege had yet to be fully recognized by the Supreme Court, 
even though the need for executive branch secrecy had been long 
recognized in other quarters.102  In 1974, historical practice was 
enshrined in legal doctrine in Nixon I.  Since that decision, the 
federal courts have had several other occasions to further 
consider the matter.  These rulings provide little in the way of 
unambiguous support for VPP, but the overall tenor of these 
decisions is more favorable than not.  Were VPP to be litigated 
today, there is no comparable series of historical precedents for 
VPP to rely upon in the way the executive branch did for 
executive privilege—though Vice Presidents have hinted that 
they do have such authority.103
1. United States v. Nixon (Nixon I) 
  Nonetheless, the underlying 
reasoning of these executive privilege decisions—particularly 
that of Nixon I—provides support for VPP in that the rationale 
broadly links constitutional privilege to the exercise of 
enumerated constitutional powers. 
In Nixon I, the Supreme Court, for the first time, was 
confronted squarely with an assertion of executive privilege.104  
In that much heralded decision, President Nixon attempted to 
quash a subpoena duces tecum issued by a federal district court 
requiring him to surrender a number of audio recordings and 
other materials to the Office of the Special Prosecutor, which was 
investigating the Watergate controversy.105  These tapes and 
papers reflected certain discussions held between Nixon and 
several White House staff members.106
 
101 See, e.g., infra Part VIII.A.  
  Nixon asserted executive 
privilege over the tapes, arguing that the privilege was absolute 
and that his decision to keep the materials secret was 
102 See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 9, 117, 128. 
103 See infra Part VI.E–F, VI.L. 
104 418 U.S. 683, 703. 
105 See id. at 686. 
106 See id. 
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unreviewable by the courts.107  The Special Prosecutor’s Office 
countered that it had an overriding need for the materials since 
they involved a judicial proceeding related to potential criminal 
matters.108
The Court ruled unanimously
 
109 that the tapes had to be 
turned over to the special prosecutor since the materials were 
linked directly to criminal proceedings, a vital Article III 
function.  While the decision led to the demise of Nixon’s 
presidency, the Court enhanced the office as an institution by 
formally recognizing a qualified executive privilege.110
Human experience teaches that those who expect public 
dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a 
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the 
detriment of the decisionmaking process . . . .  [T]he 
confidentially of Presidential communications 
has . . . constitutional underpinnings. . . .  The privilege is 
fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably 
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.
  The 
Court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, stated: 
111
The Court placed some emphasis on the particular need for 
protection of military and diplomatic secrets.  It stated that the 
“need for confidentiality . . . [regarding conversations about] 
foreign statesmen is too obvious to call for further treatment.”
 
112  
At the same time, the Court limited its holding to the criminal 
context.113
 
107 See id. at 692–93. 
   
108 See id. at 689, 711–12.    
109 Justice Rehnquist recused himself, making it an 8–0 decision. See id. at 716. 
110 See, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 71; Miller, supra note 6, at 638. 
111 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705–06, 708; see also id. at 706 (“The President’s need for 
complete candor and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from the 
courts.”). 
112 Id. at 715; see also id. at 706 (recognizing the unique importance of 
preserving “military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security secrets”).   
113 See 418 U.S. at 712 n.19 (“We are not here concerned with the balance 
between the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality and the need for 
relevant evidence in civil litigation, nor with that between the confidentiality 
interest and congressional demands for information, nor with the President’s 
interest in preserving state secrets. We address only the conflict between the 
President’s assertion of a generalized privilege of confidentiality and the 
constitutional need for relevant evidence in criminal trials.”). The Court did not 
explain whether invocation of executive privilege in the context of a civil suit or a 
congressional investigation might involve different standards. Dictum from a 
subsequent decision indicates that the President enjoys greater leeway to withhold 
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In its decision, the Court coupled pragmatic concerns with 
the doctrine of separation of powers.114  Reasoning that the 
President’s need for candid advice from his advisers justified the 
withholding of certain information from the public, the Court 
explained that a “President and those who assist him must be 
free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and 
making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling 
to express except privately.”115
At no point did the Court leave room for a Vice President to 
exercise executive privilege; references in the decision were made 
only to the “President’s powers” and “the Chief Executive,” 
omitting the Vice President altogether.  The Court’s approach in 
this regard tracked the legal position of President Nixon,
   
116
2. Post-Nixon I Jurisprudence 
 
which did not embrace anyone but the President invoking 
executive privilege.  Of course, VPP is not a subset of executive 
privilege.  It entails the Vice President’s own privilege reflecting 
his own unique constitutional role in American government. 
In the years following Nixon I, courts have had occasion to 
decide a number of other cases involving executive privilege.  
None of these decisions expressly considered whether a Vice 
President has the benefit of such a power.  Nevertheless, their 
net effect is generally supportive of the notion of VPP. 
a. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services (Nixon II) 
Following his resignation, Nixon claimed custody over his 
presidential records as part of an agreement he had worked out 
with the General Services Administration; this included 
Watergate-related tapes and papers.  Congress responded by 
 
materials in the context of a civil suit than in a criminal matter. See Cheney v. U.S. 
Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 384 (2004).   
114 See, e.g., ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 47–48. 
115 Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 708. 
116 During the Nixon I litigation, counsel for the President asserted that 
“executive privilege; in this case, [is] more accurately described as presidential 
privilege. Unless this is so, the full panoply of power embodied in the executive 
power, would be, in reality, greatly diluted, a concept at odds with the intent of the 
Framers of the Constitution.” Brief for the Respondent, Cross-Petitioner, Richard M. 
Nixon, President of the United States, Nixon I, 418 U.S. 683 (Nos. 73-1766 & 73-
1834), reprinted in UNITED STATES V. NIXON, THE PRESIDENT BEFORE THE SUPREME 
COURT 320, 350–51 (Leon Friedman ed., 1974) [hereinafter Nixon Brief] (emphasis 
added).  
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passing a statute to overturn this agreement and to address to its 
satisfaction the disposition of Nixon’s presidential materials.  In 
Nixon II,117 the Supreme Court held that former Presidents may 
invoke executive privilege under certain scenarios, but with 
respect to Nixon, the Court ruled the statutory scheme in 
question did not compromise the confidentiality considerations 
raised by the former President.118  Thus, the Court concluded 
that invocation of executive privilege was not limited to sitting 
Presidents but also included former Presidents.119  That said, a 
former President’s interest in preserving confidentiality, the 
Court reasoned, fades over time.120
In this regard, the Court provided another hint of daylight 
for VPP.  Since former Presidents, in addition to sitting 
Presidents, enjoy authority to invoke a constitutional privilege to 
protect their past deliberations, the decision broadens even 
further the range of individuals who may invoke constitutional 
privileges.  If an individual who no longer even serves in an 
official capacity may invoke a constitutional privilege, by 
extension should not a sitting constitutional officer—the Vice 
President—be all the more able to do so?
   
121
Lest it be overlooked, the Court also relied in part on 
structural reasoning in supporting its decision.
   
122
b. In re Sealed Case (Espy) 
  
In 1997, the D.C. Circuit issued an important ruling 
involving executive privilege in In re Sealed Case.123  In that 
decision, involving an independent counsel office’s investigation 
of Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy, the court decided that the 
independent counsel could have access to materials stemming 
from a White House Counsel Office’s investigation of the 
secretary.124
 
117 433 U.S. 425 (1977). 
  The court did not accept the President’s invocation 
of executive privilege in this instance, but it did further refine 
118 See id. at 446–55. 
119 See id. at 439. 
120 See id. at 451. 
121 Cf. infra Part VI.L.3 (discussing a 2001 executive order—since repealed—
that seemed to recognize authority for a Vice President or former Vice President to 
invoke a constitutional privilege).   
122 Nixon II, 433 U.S. at 447–48. 
123 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
124 See id. at 734.  
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the doctrine.  The court reasoned that the authority to withhold 
information was divided between the “presidential 
communications privilege” and the “deliberative process 
privilege.”125  Presidential communications privilege, the court 
explained, is a constitutional principle involving materials 
prepared by the President’s closest advisers,126 involving “final 
and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones.”127  
This privilege, the court concluded, is nonetheless a qualified 
one.128
“Deliberative process privilege,” on the other hand, is akin to 
a common-law privilege.
  Thus, by reiterating the uniqueness of the President’s 
constitutional role when discussing the constitutional 
presidential communications privilege, In re Sealed Case does not 
envision executive privilege extending far enough to permit the 
Vice President to invoke this doctrine.   
129  It “protects the deliberations and 
decisionmaking process of executive officials generally”130 and is 
limited to pre-decisional materials.131
 
125 See id. at 737–40, 742–57. 
  By acknowledging a 
deliberative process privilege, the court appeared to recognize a 
broadening of the scope of executive privilege to include 
communications outside of those directly involving the President 
even if the court cautioned that deliberative process privilege was 
easier to overcome.  That apparent expansion of executive 
privilege to include the deliberative process undertaken by 
executive branch officials does not involve the question of VPP, 
however.  VPP concerns whether the Vice President holds his 
own constitutional privilege, not whether he may hold a common 
law privilege akin to that of a Cabinet secretary.   
126 See id. at 752 (“[C]ommunications made by presidential advisers in the 
course of preparing advice for the President come under the presidential 
communications privilege, even when these communications are not made directly to 
the President. . . . In particular, the privilege should not extend to staff outside the 
White House in executive branch agencies.”).   
127 Id. at 745. 
128 See id.   
129 In this regard, the court indicated that such a privilege “allows the 
government to withhold documents and other materials that would reveal ‘advisory 
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which 
governmental decisions and policies are formulated.’ . . . [I]t originated as a common 
law privilege . . . [and requires that] the material[s] must be predecisional 
and . . . deliberative.” Id. at 737. The “privilege is a qualified [one] . . . and can be 
overcome by a sufficient showing of need.” Id. 
130 Id. at 735. 
131 See id. at 745. 
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c. In re Sealed Case (Secret Service) 
In yet another decision formally titled In re Sealed Case and 
again involving privilege during the Clinton administration, the 
courts had occasion to evaluate the merits of a purported 
“protective function privilege.”  The question in this case centered 
around whether a “protective function privilege” could be invoked 
by the Secretary of Treasury owing to the Secretary’s oversight of 
the secret service detail protecting the President.132  The Clinton 
administration asserted that this privilege could be invoked 
independently of the President and, once asserted, would shield 
secret service agents from testifying about any presidential 
conversations and activities they had seen or overheard.133
The D.C. Circuit rejected this claim.
  
134  In dismissing this 
novel assertion of privilege, the court followed reasoning that 
prima facie would seem to cast some doubt on the notion of VPP.  
The court stated that “the efficacy of the privilege is undermined 
by its being vested in the Secretary of the Treasury and not in 
the President, whose conduct the proposed privilege is supposed 
to influence; we know of no other privilege that works that 
way.”135
While eliminating the notion of vice presidential executive 
privilege, the court’s reasoning does not undercut VPP.  VPP, 
after all, is not a subset of executive privilege.  It is the Vice 
President’s privilege based on the Vice President’s constitutional 
powers.  The Secretary is not a constitutional officer.  Further, 
unlike the Secretary, the Vice President is not exclusively a part 
of the executive branch.  The latter’s invocation of VPP would 
stem from the Constitution, not from presidential delegation, 
statute, or common law.  Further, the Secretary had argued that 
he had to protect the communications of a constitutional officer—
the President; VPP involves the constitutional officer protecting 
his own conversations.   
  By clearly rejecting the notion that another executive 
branch official could assert this privilege, the D.C. Circuit 
appeared to undercut the notion that the Vice President could 
exercise a privilege independent from that of the President. 
 
132 See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
133 See id. at 1077. 
134 See id. at 1078–79. 
135 See id. at 1077 (emphasis added). 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
460 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:423   
C. Executive Privilege Policies 
Although little hint of executive privilege can be gleaned 
from the Constitutional Convention, the debates over ratification, 
as well as early practice, indicate that it was generally 
understood in the late eighteenth century that the President 
could withhold certain information from the public and even from 
Congress, particularly in the realm of foreign and military 
affairs.136
Past practice
  Nowhere does it seem that there was any indication 
that the Vice President might have similar needs.   
137 indicates that what is now called executive 
privilege was not an alien concept during the early years of the 
Constitution.  Ultimately, during the 1790s, an implicit 
recognition of the authority of the President to withhold certain 
information from Congress138 and the public was established; at 
the same time, Congress’s parallel authority to investigate the 
executive branch was also acknowledged.139
 
136 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 356 (Alexander Hamilton) (Garry Wills 
ed., 1982); HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 9, 30, 32–33, 117, 128; THE FEDERALIST NO. 
64, at 327 (John Jay) (Garry Wills ed., 1982). Such sentiments were not uniform 
among the Framers, however. See 2 ELLIOT, supra note 28, at 480 (quoting James 
Wilson during the Pennsylvania ratifying convention); 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 385 ((Max Farrand & David Matteson eds., rev. 
ed. 1966) (quoting Charles Pinckney in the U.S. Senate in 1800); cf. ABRAHAM D. 
SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS 396–97 
n.212 (1976). 
  
The Vice President plays no constitutional role of his own in foreign or military 
affairs. He, however, may have responsibilities in these areas delegated to him by 
the President and delegated to him by statute, but those are by definition not 
reflective of his own constitutional authority. See, e.g., 3 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). See 
generally PAUL KENGOR, WREATH LAYER OR POLICY PLAYER?: THE VICE PRESIDENT’S 
ROLE IN FOREIGN POLICY (2000); JACK LECHELT, THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN FOREIGN 
POLICY (2009). 
137 Custom is often accorded great respect by the courts in determining the 
constitutionality of an action. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 
(1989) (“ ‘[T]raditional ways of conducting government . . . give meaning’ to the 
Constitution.” (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 
U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring))); Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. 579, 610–
11 (1952) (“It is an inadmissibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to 
confine it to the words of the Constitution and to disregard the gloss which life has 
written upon them. In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long 
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in 
by Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were 
such exercise of power part of the structure of our government, may be treated as a 
gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
138 See, e.g., HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 9, 117, 128; SOFAER, supra note 136, at 
81–88. 
139 See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 6, at 10–11, 13–14, 30–39.   
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It is worth noting that on occasion President Washington 
requested advice on policy matters from Vice President John 
Adams.140  During one of these consultations, the question of 
secrecy arose, but it was Washington, not Adams, who raised the 
issue.  The President wrote to the Vice President that “I would 
thank you for giving the papers herewith sent a perusal . . . .  
None but the heads of department [sic] are privy to these papers, 
which I pray may be returned this evening or in the morning.”141  
There seems no acknowledgement that the Vice President 
himself enjoyed any right of confidentiality over the 
documents.142
Later in his administration, Washington became embroiled 
in a conflict over information with the House regarding 
documents related to the Jay Treaty.  During a subsequent 
debate over whether treaty materials should be disclosed to the 
House of Representatives, Vice President Adams acknowledged 
to his wife the lower chamber’s authority to call for the 
documents.  He wrote: 
   
I cannot deny the Right of the H. to ask for Papers, nor to 
express their opinions upon the Merits of a Treaty.  My Ideas 
are very high of the Rights and Powers of the H. of R.  These 
Powers may be abused and in this instance there is great 
danger that they will be.143
 
140 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE 
FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789–1801, at 240 n.10 (1997) (noting that President 
Washington consulted with Vice President Adams on at least three occasions).  
   
141 Letter from George Washington, President, U.S., to John Adams, Vice 
President, U.S. (Jan. 8, 1794), in 8 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 515 (Charles 
Francis Adams ed., 1853). The documents likely discussed the actions of French 
envoy Edmond Charles Genet’s attempts to recruit U.S. citizens for a filibustering 
operation in Florida. See id. at 515 n.2. 
142 Indeed, the definitive work on governmental secrecy in the Federalist period 
makes no reference to either Vice President Adams or Vice President Jefferson 
raising a question of vice presidential privilege. See LINDA DUDIK GUERRERO, JOHN 
ADAMS’ VICE PRESIDENCY, 1789–1797: THE NEGLECTED MAN IN THE FORGOTTEN 
Office 104 (1982). Harry C. Thompson, The Second Place in Rome: John Adams as 
Vice President, 10 PRES. STUD. Q. 171 (1980). See generally HOFFMAN, supra note 6.  
143 Letter from John Adams, Vice President, U.S., to Abigail Adams, wife (July 
19, 1796), available at http://www.masshist.org/digitaladams/aea/cfm/ 
doc.cfm?id=L17960419ja. At least early in his career, Adams seemed to be favorably 
disposed toward limited secrecy in government. See, e.g., BRUCE P. MONTGOMERY, 
THE BUSH-CHENEY ADMINISTRATION’S ASSAULT ON OPEN GOVERNMENT xii (2008) 
(“ ‘Liberty . . . cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, 
who have a right, from the frame of their nature, to knowledge . . . and a desire to 
know; but besides this, they have a right, an indisputable, undeniable, indefensible, 
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It seems doubtful Adams would have felt the President would 
have had to turn over such sensitive materials to the House, but 
at the same time, he would not have had to do the same should a 
comparable issue have arisen involving vice presidential 
authority.   
Of course, Vice President Adams spent the overwhelming 
portion of his time presiding over the Senate, which was the 
predominant role for the officeholder at the time.  For the first 
five years of the Senate’s existence, its proceedings were closed to 
the general public.144  In this respect, the Vice President 
participated in secret deliberations but cannot be said to have 
exercised what amounted to a vice presidential privilege.145  His 
successor, Thomas Jefferson, however, played a minor role in 
matters involving Senate secrecy.  He voted to break a tie and 
defeat a proposed Senate rule that would have imposed secrecy 
obligations on Senators when debating treaties.146
As far as the development of executive privilege, precedents 
beginning in the Washington administration were built upon 
over time.  Gradually, assertions of the executive branch’s 
perceived need to withhold information became a more common 
occurrence.  Following the New Deal and World War II, as the 
federal bureaucracy grew larger and as the amount of 
information collected by the national government increased, the 
need for policies regularizing disclosure of executive branch 
information became an increasingly pressing matter.  During 
this time, Presidents began issuing formal policies on executive 
privilege.  What is particularly noteworthy is that none of these 
policies makes any reference to the Vice President possessing 
executive privilege.  Instead, the policies almost uniformly reflect 
that the power to invoke executive privilege lies with the 
President alone.   
  Again, this 
action seems inconsistent with Vice Presidents having their own 
privilege.   
 
divine right to that most dreaded and envied kind of knowledge, I mean, of the 
characters and conduct of their rulers.’ ” (quoting Adams in 1765)). 
144 See, e.g., ROY SWANSTROM, THE UNITED STATES SENATE: 1787–1801: A 
DISSERTATION ON THE FIRST FOURTEEN YEARS OF THE UPPER LEGISLATIVE BODY 
238 (1988).    
145 Some have speculated that Adams may have contributed to the Senate’s 
decision during its early years to conduct its business in private. See HOFFMAN, 
supra note 6, at 56–57. Compare id., with note 143 and accompanying text. 
146 See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 214–15. 
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In response to a congressional inquiry on his policy 
regarding executive privilege, President Kennedy wrote that the 
doctrine “can be invoked only by the president and will not be 
used without specific presidential approval.”147  President 
Johnson, consistent with the example of his predecessor, stated 
that during his administration “the claim of ‘executive privilege’ 
will continue to be made only by the president.”148  In an internal 
memorandum dated March 24, 1969, his successor, President 
Nixon wrote in similar fashion:  “Executive privilege will not be 
used without specific Presidential approval.”149  President Nixon 
replied to a House inquiry on April 7, 1969, by commenting:  
“Under this Administration, executive privilege will not be 
asserted without specific Presidential approval.”150  Professor 
Mark Rozell notes, however, that both the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations acted counter to their stated guidance in this 
regard.151  President Nixon also seems to have violated his own 
policy in this respect.152  Notably, none of these anomalies 
involved the Vice President.153
 
147 ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 47. 
   
148 Id.   
149 Id. at 64.    
150 Id.; see also Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Information by the 
Executive, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 438 (1971) [hereinafter Executive Privilege Hearing] 
(“Senator ERVIN. . . . ‘It is your view that the question of invoking the executive 
privilege is a question to be answered by the President himself rather than by some 
subordinate in the executive branch of the Government?’ Mr. REHNQUIST. 
‘Unquestionably.’ ” (quoting an exchange between Senator Sam Ervin and then-
Assistant Attorney General William H. Rehnquist)).  
151 See, e.g., ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 46–48; cf. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON 
SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., REFUSALS 
BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PROVIDE INFORMATION TO THE CONGRESS: 1964–
1973 (1974) [hereinafter REFUSALS]. 
152 See, e.g., ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 66–67. For instance, Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird declined to provide the Senate Foreign Relations Committee with the 
“Pentagon Papers.” See JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE: A STUDY OF 
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 194 (1976). Efforts to withhold information by 
those in the Nixon administration other than the President led to several ultimately 
unsuccessful efforts to legislate that only the President could invoke executive 
privilege. See ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 58. 
153 See REFUSALS, supra note 151, at 17–52. President Johnson’s Vice President, 
Hubert Humphrey, and Nixon’s Vice President, Spiro Agnew, both made serious 
soundings about the Vice President enjoying a constitutional privilege but both 
stopped short of making formal invocations. See infra Part VI.E–F.  
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While inquiries were made of President Ford about his views 
on executive privilege, he apparently did not reply.154  President 
Carter seemed to adopt Ford’s approach and did not formally 
communicate his executive privilege policy to Congress.155  
Carter’s staff, however, made informal representations, the 
substance of which mirrored the formal policies issued by 
Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon156: “[O]nly the president is 
authorized to invoke a claim of ‘executive privilege.’ ”157  In 1980, 
White House counsel Lloyd Cutler laid out internal guidance on 
the invocation of executive privilege within the executive office of 
the President.158  That document indicated that the President 
alone could waive executive privilege regarding materials sought 
by outside parties.159
Reagan’s posture with respect to the ultimate authority 
regarding invocation of executive privilege was little different 
from those of Carter, Nixon, Johnson, and Kennedy.  Anytime the 
doctrine was to be asserted, the President would make the 
decision and Congress would be notified “that the claim of 




President George H.W. Bush never replied to congressional 
inquiries regarding his stance on executive privilege.
 
161  
Nonetheless, practice during his presidency seems to have 
reaffirmed the policies of his predecessors.  During the Bush 
administration, the Department of Education (“ED”) became 
embroiled in a conflict with a congressional committee over 
documents.162  Without the President’s blessing, the DOJ urged 
the ED to invoke executive privilege on its own.163  The 
administration blinked in the face of strong political pressure 
and backed away from asserting privilege.164
 
154 See ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 85. 
  The ED precedent 
for the need for the President to provide his personal approval for 
155 See id. at 98–99. 
156 See id. 
157 Id. at 99.  
158 See id. at 100–01.   
159 See id. at 101. 
160 ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 95. 
161 See id. at 108. 
162 See id. at 113–14. 
163 See id. at 114. 
164 See id. at 114–15. 
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executive privilege was further underscored when President 
Bush later asserted executive privilege himself over materials 
involved with a Navy aircraft system.165
The Clinton administration adopted a policy on the 
invocation of executive privilege that was very much in keeping 
with those of earlier administrations.  Clinton’s White House 
counsel stated in a memorandum:  “Executive privilege belongs 
to the President, not individual departments or agencies.”
 
166
Clinton’s successor, George W. Bush, never issued a formal 
policy on the doctrine.  His administration claimed privilege on a 
handful of occasions and at times came close to invoking a vice 
presidential privilege of sorts but never actually did so.
   
167
In sum, no presidential policy statement has ever 
acknowledged that a Vice President may invoke executive 
privilege.  Moreover, as a matter of practice, no President has 
ever deviated from his own executive privilege policy to permit 
the Vice President to make such a claim.  That has been the case 
even as Vice Presidents have steadily gained in stature and 
influence during the past several decades.  Perhaps it also 
warrants mention that Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and 
George H.W. Bush were all former Vice Presidents and 
presumably were somewhat sensitized to the needs of the 
position.  None of them as President made any special allowances 
for the Vice President to invoke executive privilege. 
 
D. Prominent Authorities on the Exclusiveness of the President 
Invoking Executive Privilege 
The preceding discussion reflects that the longstanding 
executive branch position has been that only the President, or 
former President, may invoke executive privilege.  This 
conclusion is one that has been embraced in lower courts, in the 
halls of Congress and by prominent commentators.   
No less than Chief Justice John Marshall, while riding 
circuit, implied that executive privilege must be invoked by the 
President himself.168
 
165 See id. at 115–16. 
  In United States v. Burr, he wrote: 
166 See id. at 124. 
167 See infra Part VI.L; cf. infra Part VI.L.3 (discussing an executive order that 
implied a form of vice presidential privilege).   
168 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 187, 191–92 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). The view 
that only the President may invoke executive privilege has not been embraced with 
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[M]uch reliance must be placed on the declaration of the 
president; and I do think that a privilege does exist to withhold 
private letters of a certain description.  The reason is this: 
Letters to the president in his private character, are often 
written to him in consequence of his public character, and may 
relate to public concerns.  Such a letter, though it be a private 
one, seems to partake of the character of an official paper, and 
to be such as ought not on light ground to be forced into public 
view. . . .  The president may himself state the particular 
reasons which may have induced him to withhold a paper, and 
the court would unquestionably allow their full force to those 
reasons.169
Marshall went on to state:  “The propriety of withholding it [the 




The former Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, George 
MacKinnon, espoused the same view in a concurring opinion in a 
case on executive privilege.
 
171  In Senate Select Committee v. 
Nixon, he wrote that “the President, as distinct from the executive 
establishment generally, possesses a constitutionally founded 
privilege enabling him to protect the confidentiality of 
conferences with his advisors.”172  Three decades later, the D.C. 
Circuit in Judicial Watch v. Department of Justice observed that 
“[u]nlike the deliberative process privilege, which is a general 
privilege that applies to all executive branch officials, the 
presidential communications privilege is specific to the 
President.”173
In the early 1970s, during debate over executive privilege, 
members of Congress expressed misgivings about executive 
branch officials other than the President exercising what 
   
 
respect to military secrets or state secrets privilege within government agencies. Cf. 
United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10–11 n.26 (1953). In these instances, 
department or agency heads may invoke this nonconstitutional privilege. See id. at 4 
(quoting the Air Force’s determination that release of information would not be in 
the public interest). 
169 Burr, 25 F. Cas. at 192 (emphasis added). 
170 Id. (emphasis added). 
171 Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 
725, 733 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, C.J., concurring); see also In re Cheney, 334 
F.3d 1096, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Randolph, J., dissenting) (“If executive privilege is 
to be asserted, it therefore appears that the President must make the decision.”), 
vacated and remanded by Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 293 (2004). 
172 498 F.2d at 733 (emphasis added). 
173 365 F.3d 1108, 1113–14 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
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amounted to executive privilege.174  For example, Representative 
William S. Moorhead concluded that a “witness such as Dr. 
Kissinger does not personally have an executive privilege.  It is 
only the President who enjoys and can invoke this privilege.”175
Commentators have expressed the same view.  Professor 
Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, in his thoughtful book on the 
subject, aptly concluded that “executive privilege should be 
invoked only personally by a president.  It should be called the 
Executive privilege—with a capital E—and not be used as a 
recourse to privilege generally.”
 
176  Professor Breckenridge 
asserted that Presidents could withhold information for certain 
reasons “but presumably only if asserted personally by the 
president on a case-by-case basis.”177  Professor Rozell, perhaps 
the preeminent authority in the field of executive privilege, 
echoes Breckenridge’s views.  He has written that “the common 
standard for years has been that presidents alone have the 
authority to either assert executive privilege or direct an 
administration official to do so.”178
As noted throughout this subsection, the view that only the 
President may assert executive privilege has been borne out by 
executive privilege policies through the years.  The Supreme 
Court has seen fit to extend this principle only to former 
Presidents.  If only the President, or former President, may 
invoke executive privilege, then by definition that would preclude 
the Vice President from exercising the same privilege, preventing 
him from exercising a constitutional privilege with respect to his 
 
 
174 See ROZELL I, supra note 6, at 67.   
175 BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 6, at 97. Legislative opposition to having 
executive branch officials other than the President invoke what amounted to 
executive privilege can be traced back to the 1790s. See HOFFMAN, supra note 6, at 
122–23.   
176 BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 6, at 155. Other authorities have taken a similar 
view. See, e.g., REFUSALS, supra note 151, at 7 (“[T]he only person who can invoke 
Executive privilege in the formal sense of the word is the President of the United 
States.” (quoting William Bundy)); HAROLD J. KRENT, PRESIDENTIAL POWERS 183 
(2005) (“[T]he president personally must invoke executive privilege—the decision 
cannot be delegated.”); KURLAND, supra note 6, at 42 (“It was generally agreed at the 
1971 [Senate Judiciary Subcommittee] hearings [on executive privilege] . . . that, 
whatever the scope of executive privilege . . . it was a privilege personal to the 
President and could be asserted only by him.”); 1 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 776 n.40 (3d ed. 2000) (“[T]he asserted privilege is the 
President’s and could be invoked only by him.”); supra note 12.   
177 BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 6, at 57 (emphasis added). 
178 ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 155. 
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executive branch activities as delegated to him by the President 
or by statute.  Such a restriction would not, of course, limit the 
Vice President in exercising a privilege so long as it concerns his 
own constitutional powers.   
III. LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE 
Much as the President as a constitutional officer may invoke 
a privilege to protect the confidentiality of his communications 
when exercising his duties, members of the legislative branch 
may do the same.179  The authority of the President and federal 
lawmakers to invoke such a privilege would seem to reinforce the 
structural notion that the Vice President in his admittedly 
limited constitutional duties would be able to invoke his own 
privilege.  Moreover, the Vice President himself should be able to 
assert legislative privilege to the extent he is carrying out his 
legislative branch duties.180
 
179 For authorities discussing the confidentiality of intra-legislative branch 
communication, see, for example, Amar, supra note 91 (“Senators must be free to 
talk candidly with colleagues and staff in cloakrooms.”); Jennifer Yachnin, Hurdles 
Confront Visclosky Probe, ROLL CALL, June 2, 2009 (“ ‘Those probing the 
Congressman will not be able to get close to his discussion about legislation or 
appropriations.’ ” (quoting former House general counsel Charles Tiefer); id. (“ ‘One 
thing I think is pretty clear is the internal deliberations about earmarks inside the 
Congress, between the staff and the Member or the committee and the Member, I 
think are clearly protected.’ ” (quoting former House general counsel Stanley 
Brand)). But cf. United States v. Myers, 692 F.2d 823, 860 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[Former 
Representative] Thompson claims that the Speech or Debate Clause bars the 
introduction into evidence of his private conversations with Congressman Murtha on 
the floor of the House of Representatives, in which he invited Murtha to join the 
ranks of those accepting bribes. One would think that a Congressman, even when 
grasping for objections to a criminal conviction, would understand that the Speech or 
Debate Clause accords immunity to what is said on the House floor in the course of 
the legislative process not to whispered solicitations to commit a crime.” (citations 
omitted)). For a historical treatment of legislative privilege, see generally Cox, supra 
note 6, at 1393–95; David Kaye, Congressional Papers and Judicial Subpoenas, 23 
UCLA L. REV. 57 (1975). 
  
180 The Vice President may exercise legislative privilege—as opposed to 
executive privilege—because the former privilege is not unique to a single 
constitutional officer. Any member of Congress may invoke the privilege. Moreover, 
it is not contingent upon approval of either or both houses of Congress. See United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972) (“[T]he Speech or Debate 
Clause . . . [was written] to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring 
the independence of individual legislators.” (emphasis added)); id. at 524 (“[T]he 
purpose of the Speech or Debate Clause is to protect the individual legislator.”); 
Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 621–22 (1972) (“[T]he privilege 
applicable . . . is viewed, as it must be, as the privilege of the Senator, and invocable 
only by the Senator or by the aide on the Senator’s behalf.”); In re Grand Jury 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 469 
Whereas executive privilege is not spelled out clearly in 
constitutional text, legislative privilege has a plausible textual 
basis: the Speech or Debate Clause.181  Not only does the Speech 
or Debate Clause supply potential textual support for members of 
Congress to exercise a constitutional privilege, but courts have 
also applied structural considerations and past practice to the 
question of whether there is a privilege for lawmakers.  In so 
doing the courts recognized what in this Article will be called 
“generalized legislative privilege.”182
 
Investigation, 587 F.2d 589, 593 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that the Speech or Debate 
“privilege, although of great institutional interest to the House as a whole, is also 
personal to each member”); see also Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 (1808) (“[T]he 
privilege secured by it is not so much the privilege of the House as an organized 
body, as of each individual member composing it, who is entitled to this privilege, 
even against the declared will of the house . . . . [The lawmaker] derives [the 
privilege] from the will of the people, expressed in the constitution . . . Of these 
privileges, thus secured to each member, he cannot be deprived, by a resolve of the 
house or by an act of the legislature.”); Robert J. Reinstein & Harvey A. Silverglate, 
Legislative Privilege and the Separation of Powers, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 1169–70 
(1973) (“[T]he privilege is guaranteed to each member [of Congress] personally, and 
its constitutional protection is not subject to collective discretion.”). On the other 
hand, the Vice President may not exercise executive privilege since that authority is 
unique to the President and only the President may assert it. See supra Part II.C–D. 
 
181 See, e.g., David Kaye, Congressional Papers, Judicial Subpoenas, and the 
Constitution, 24 UCLA L. REV. 523, 579 (1977) (“Where speech or debate would be 
brought into question by compliance with a subpoena, the Constitution leaves it to 
Congress to decide whether secrecy is in the public interest.”); id. at 572 (“[T]he 
speech or debate clause privileges Congress from judicial discovery of those papers 
that document or describe ‘legitimate legislative activity.’ ”); Note, Evidentiary 
Implications of the Speech or Debate Clause, 88 YALE L.J. 1280, 1286 n.30 (1979) 
(“The speech or debate clause’s evidentiary privilege insulates the legislative process 
by providing both a limited guarantee of confidentiality and an exclusionary rule.”). 
Other constitutional provisions such as the Arrest Clause, the Publication Clause, 
and Congress’s authority over its own rules could also be read as supplying 
authority to Congress to withhold documents from the other branches. See Kaye, 
supra, at 525–46. These textual provisions, however, are much more difficult to link 
to legislative privilege, as defined in this Article. For example, the privilege of 
freedom from arrest has been construed narrowly by the courts. See, e.g., Brewster, 
408 U.S. at 520–21. One noted authority in the area of legislative privilege has 
rejected not only the Arrest Clause as a legitimate basis for legislative privilege but 
also the Publication Clause. See Kaye, supra, at 526–46. Congress’s constitutional 
power to make its own internal rules gives each body authority to compel its 
members to keep information secret. Execution of this aspect of legislative 
confidentiality is unlike that derived from the Speech or Debate Clause privilege or 
the generalized legislative privilege, since rulemaking authority is contingent on 
actions taken by the chamber as a whole whereas the latter two privileges are 
invoked by individual members. See supra note 180. 
182 See infra Part III.B.   
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A. The Speech or Debate Clause as a Constitutional Privilege 
The Constitution provides that regarding “Senators and 
Representatives . . . for any Speech or Debate in either House, 
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.”183  Courts have 
interpreted the clause broadly to include an absolute 
constitutional privilege permitting members of Congress to 
withhold certain information from the public.184
The intent behind the Speech or Debate Clause was to 
protect the House and Senate from encroachment by the other 
branches.
   
185  The Supreme Court has noted that “the privilege 
has been recognized as an important protection of the 
independence and integrity of the legislature.”186  While the 
“heart of the Clause is speech or debate in either House,” other 
legislative actions may receive the Clause’s protection if they 
constitute “an integral part of the deliberative and 
communicative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceedings with respect to the 
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or 
with respect to other matters which the Constitution places 
within the jurisdiction of either House.”187
That said, in United States v. Brewster, involving whether an 
investigation could be made into activities peripheral to the 
legislative function, the Court cautioned that the provision was 
“not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or 
   
 
183 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. 
184 See, e.g., United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420 (D.C. 
Cir. 1995) (“permit[ting] Congress to insist on the confidentiality of [its] 
investigative files”); United States v. Ehrlichman, 389 F. Supp. 95, 97–98 (D.D.C. 
1974) (“[S]ince the requested transcript [of the committee hearing] would reveal the 
deliberative and communicative processes by which Members participate in 
committee and House proceedings . . . judicial efforts to compel production of that 
document would, under the present circumstances, also violate the Speech and [sic] 
Debate Clause . . . . That provision clearly prohibits the Court from forcing the 
Chairman of the Subcommittee or the Speaker to . . . be required to produce at trial 
the official record of that testimony or to put the issue to a vote of the full House.” 
(internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted)); cf. Minpeco S.A. v. 
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 844 F.2d 856, 859–61 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Kaye, supra 
note 181, at 552 n.130. But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 587 F.2d at 597.   
185 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 181 (1966) (stating that the 
purpose of the Clause was to “prevent intimidation of legislators by the executive 
and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary”). 
186 Id. at 178. 
187 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 624–25 (1972). 
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private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the 
integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence 
of individual legislators.”188  While the scope of the Clause “does 
not prohibit inquiry into activities that are casually or 
incidentally related to legislative affairs,”189 the Court elsewhere 
has indicated it does restrict investigation into “[c]ommittee 
reports, resolutions, and the act of voting . . . [as well as] ‘things 
generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in 
relation to the business before it.’ ”190
In United States v. Johnson,
  Acts of voting would 
certainly implicate the Vice President’s legislative duties since he 
has the authority to break tie votes in the Senate. 
191 the issue arose as to whether 
the government could ask a former member of Congress to 
discuss a speech he gave on the House floor and the motivation 
behind it.  The Court concluded that “such an intensive judicial 
inquiry, made in the course of a prosecution by the Executive 
Branch . . . violates the express language of the Constitution.”192
In his dissenting opinion in Nixon II, Chief Justice Burger 
tied the Speech or Debate Clause to a constitutional privilege.  
He reasoned that 
  
Moreover, as in Nixon II, the Court in Johnson interpreted the 
Constitution in such a manner as to permit a former 
constitutional officer to invoke a privilege.  As noted earlier, if a 
former constitutional officer may invoke such a privilege, it 
would seem a fortiori that a sitting constitutional officer—the 
Vice President—ought to be able to do the same.   
[t]he Constitution . . . expressly grants immunity to Members of 
Congress as to any “Speech or Debate in either House . . .”; yet 
the Court has refused to confine that Clause literally “to words 
spoken in debate.” . . .  Congressional papers . . . have been held 
protected by the Clause in order “to prevent intimidation (of 
legislators) by the executive and accountability before a possibly 
hostile judiciary.”193
 
188 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). 
 
189 Id. at 528. 
190 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (quoting Kilbourn v. 
Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)). 
191 383 U.S. 169. 
192 Id. at 177. 
193 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 511 (1977) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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The Chief Justice noted that “[d]espite the Constitution’s silence 
as to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court [has] had 
no difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by 
other branches.”194  In addition to relying on the Speech or 
Debate Clause to support legislative privilege, Burger also noted 
the importance of structural comparisons to the privileges 
enjoyed by the magisterial branches of government.  He wrote 
that the “independence of the three branches of Government, 
including control over the papers of each, lies at the heart of this 
Court’s broad holdings concerning the immunity of congressional 
papers from outside scrutiny.”195
In Nixon v. Sirica,
 
196 in a per curiam opinion, the D.C. 
Circuit also endorsed the Speech or Debate Clause as conferring 
a constitutional privilege.  As with Burger’s dissenting opinion in 
Nixon II, the court in Sirica reinforced its position on legislative 
privilege by placing it in the context of the privileges relied upon 
by the other branches.  The court stated that “[executive] 
privilege, intended to protect the effectiveness of the executive 
decision-making process, is analogous to that between a 
congressman and his aides under the Speech and [sic] Debate 
Clause; to that among judges, and between judges and their law 
clerks.”197
The very next year, in considering whether a Senate 
committee’s subpoena duces tecum could overcome a presidential 
assertion of privilege, the D.C. Circuit again analogized executive 
privilege to the privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause.  In 
Senate Select Committee v. Nixon, the court quoted Sirica with 
approval:  “We recognized this great public interest, analogizing 
the privilege, on the basis of its purpose, ‘to that between a 
congressman and his aides under the Speech and [sic] Debate 
Clause; to that among judges, and between judges and their law 
clerks’ . . . .”
   
198




194 Id. at 515 n.9. 
 the issue of a constitutional 
privilege derived from the Speech or Debate Clause arose in a 
more concrete fashion.  In this case, a former Nixon aide tried to 
195 Id. at 510–11. 
196 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam). 
197 Id. at 717. 
198 498 F.2d 725, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (quoting Sirica, 487 F.2d at 717). 
199 542 F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
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subpoena the testimony of witnesses who had appeared during 
an executive session of the House Armed Services Committee.200  
The House refused to provide the materials.201  In response, the 
lower court concluded that it could not direct the House 
committee to provide the documents.202  On appeal, the D.C. 
Circuit took pains to avoid the privilege issue.  It wrote that “[w]e 
need not . . . indulge in any discussion as to whether . . . [the 
congressman’s] response constituted a claim of privilege 
under . . . Art. I, Sec. 5, Cl. 3 and under the Speech or Debate 
Clause . . . or under the House Rules which prohibit production of 
executive session testimony except upon affirmative vote of the 
Committee or the House.”203  The court noted that the “specter of 
an academic discussion giving rise to a possible future conflict 
between co-equal branches of the government is both 
unappealing and inappropriate under the existing 
circumstances.”204  Instead, the court determined that the 
House’s failure to produce the subpoenaed documents was not 
prejudicial to the aide’s defense.205
Of particular note regarding Speech or Debate privilege is 
the 2007 D.C. Circuit decision, United States v. Rayburn House 
Office Building.
 
206  In this case, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (“FBI”) executed a search warrant for the office of 
Representative William Jefferson without providing advance 
notice to him or other congressional authorities.207  The FBI 
intended to use the nonprivileged materials seized during the 
effort to prosecute Jefferson for bribery and racketeering.208  The 
lawmaker challenged the constitutionality of the raid, asserting 
that the Speech or Debate Clause not only provides an 
exclusionary rule with respect to evidence related to legislative 
duties, but also that such materials should be considered 
confidential and not reviewable by the executive branch.209
 
200 See id. at 82. 
   
201 See id. 
202 See id. at 82 n.19 (quoting district court Judge Gesell, who stated that 
“further proceeding to enforce the subpoenas would be futile”). 
203 Id. at 82–83. 
204 Id. at 83. 
205 See id. 
206 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
207 See id. at 657. 
208 See id. at 658. 
209 See id. at 655.   
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While Jefferson’s argument with respect to confidentiality 
was not accepted at the district court level,210 it was embraced on 
appeal by the D.C. Circuit even though the matter involved a 
criminal investigation.  The court—often considered the second 
highest judicial tribunal in the land—concluded that “[o]ur 
precedent establishes that the testimonial privilege under the 
[Speech or Debate] Clause extends to non-disclosure of written 
legislative materials.”211
exchanges between a Member of Congress and the Member’s 
staff or among Members of Congress on legislative matters may 
legitimately involve frank or embarrassing statements; the 
possibility of compelled disclosure may therefore chill the 
exchange of views with respect to legislative activity.  This chill 
runs counter to the Clause’s purpose of protecting against 
disruption of the legislative process.
  The court reasoned that  
212
Based on that premise, the court ordered Jefferson’s legislative 
papers returned to him
 
213 and concluded that the privilege 
involved was absolute.214  The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 
permitting the D.C. Circuit decision to stand.215
In reaching its decision, the D.C. Circuit adopted the same 
reasoning for Speech or Debate privilege as the Supreme Court 
had applied earlier in Nixon I with respect to executive privilege:  
Candor must be encouraged among constitutional officers and 
their staffs, and that can only be achieved by preserving the 
confidentiality of their deliberations.
   
216
 
210 See In re Search of the Rayburn House Office Bldg., 432 F. Supp. 2d 100, 112 
(D.D.C. 2006). 
  Rayburn would seem to 
211 Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 655; see also id. at 664 (“The Speech or Debate Clause 
protects against the compelled disclosure of privileged documents to agents of the 
Executive.”).    
212 Id. at 661; see also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 628–29 (1972) 
(“Because the Speech or Debate Clause privilege applies both to Senator and aide, it 
appear [sic] to us that paragraph one of the [lower court’s] order, alone, would afford 
ample protection for the privilege if it forbade questioning any 
witness . . . concerning communications between the Senator and his aides during 
the term of their employment and related to said meeting or any other legislative act 
of the Senator.”). 
213 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 666; see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. 
Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 421 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party is no more entitled to compel 
congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue 
congressmen.”).    
214 See Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660 (“The bar on compelled disclosure is absolute.”). 
215 See United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 522 U.S. 1295 (2008). 
216 For similar reasoning, see In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 571 F.3d 1200, 1208 
(D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“In some respects, the Speech or 
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protect from inquiry lawmakers’ conversations with staff, 
internal memoranda, and draft documents as they relate to 
legislative activities.  Such a conclusion can be read to provide 
support for VPP to the extent the Vice President is carrying out 
his legislative duties.217
B. Support for the Generalized Legislative Privilege 
 
In addition to justifying a constitutional privilege for 
members of Congress based on the Speech or Debate Clause, 
federal judges have also endorsed such authority for lawmakers 
on other grounds.  In these opinions, judges have concluded that 
there exists what in this Article is called the generalized 
legislative privilege;218 that is to say, members of Congress may 
claim a constitutional privilege based on structural comparisons 
to executive privilege and judicial privilege219
In his opinion in Sirica,
 or based on past 
practice. 
220
the House or the Senate itself judges and controls the extent to 
which its members and documents should be produced in courts 
and before grand juries in response to subpoenas.  Congress 
since 1787 has claimed that it has the absolute privilege to 
decide itself whether its members or employees should respond 
to subpoenas and to determine the extent of their response.  As 
 Judge MacKinnon reasoned that 
generalized legislative privilege should be recognized.  While 
concurring in part and dissenting in part, he wrote that  
 
Debate Clause is a counterpart to the executive privileges that constitute an 
essential part of the President’s ‘executive power’ under Article II.”). 
217 See infra Part VII.A.1.   
218 See Common Cause v. Bailar, Civ. No. 1887-73 (D.D.C. 1973), Order of July 
30, 1975, in REP. OF THE J. COMM’N ON CONG. OPERATIONS, COURT PROCEEDINGS 
AND ACTIONS OF VITAL INTEREST TO THE CONGRESS, 94TH CONG. 209, 211 (Comm. 
Print 1976) (“[w]e can agree that a privilege for Senatorial documents exists”); 
Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 220 (5th Cir. 1975) (concluding that, despite the 
House’s failure to release information from an executive session of a House 
committee to Lieutenant Calley, he was not deprived of his rights); cf. Kaye, supra 
note 179, at 76 (“[Congress] has come to . . . occasionally treat[ ] matters relating to 
executive sessions as inviolate.”). But cf. United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 
341, 25 F. Cas. 626, 626 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (denying that there is “any privilege to 
exempt members of Congress from the service, or the obligations, of a subpoena, in 
such cases”). For a discussion of these and related cases, see generally Kaye, supra 
note 181.    
219 See supra Part I.C.1.   
220 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 729 (MacKinnon, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
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far as I have been able to discover, that practice has never been 
successfully challenged.221
In the same case, Judge Wilkey agreed with Judge 
MacKinnon on the legitimacy of the generalized legislative 
privilege, also basing his conclusion on past practice.
 
222  In his 
dissent in Sirica, Judge Wilkey wrote that “the Legislative 
Branch has never acceded to a demand of the Judicial Branch for 
papers in any case without an assertion and preservation of 
Congressional privilege.”223  He continued by asserting that 
“similar precedents [as to access to congressional documents] in 
both Houses are ancient, numerous, and established beyond 
question in the Legislative Branch.”224  To buttress his argument, 
he quoted with approval the words of long-serving Senator John 
Stennis:  “I know of no case where the court has ever made the 
Senate or the House surrender records from its files, or where 
the Executive has made the Legislative Branch surrender 
records from its files—and I do not think either of them could. . . .  
[T]he rule works three ways.”225
In a 1977 Second Circuit case, Herbert v. Lando,
   
226
 
221 Id. at 739–40. 
 Judge 
Thomas Meskill issued a dissent, the merits of which were later 
upheld by the Supreme Court.  In so doing, he discussed 
legislative privilege within the context of governmental 
structure.  He wrote that his collegue’s concurring opinion 
222 For Judge Wilkey’s reasoning that legislative privilege can also be justified 
based on constitutional structure, see supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.   
223 Sirica, 487 F.2d at 772 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Wilkey, J., dissenting); see also 
Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1081–82 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., concurring) 
(“While the constitutional privilege has been asserted most frequently in our history 
by the executive against the demands of the legislature, yet the Congress itself has 
always recognized a privilege for its own private papers and deliberations. Not only 
is there no provision or procedure for a demand by a private citizen for access to any 
papers deemed confidential, but no court subpoena is complied with by the Congress 
or its committees without a vote of the house concerned.”).   
224 Sirica, 487 F.2d at 772–73. 
225 Id. at 773. Other prominent lawmakers have echoed Senator Stennis’s views. 
See, e.g., 108 CONG. REC. 3627 (1962) (statement of Sen. McClellan) (noting that the 
Senate may exercise a constitutional privilege since it is part of “a separate and 
distinct branch of Government”); Kaye, supra note 181, at 573 n.212 (“[T]he 
Constitution created the Congress as an independent branch of the government, 
separate from and equal to the executive and judicial branches. As a separate 
branch, it is our belief that only the Congress can direct the disclosure of legislative 
records.” (quoting Rep. Hebert)). 
226 See 568 F.2d 974, 996 (2d Cir. 1977) (Meskill, J., dissenting), rev’d, 441 U.S. 
153 (1979). 
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“appears to convert the fourth estate into an institution not 
unlike an unofficial fourth branch of government.  This fourth 
branch is given a special privilege presumably for the same 
reasons that the three official branches are given executive, 
congressional and judicial privileges.”227
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed 
the issue of lawmaker confidentiality—neither Speech or Debate 
nor generalized legislative privilege—lower federal courts, 
including the D.C. Circuit, have repeatedly recognized the 
legitimacy of such a privilege.  Admittedly, none of the cases 
discussed above mentions anything directly about the Vice 
President holding the same or similar privilege.  Nonetheless, the 
existence of legislative privilege reinforces the notion of VPP on 
two counts: (1) by analogy since he too is a constitutional officer; 
and (2) by virtue of his acting legislatively within the Senate 




C. Political Practice and Legislative Privilege 
  
Legislative privilege is also supported by custom.  For 
example, the Senate or the House must pass a unicameral 
resolution before the chamber in question can provide committee 




228 See infra Part VII.A.1. 
229 For examples of such assertions of legislative privilege, see S. RES. 333, 110th 
Cong., 153 CONG. REC. S12,156 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 2007) (enacted) (“Whereas, by the 
privileges of the Senate of the United States and Rule XI of the Standing Rules of 
the Senate, no evidence under the control or in the possession of the Senate can, by 
administrative or judicial process, be taken from such control or possession but by 
permission of the Senate . . . . That the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of 
the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, acting jointly, are authorized to provide to 
federal or state law enforcement or regulatory agencies and officials records of the 
Subcommittee’s investigation into abusive practices by the credit counseling 
industry.”); S. RES. 411, 108th Cong., 150 CONG. REC. S8,485 (daily ed. July 20, 
2004) (enacted) (stating that under the privileges of the Senate and Senate Rule XI 
“no evidence under the control or in the possession of the Senate may, by the judicial 
or administrative process, be taken from such control or possession but by 
permission of the Senate  . . . Resolved That the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the 
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, acting jointly, are authorized to provide to 
the United States Department of Justice, under appropriate security procedures, 
copies of Committee documents sought in connection with its investigation into the 
involvement of U.S. government officials in the counter-narcotics air interdiction 
program in Peru.”); S. RES. 338, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1974) (enacted) 
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There are also examples of one house of Congress declining 
outright to release legislative materials to the judiciary.  Since 
the Supreme Court places a premium on past practice when 
considering the constitutionality of an action, these political 
precedents are useful in evaluating the lawfulness of VPP.230
In 1876, members of a House committee involved with the 
impeachment of Secretary of War William Belknap were directed 
by a District of Columbia court to produce “all papers, 
documents, records, checks, and contracts in [their] 
possession.”
 
231  The matter was debated on the House floor and a 
resolution ultimately passed the chamber ordering the committee 
to ignore the court’s instructions.  It read that “the said 
committee and members thereof are hereby directed to disregard 
said mandate.”232
 
(“[N]o evidence under the control and in the possession of the Senate of the United 
States can, by the mandate of process of the ordinary courts of justice, be taken from 
such control or possession, but by its permission. . . . [But this resolution hereby 
authorizes the committee staff member in question] to furnish an affidavit [to 
Special Prosecutor Leon Jaworski about certain legislative activities, subject to 
various limitations].”); S. RES. 338, 93d Cong., 120 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1974) 
(enacted); S. RES. 307, 87th Cong., 108 CONG. REC. 3,626 (1962) (enacted) (“Senator 
John L. McClellan is granted leave in his discretion to appear at the place and before 
the court named in the subpoena duces tecum before mentioned, but shall not take 
with him any papers or documents on file in his office or under his control or in his 
possession as chairman of [a Senate subcommittee].”). For an extensive listing, see 
Senate Office of Legal Counsel, List of Resolutions Relating to Office or Senate 
Litigation Resolutions—Chronological Listing (as of Feb. 20, 2009) (on file with 
author). 
 
On the House side, see, for example, 116 CONG. REC. 37,652 (1970) (“The rules and 
practices of the House . . . indicate that no official of the House may, either 
voluntarily or in obedience to a subpoena duces tecum, produce such records without 
the consent of the House being first obtained.” (quoting a Letter to the Speaker of 
the House from the House clerk); H.R. Res. 255 & 256, 87th Cong., 107 CONG. REC. 
5851–52 (1961) (enacted) (not permitting disclosure of “confidential papers, 
documents, or files”); H.R. Res. 177, 87th Cong., 107 CONG. REC. 2481 (1961) 
(enacted) (“[I]n no circumstances shall any minutes or transcripts of executive 
sessions, or any evidence of witnesses in respect thereto, be disclosed or copied.”). 
For a historical discussion of Congress’s efforts to secure its own documents, see 
generally Kaye, supra note 179.    
The executive branch has also recognized the legitimacy of legislative privilege. See, 
e.g., Nixon Brief, supra note 116, at 357–59 (acknowledging the lawfulness of 
legislative privilege); infra note 294 and accompanying text. 
230 See, e.g., supra note 137; see also supra notes 221–25 and accompanying text 
(detailing judicial reliance on the past practice of legislative privilege). 
231 3 HINDS’, supra note 13, § 2661, at 1111–12. 
232 Id. § 2661, at 1112. During the debate, Representative Otho Singleton argued 
forcefully that “the members of a committee cannot be compelled to disclose what 
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Fifty years later, Representative Fiorello LaGuardia was 
subpoenaed to appear before a federal grand jury.233  LaGuardia 
attempted to put the question of whether he should honor the 
subpoena to the full House for its consideration.234  The chamber 
took no action, apparently declining the lawmaker’s request that 
he be allowed to appear before the tribunal.235
In 1929, Senator Coleman Blease was subpoenaed by the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to appear before a 
grand jury.
   
236  The Senator stated that he would disobey the 
subpoena.237  Without conceding the legal question, the judge 
admitted there was little the court could do to compel Blease’s 
appearance.238
Thus, political practice involving Congress’s firm control over 
its own internal documents and records bolsters the argument in 
favor of legislative privilege. 
 
D. Conclusion 
In Rayburn, the court was faced squarely with the question 
of whether a legislative privilege derived from the Speech or 
Debate Clause exists with respect to the confidentiality of 
internal congressional documents.  The D.C. Circuit ruled that 
the clause does in fact provide members of Congress with such a 
privilege, protecting the confidentiality of lawmakers’ interaction 
with their aides.  In this regard, Rayburn builds on dicta from 
opinions such as Chief Justice Burger’s dissents in Nixon II and 
New York Times and D.C. Circuit opinions such as Sirica and 
Senate Select Committee.  Additional support for a privilege for 
members of Congress is found in judicial opinions such as Judge 
MacKinnon’s opinion in Sirica, Judge Wilkey’s concurrence in 
Soucie and dissent in Sirica, and Judge Meskill’s dissent in 
Herbert.  Portions of the latter four opinions support the notion of 
legislative privilege for reasons other than the Speech or Debate 
 
took place in the committee-room.” 4 CONG. REC. 1527 (1876); see also id. at 1522, 
1528 (members referring to committee secrecy). 
233 See 6 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 586, at 825 (1935) [hereinafter CANNON’S]. 
234 See id. 
235 See id. 
236 See id. § 588, at 828; see also 72 CONG. REC. 109 (1929). 
237 See CANNON’S, supra note 233, § 588, at 828.    
238 See id. § 588, at 829 (“Unless the gentlemen see fit to obey the subpoenas, 
this court at the present time has no power to compel them to do so.”). 
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Clause.  Finally, the concept of legislative privilege is buttressed 
by past congressional practice and the acquiescence of the 
judiciary in such episodes.   
That constitutional officers under Article I may invoke a 
privilege to withhold information from the public and the courts 
would appear to provide two-pronged support for VPP.  First, 
when acting as part of the legislative branch, the Vice President 
may draw on a legislative privilege when carrying out his Article 
I duties.239
IV. JUDICIAL PRIVILEGE 
  Second, since his fellow constitutional officers may 
exercise such a privilege, by analogy, the case for the Vice 
President having his own constitutional privilege is bolstered 
accordingly. 
Much as the President and members of Congress each may 
invoke a privilege to withhold certain information from public 
view when exercising their own constitutional authority, so too 
can federal judges.240
A. The Vesting Clause of Article III 
  Because the notion of federal judges having 
authority to preserve internal confidentiality seems widely 
acknowledged, further support is lent to the structural argument 
that the Vice President as a constitutional officer himself enjoys 
a right of confidentiality in carrying out his own constitutional 
powers. 
As with executive privilege, judicial privilege lacks explicit 
textual support.  Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution 
appears the most plausible textual provision in support of 
judicial privilege.  It provides that the “judicial Power of the 
United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such 
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain 
and establish.”241
 
239 See infra Part VII.A.1. 
  That language mirrors that of Section 1 of 
Article II, which states without apparent restriction, that the 
240 It would seem doubtful that non-Article III judges would enjoy judicial 
privilege. This is because the authority exercised by, for example, an Article I judge 
is delegated legislative authority, not Article III constitutional authority. See Am. 
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (“These [Article I] courts, then, 
are not constitutional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the 
constitution on the general government, can be deposited.”). The author would like 
to thank Fred Karem for raising this issue.       
241 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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“executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”242  As discussed earlier,243 the Vesting Clause 
of Article II has been viewed by some as a textual basis for 
executive privilege.  Like that of Article II, the Vesting Clause of 
Article III is similarly free from express language of limitation244 
and would seem by analogy to provide the judiciary with similar 
implied powers, perhaps even those of judicial privilege.  
However, none of the case law or other authority involving 
judicial privilege seems to link the privilege to Article III’s 
Vesting Clause.  Thus, as with executive privilege, one must look 
elsewhere for its constitutional justification.  In this regard, 
judicial privilege—like executive privilege—is best supported by 
structural considerations.245
B. Judicial Treatment of Judicial Privilege 
 
There are numerous judicial opinions that have implicitly 
recognized the principle of judicial privilege, relying on 
constitutional structure and symmetry—to the extent a 
developed rationale was provided.246
 
242 Id. art. II, § 1. 
  The first is In re Certain 
Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Committee of 
243 See supra Part II.A. 
244 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 15, at 1175–76. 
245 See, e.g., supra Parts II–III. 
246 See Robert S. Catz & Jill J. Lange, Judicial Privilege, 22 GA. L. REV. 89, 125 
(1987) (“Clearly, the judiciary has long believed in its privilege to protect the 
confidentiality of its internal decision-making process, even from the other branches 
of government.”); id. at 120 (“[I]nsofar as is determinable, every court that has 
considered the question as a matter of dicta has concluded that conversations and 
records of federal judges and their immediate staff concerning the manner in which 
a judge conducts the judicial office are protected from compelled disclosure.”); see 
also Goetz v. Crosson, 41 F.3d 800, 805 (2d Cir. 1994) (“The inner workings of 
administrative decision making processes are almost never subject to discovery. 
Clearly, the inner workings of decision making by courts are kept in even greater 
confidence.” (citations omitted)); Catz & Lange, supra, at 117 (“My relationship with 
my law clerks is a close and confidential one. If I cannot speak freely to them, they 
cannot do their job for me. And I could not speak freely to them if I thought that my 
questions, soul-searching, and opinions would be made matters of public record . . . .” 
(quoting an anonymous judge) (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Executive 
Privilege, Secrecy in Gov’t, Freedom of Info.: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on 
Intergovernmental Relations of the Comm. on Gov’t Operations and the Subcomms. 
on Separation of Powers and Admin. Practice and Procedure of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 93d Cong. 333–42 (1973) (discussing the possible existence of a “Judicial 
Conference Privilege”). 
Like legislative privilege, judicial privilege has been under examined in the 
academic literature. One notable exception is Catz & Lange, supra, at 120–43.      
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the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit.247  This decision 
involved a federal judge, Alcee Hastings, and his employees who 
challenged the lawfulness of a subpoena duces tecum issued to 
them to provide documents pertaining to their work in 
chambers.248  The subpoena was issued by a judicial council 
created by statute to investigate alleged wrongdoing in the 
federal judiciary.249  Among the arguments made by Hastings 
and his employees was that they could not reveal such material 
since doing so would violate judicial privilege.250
While the court rejected the assertion of privilege in this 
instance, it supported the notion of judicial privilege in general.  
Citing Sirica, Senate Select Committee, and Judge Wilkey’s 
concurrence in Soucie, the court commented that “[a]lthough we 
have found no case in which a judicial privilege protecting the 
confidentiality of judicial communications has been applied, the 
probable existence of such a privilege has often been noted.”
 
251
The Eleventh Circuit also analogized judicial privilege to 
that of executive privilege.  Highlighting the familiar argument 
of the need to encourage candor in internal governmental 
decisionmaking, the court concluded that the “Supreme Court’s 
reasons for finding a qualified privilege protecting confidential 
Presidential communications in United States v. Nixon support 
the existence of a similar judicial privilege.”
   
252  The court 
continued by explaining that since Nixon I “discerned the 
constitutional foundation for the executive privilege—
notwithstanding the lack of any express provision—in the 
constitutional scheme of separation of powers and in the very 
nature of a President’s duties . . . the same must be true of the 
judiciary.”253
[j]udges, like Presidents, depend upon open and candid 
discourse with their colleagues and staff to promote the effective 
discharge of their duties.  The judiciary, no less than the 
executive, is supreme within its own area of constitutionally 
assigned duties.  Confidentiality helps protect judges’ 
  The court observed further that  
 
247 See 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). For discussion of the case, see Catz & 
Lange, supra note 246, at 128–43. 
248 See In re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1491–92. 
249 See id. at 1491.  
250 See id. at 1517–25. 
251 Id. at 1518. 
252 Id. at 1519 (citation omitted). 
253 Id. 
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independent reasoning . . . .  We conclude, therefore, that there 
exists a privilege (albeit a qualified one) protecting confidential 
communications among judges and their staffs in the 
performance of their judicial duties.254
What is noteworthy for purposes of this Article is that the court’s 
reasoning in justifying judicial privilege—analogizing it to 
executive privilege—reflects this Article’s main argument 
supporting VPP.   
 
Despite its recognition of judicial privilege in In re Certain 
Complaints, the court was careful to limit it “only to 
communications among judges and others relating to official 
judicial business such as . . . the framing and researching of 
opinions, orders, and rulings.”255  The court concluded that as a 
qualified privilege it could be overridden by a proper showing of 
need by the council.256  In this instance, the court determined 
that the council’s interest overcame the judge’s desire for 
confidentiality.257
A second decision that has relevance to the subject of judicial 
privilege is United States v. Mendoza.
 
258  In that case, a federal 
district court reviewed the constitutionality of the Feeney 
Amendment, a congressional reporting requirement mandating 
that the DOJ report to Congress when individual judges departed 
from the federal sentencing guidelines.259  The court ruled that 
this reporting requirement was unlawful.260  It reasoned that the 
“judiciary must provide a defense against attempts to usurp 
judicial independence through inappropriate controls and the 
dissemination of information that fosters distrust, 
misunderstanding, and apathy towards the function of the 
court.”261
 
254 Id. at 1519–20. 
  While not explicitly asserting a judicial privilege, the 
court, by striking down this congressional reporting requirement, 
seemed to be staking out the constitutional position that the 
255 Id. at 1520. 
256 See id. at 1521.   
257 See id. at 1525.   
258 No. 03-CR-730-ALL, 2004 WL 1191118, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2004); see 
also ELIZABETH B. BAZAN & MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF JUDGES AND JUSTICES 2–3, 30–33 (2005).     
259 See Mendoza, 2004 WL 1191118, at *1–2. 
260 See id. at *6–7; BAZAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 258; see also Douglas A. 
Kelley, Minnesota Federal Judge Caught in Constitutional Crossfire, 27 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 427, 450–51 (2004).  
261 Mendoza, 2004 WL 1191118, at *3. 
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judicial branch may not be compelled by Congress to provide 
certain information about the execution of its duties.262
In addition to these two decisions, there are also a fair 
amount of dicta supporting the view that federal judges may 
protect the confidentiality of their internal deliberations.  In 
Nixon I, the Court drew a comparison between executive 
privilege and judicial privilege.  It reasoned that  
  In this 
regard, the opinion seems to recognize judicial privilege without 
explicitly saying so. 
[t]he expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his 
conversations and correspondence, like the claim of 
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the 
values to which we accord deference for the privacy of all 
citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for 
protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even 
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking.263
Chief Justice Burger, in dissent in New York Times Co. v. 
United States, even more forcefully asserted the existence of 
judicial privilege.  He wrote that: 
 
With respect to the question of inherent power of the Executive 
to classify papers, records, and documents as secret, or 
otherwise unavailable for public exposure, and to secure aid of 
the courts for enforcement, there may be an analogy with 
respect to this Court.  No statute gives this Court express power 
to establish and enforce the utmost security measures for the 
secrecy of our deliberations and records.  Yet I have little doubt 
as to the inherent power of the Court to protect the 
 
262 Impeachment proceedings would presumably be an exception to this rule. 
House committee subpoenas issued to the judiciary as part of impeachment efforts 
against sitting judges are generally thought to be permissible. See BAZAN & 
ROSENBERG, supra note 258, at 18–19; see also KYVIG, supra note 12, at 101 (quoting 
Supreme Court Justice William Douglas who, prior to a hearing on his potential 
impeachment, permitted a House Judiciary subcommittee full access to all 
documents in his possession, “whether [they] concern[ ] Court records, 
correspondence files, financial matters or otherwise” (emphasis added)); cf. 14 
ANNALS OF CONG. 262–67 (1805) (reflecting Chief Justice Marshall’s testimony 
during the impeachment trial of Justice Chase); WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND 
INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND 
PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON 81, 84–85 (1999). 
It is also possible that judges could have judicial materials subpoenaed as part of 
their Senate confirmation hearings for higher judicial office. See BAZAN & 
ROSENBERG, supra note 258, at 7. 
263 United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (emphasis added). 
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confidentiality of its internal operations by whatever judicial 
measures may be required.264
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Justice 
William Douglas also implicitly recognized the legitimate need 
for secrecy in judicial deliberations.  In his dissent in Gravel v. 
United States, Douglas wrote that “there may be situations and 
occasions in which the right to know must yield to other 
compelling and overriding interests. . . .  [M]any deliberations in 
Government are kept confidential such as . . . our own 
Conferences, despite the fact that the breadth of public 
knowledge is thereby diminished.”
 
265
Justice John Paul Stevens, in an opinion involving a denial 
of a certiorari petition, expressed similar views.  He wrote that  
 
[t]here are those who believe that these [Supreme Court] 
Conferences should be conducted entirely in public or, at the 
very least, that the votes on all Conference matters should be 
publicly recorded.  The traditional view, which I happen to 
share, is that confidentiality makes a valuable contribution to 
the full and frank exchange of views during the decisional 
process; such confidentiality is especially valuable in the 
exercise of the kind of discretion that must be employed in 
processing the thousands of certiorari petitions that are 
reviewed each year.  In my judgment, the importance of 
preserving the tradition of confidentiality outweighs the 
minimal educational value of these opinions.266
Justice Abe Fortas took a similar view.  During his 
nomination hearing to serve as Chief Justice, Fortas explained to 
the Senate Judiciary Committee why he felt he could not discuss 
the background behind his judicial work.  He explained that 
“ ‘members of the Congress shall not be called to answer in any 
other place for their votes or statements on the floor.  And I think 





264 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).   
 
265 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 642 n.10 (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).   
266 Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 945 (1978). 
267 Hearings on Nomination of Abe Fortas, of Tenn., To Be Chief Justice of the 
U.S. and Nomination of Homer Thornberry, of Tex., To Be Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the U.S., Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 121–22 
(1968) [hereinafter Fortas Hearings]; see also id. at 100–01 (“Just as a Senator or a 
Congressman may not be called upon by courts to explain or justify his votes as a 
representative of the people, or his speeches on the floor of Congress, so a Justice of 
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Judge MacKinnon of the D.C. Circuit, while concurring in 
part and dissenting in part in Sirica, also evaluated judicial 
privilege from a structural perspective.  He wrote that, much as 
Congress can restrict information from being made public, the 
judiciary can do the same.268  He reasoned that the “judicial 
branch of our government claims a similar privilege [to that 
exercised by the Congress], grounded on an assertion of 
independence from the other branches.”269  MacKinnon noted 
that “the judicial branch asserts the same immunity from being 
compelled to respond to congressional subpoenas that past 
Presidents have asserted.”270  He concluded that its “source is 
rooted in history and gains added force from the constitutional 
separation of powers of the three departments of government.”271
In sum, while the Supreme Court has never decided the 
issue on the merits, judicial privilege has been recognized—
implicitly or otherwise—in several notable judicial opinions.  
 
C. Political Practice and Judicial Privilege 
In addition to court opinions and dicta supporting judicial 
privilege, there is also political precedent that favors the exercise 
of this authority.272  On more than one occasion members of the 
federal judiciary have had conflicts with congressional 
committees about whether they must testify.273
 
the Supreme Court may not be required, by the Senate or a Senate committee, to 
explain or justify his votes on decisions by the Court or his judicial opinions.” 
(quoting Sen. Gore); James A. Thorpe, The Appearance of Supreme Court Nominees 
Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 18 J. PUB. L. 371, 389–95 (1969). For more 
on Fortas’s testimony, see MARK SILVERSTEIN, JUDICIAL CHOICES: THE POLITICS OF 
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATIONS 22–24 (2d ed. 2007). When Fortas declined to 
discuss his conversations with President Johnson on executive branch matters, 
concerns over judicial and executive privilege seemed to converge. See Fortas 
Hearings, supra, at 167–68; see also SILVERSTEIN, supra, at 24. 
  In these 
268 See Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 739–40 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (MacKinnon, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
269 Id. at 740. 
270 Id. at 741. 
271 Id. at 740. 
272 As noted above, past practice is an important indicator of constitutionality. 
See supra note 137; cf. WIGDOR, supra note 58, at 1036 (“[T]he tradition of judicial 
secrecy . . . was firmly established by the Marshall Court.”).    
273 Sitting judges who have been nominated to higher positions within the 
federal judiciary routinely testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. This was 
not always so. Then Judge Sherman Minton of the Seventh Circuit declined to 
appear at a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing following his nomination by 
President Truman to serve on the Supreme Court. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM, 
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instances, judges have asserted what amounts to a judicial 
privilege. 
In 1953, a House Judiciary subcommittee invited Supreme 
Court Justice Tom Clark to make an appearance to discuss issues 
involving the DOJ during his service as Attorney General.274  
This effort to have a sitting Supreme Court Justice testify before 
a congressional committee was thought to be unprecedented.275  
Clark refused to appear.276
 
JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 36 (5th ed. 2008). He argued that it 
was improper for him to appear as a sitting judge. See id. Ultimately, the committee 
ignored the slight, and Minton was confirmed by the Senate. See id.; see also Thorpe, 
supra note 267, at 378–84; Text of Minton Letter to Senate Group, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 
1949, at 24. 
  In so doing, he noted to the panel 
that the “invitation involves a high principle of great importance, 
the preservation of the independence of three branches of 
Government.  As with the Executive and Legislative Branches, 
our constitutional system makes the Judiciary completely 
independent . . . [, which] is necessary for the proper 
Supreme Court Justices will also often appear voluntarily before the appropriations 
committees to defend the annual budget request for the federal judiciary, but rarely 
do so in other contexts. See, e.g., Letter from William Rehnquist, Chief Justice, U.S. 
Supreme Court, to Sen. Joseph Lieberman, June 7, 1993, in SUSAN LOW BLOCH ET 
AL., INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT:  THE INSTITUTION AND ITS PROCEDURES 1047 (2d. 
2008) (declining to testify at a Senate hearing on the disposition of judicial papers 
and raising separation of powers concerns about proposed legislation to govern 
preservation of judicial materials). There is also precedent for former Justices 
appearing before congressional committees to discuss extrajudicial, governmental 
activities. See Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on the Investigation of the Pearl 
Harbor Attack (pt. 7), 79th Cong. 3259–303 (1946) (congressional testimony provided 
by former Justice Owen Roberts in his capacity as a former member of an 
investigative commission); see also Peter Alan Bell, Extrajudicial Activity of 
Supreme Court Justices, 22 STAN. L. REV. 587, 592 & n.27 (1970). 
Sitting Supreme Court Justices have testified in court regarding criminal matters. 
For example, Justices Felix Frankfurter and Stanley Reed appeared in federal court 
at the perjury trial of Alger Hiss. See William R. Conklin, Frankfurter, Reed Testify 
to Loyalty, Integrity of Hiss, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1949, at 1. Reed was served with a 
subpoena, while Frankfurter “deemed it an unnecessary formality to be formally 
served with a subpoena.” A “Duty” To Testify, Says Frankfurter, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 
1949, at 7; see also Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 31 (1980) (“Neither are we aware 
of any rule generally exempting a judge from the normal obligation to respond as a 
witness when he has information material to a criminal or civil proceeding.”). 
274 See Harold B. Hinton, House Unit Invites Clark To Testify, N.Y. TIMES, June 
16, 1953, at 14. 
275 See id.; see also BAZAN & ROSENBERG, supra note 258, at 3. But cf. 14 
ANNALS OF CONG. 262–67 (1805) (testimony of C.J. Marshall). 
276 See Harold B. Hinton, Justice Clark Rejects Bid to House Inquiry, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 18, 1953, at 1. 
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administration of justice.”277  Although somewhat 
underdeveloped, his argument—by noting the shared interest of 
each of the three branches in their own independence—seemed to 
reflect structural considerations.  Following Justice Clark’s 
refusal to appear, the committee decided not to pursue the 
matter further even though it involved issues that preceded his 
tenure on the Court.278
In November of the same year, the House Committee on Un-
American Activities (“HUAC”) went a step further and issued a 
subpoena to Justice Clark.
 
279
I have your subpoena dated Nov. 10, 1953, calling upon me to 
appear before your committee . . . .  As you know, the 
independence of the three branches of our Government is the 
cardinal principle on which our constitutional system is 
founded.  This complete independence of the judiciary is 
necessary to the proper administration of justice.  In order to 
discharge this high trust, judges must be kept free from the 
strife of public controversy. . . .  For this reason, as much as I 
wish to cooperate with the legislative branch of the 
Government, I must forego an appearance before the committee.  
However . . . you may rest assured that such written questions 
as you and your committee may wish to send me will receive my 
serious consideration subject only to my duties under the 
Constitution.
  Here again, the Justice declined.  
This time, Clark made public his reasons for refusing to appear.  
In this regard, his arguments largely mirrored those offered 
earlier to the House Judiciary subcommittee.  Clark wrote that  
280





277 Id. at 33.   
 
278 See Decision Put off on Calling Clark, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1953, at 16 
(“[T]here was every indication that considerable difference of opinion existed over 
both the legality and the advisability of directing Mr. Clark to appear.”); see also 
House Group Bars a Clark Subpoena, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1953, at 19. 
279 See W.H. Lawrence, Velde Unit ‘Invites’ Brownell and He Promises To Testify, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1953, at 1. 
280 Clark’s Letter, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1953, at 9 (letter from Associate Justice 
Tom C. Clark to Rep. Harold Velde). 
281 See W.H. Lawrence, Senators To Hear Brownell Tuesday, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
14, 1953, at 1. In a 1956 speech, Justice Clark again asserted the importance of 
judicial independence, emphasizing the value of deliberating in private. Were it 
otherwise, he explained, “the whole process of decision [would be] destroyed.” Arthur 
Selwyn Miller & D.S. Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for 
Piercing the Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUFF. L. REV. 799, 805 (1973). 
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Also in 1953, a group of federal district court judges opposed 
a House committee subpoena issued to one of its members, Judge 
Louis E. Goodman.282  In a statement to the committee, the 
judges noted that the “Constitution does not contemplate that 
such matters be reviewed by the Legislative Branch . . . .  [W]e 
know of no instance, in our history where a committee such as 
yours, has summoned a member of the Federal Judiciary.”283  
Goodman appeared before the subcommittee but refused to 
answer questions specifically involving his judicial duties.284
In 1973, Senator Ted Stevens contacted the Chief Judge of 
the D.C. Circuit, David Bazelon, inquiring about which judges 
had recused themselves in litigation involving the Alaska 
pipeline.  Senator Stevens wrote:  “I have been told one or more 
judges have disqualified themselves in the trans-Alaska pipeline 
case currently under advisement.  Kindly advise me of their 
identities and reasons if this is the case.  I would appreciate a 
reply in writing as soon as possible.  Thank you very much.”
   
285
Judge Bazelon declined Senator Stevens’s request.  He 
wrote:  
 
In re your telegram of February 5, 1973 inquiring as to whether 
1 or more judges have disqualified themselves in the trans 
Atlantic [sic] pipeline cases currently under advisement and in 
which you request their identities and reasons if this is the case.  
The opinion, when issued, will reveal the names of the judges 
who have participated therein.  With great respect, we believe 
that further reply to your inquiry would not be appropriate with 
cordial wishes.286
In 2002, a federal judge voluntarily appeared before a 





282 See Statement of the Judges of the U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. of Cal., 
Made to the Subcomm. of the Comm. of the House of Representative To Investigate 
the Dep’t of Justice of the U.S., 14 F.R.D. 335 (1953). 
  The judge’s remarks at the hearing 
283 Id. at 336. The hearing involved concerns regarding a recent grand jury 
inquiry into controversies under the Truman administration. See, e.g., Lawrence E. 
Davies, U.S. Judge Rejects Queries at Inquiry, Tells House Unit Replies Would Make 
Judiciary “Subservient to Legislative Branch,” N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 1953, at 22.    
284 See Hinton, supra note 274, at 14. Two of Goodman’s colleagues on the bench 
also testified. See Davies, supra note 283. 
285 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (MacKinnon, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Senator Stevens’s letter). 
286 Id. (quoting Chief Judge Bazelon’s response to Senator Stevens’s letter). 
287 See Kelley, supra note 260, at 430–32. 
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contained some controversial assertions about the guidelines, 
and the committee subsequently asked that he submit materials 
to back up his statements.288  To the chagrin of the committee, 
the judge declined to produce several sentencing documents.289  
The committee responded by intimating it might subpoena the 
judge’s materials.290  Ultimately, the documents seem to have 
been given to the panel.291  At the time of the controversy, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist publicly expressed concern about the 
investigation, stating that “efforts to obtain information may not 
threaten judicial independence or the established principle that a 
judge’s judicial acts cannot serve as a basis for his removal from 
office.”292
These political precedents involving the judiciary and 
Congress underscore that a judicial privilege exists.  They are 
further supported in that the executive branch has also 
recognized this privilege over the years.  For example, in one of 
its briefs during executive privilege litigation during the 
Watergate era, executive branch lawyers noted:  
   
It has always been recognized that judges must be able to confer 
with their colleagues, and with their law clerks, in 
circumstances of absolute confidentiality.  Justice Brennan has 
written that Supreme Court conferences are held in “absolute 
secrecy” for “obvious reasons.”  Justice Frankfurter has said 
that the “secrecy that envelops the Court’s work” is “essential to 
the effective functioning of the Court.”293
While serving as Assistant Attorney General for the Office of 
Legal Counsel (“OLC”), Rehnquist acknowledged the legality of 
judicial privilege.  In testimony before Congress, he stated:  “The 
President is entitled to undivided and faithful advice from his 
subordinates, just as Senators and Representatives are entitled 
to the same sort of advice from their legislative and 
 
 
288 See id. at 432. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. at 434. 
291 See id. at 439–40.   
292 Id. at 441; see also id. at 442 (quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist). In 2009, a 
controversy arose following the Senate Judiciary Committee’s request of a sitting 
court of appeals judge to appear before the panel to discuss matters involving his 
tenure in the executive branch. See Carrie Johnson, Judge Invited To Testify About 
Role in Interrogation Memos, WASH. POST, Apr. 30, 2009, at A7.   
293 Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (per curiam) (MacKinnon, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing with approval a brief submitted 
by the President).  
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administrative assistants, and judges to the same sort of advice 
from their law clerks.”294
D. Conclusion 
   
As with the President and members of Congress, federal 
judges enjoy a constitutional privilege.  This is because the 
Constitution places a premium on encouraging effective 
decisionmaking by its constitutional officers.  It would be 
inconsistent with constitutional norms for the Vice President to 
lack a privilege of his own.  This anomaly would seem 
particularly striking when considered in light of judicial 
privilege.  One would assume that the Vice President, as an 
elected official who owes his job to the electorate, would have a 
greater need for having his sensitive deliberations shielded from 
disclosure than a life-tenured judge.  After all, while a judge may 
experience temporary discomfort from disclosure of his 
deliberations, he would not stand to be driven from office based 
on such revelations, provided his conduct was not impeachable.  
A Vice President, on the other hand, could have his political 
future jeopardized by such revelations and therefore without a 
privilege may become unduly cautious in his decisionmaking.  
Thus, one would assume judicial decisionmaking would be less 
susceptible to harm in light of disclosures or potential disclosures 
than would that of the Vice President.   
 
294 Executive Privilege Hearing, supra note 150, at 425 (statement of Assistant 
Att’y Gen. William H. Rehnquist).   
Academic opinion also seems to come down in favor of judicial privilege. See Amar, 
supra note 91 (“Senators must be free to talk candidly with colleagues and staff in 
cloakrooms; judges need similar freedom to converse with each other in judicial 
conferences and with clerks in closed chambers.”); Catz & Lange, supra note 246, at 
117–19 (“The element of confidentiality between a judge and those who aid her in 
chambers is essential . . . to the execution of the judicial office. . . . [T]he principle of 
separation of powers requires the availability of the judicial privilege in order to 
protect courts from improper interference from other branches.”); Alan K. Ota, 
House Leaders Wary of Being Too Helpful, CQ TODAY, May 18, 2006, at 42 (“If 
Congress sought records from the White House or from the chief justice . . . the 
requests would be denied.” (quoting former congressional committee counsel William 
Canfield)); cf. DAVID M. O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER: THE SUPREME COURT IN 
AMERICAN POLITICS 123–24 (8th ed. 2008) (“Isolation from the Capitol and the close 
proximity of the justices’ chambers within the Court promote secrecy, to a degree 
that is remarkable . . . . The norm of secrecy conditions the employment of the 
justices’ staff . . . .”); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 298–
304 (1993) (discussing the elaborate efforts undertaken by the Supreme Court to 
preserve confidentiality when deliberating on the first Brown v. Board of Education 
decision). But see generally Miller & Sastri, supra note 281. 
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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT:  
THE VICE PRESIDENCY, INVESTIGATIONS, AND OPPORTUNITIES  
FOR ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE 
 
V. THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A. The Framers and the Evolving Role of the Vice President 
What the Framers of the Constitution had in mind about the 
role of the Vice President is in no small part a matter of 
conjecture.295  They were largely silent about their handiwork.  
One author described the Framers’ treatment of the Vice 
President as “a hasty postscript,”296 as formulation of the office 
was not undertaken until late in the Constitutional 
Convention.297  A few generalizations, however, can be hazarded.  
First, since the Framers did not anticipate political parties, they 
set up a system whereby a member of the electoral college would 
vote for two candidates for President, with the caveat that only 
one could hail from the same state as the elector.  This 
precaution thereby prevented each state from voting only for its 
“favorite son.”298  Of the top two Presidential candidates, the one 
with the majority of electoral votes would become President.299
 
295 See, e.g., JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 4 (1982). 
  
The Vice President would be the person with the second-most 
electoral votes.  The Twelfth Amendment modified this 
arrangement after the election of 1800 almost made Aaron 
Burr—the clear vice presidential candidate for the Jeffersonian 
party—President instead of Vice President. 
296 EDGAR WIGGINS WAUGH, SECOND CONSUL: THE VICE PRESIDENCY: OUR 
GREATEST POLITICAL PROBLEM 25 (1956). 
297 See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, An Overview of the Vice-Presidency, 45 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 786, 789 (1977). For example, neither the Virginia Plan nor the New Jersey 
Plan included a means of succession for the executive. See RUTH SILVA, 
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 4 (1951). Hamilton and Charles Pinckney, on the other 
hand, drafted plans that addressed the issue. See id. 
298 See Goldstein, supra note 297. In this same vein, Joel Goldstein has argued 
that the Framers established the vice presidency to increase the likelihood that 
capable Presidents would be elected. See Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional 
Vice-Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 505, 512–13 (1995). 
299 See Goldstein, supra note 297. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 493 
Second, the Framers were concerned about presidential 
succession.  Preliminary versions of the charter had the Chief 
Justice or an executive council filling in for the fallen 
executive.300  Other ideas included having the President of the 
Senate so serving—at that point during the constitutional 
drafting there was no Vice President.301
Third, there was the question about who would preside over 
the Senate.
   
302  This involved two related issues, one being 
concern that, if the presiding officer was a Senator, he could not 
cast a vote and one state would have diminished 
representation.303  The other was that since the Constitution 
provided for two Senators per state, the body’s membership 
would always be evenly numbered.  Therefore, the Framers were 
concerned that the Senate could become regularly deadlocked 
and be unable to make decisions.304  The result was that the Vice 
President was tasked with presiding over the Senate, 
presumably to allow all the Senators to have a vote and to permit 
ties to be broken, thus alleviating these concerns.305
The net result of the Framers’ actions is that vice 
presidential power flows very little from constitutional grants but 
largely from formal and informal delegations from the 
President
   
306 and Congress.307
 
300 See id. 
  In fact, throughout most of U.S. 
301 See id. 
302 See id. 
303 See id. 
304 See id. 
305 See id. 
306 See, e.g., FOIA Opinion, supra note 24, at 10 (“[T]he Vice President and his 
staff do not have ‘substantial independent authority in the exercise of specific 
functions,’. . . but rather have the sole function of advising and assisting the 
President. The Vice President has no constitutional or statutory responsibilities as 
an executive branch officer . . . .” (citations omitted) (emphasis added)); cf. 
3 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (authorizing funds to the Vice President “[i]n order to enable 
the Vice President to provide assistance to the President in connection with the 
performance of functions specifically assigned to the Vice President by the President 
in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities” (emphasis added)); Meyer v. 
Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[D]espite the Vice President’s rank, we 
do not believe his status as Chairman [of the interagency group] lent the Task Force 
any authority independent of the President.”); PAUL C. LIGHT, VICE-PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER: ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE 5 (1984) (contending that 
“Vice-Presidents must function on the basis of ever-changing customs and practices, 
with no constitutional mandate in the policy process”); David Nather, A Power Surge 
Under Scrutiny, CQ WEEKLY, June 17, 2007, at 1734, 1738 (the Vice President’s 
“power depends almost entirely on how much a president is willing to hand over”). 
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history under the Constitution, Vice Presidents played only a 
minor role in the executive branch.  Owing to their responsibility 
to preside over the Senate, they were long thought to be more a 
part of the legislative branch than the executive.308
Beginning in the early 1920s, however, Vice Presidents 
began to participate in Cabinet deliberations.
  Seldom did 
they receive important assignments from the President.   
309 President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s Vice President, John Nance Garner, not 
only sat in on Cabinet meetings, but represented the President 
on a foreign visit.310  By the time of U.S. entry into World War II, 
Vice Presidents had begun to enjoy much greater executive 
branch responsibility as the President and Congress delegated 
ever increasing authority to them.311
 
307 For example, Congress included the Vice President on the National Security 
Council (“NCS”) when it was modified in 1949. See 50 U.S.C. § 402 (2006); see also 
Harold C. Relyea, The Law: The Executive Office of the Vice President: Constitutional 
and Legal Considerations, 40 PRES. STUD. Q. 327, 329 (2010) [hereinafter The 
Executive Office]. Before the NSC assignment, he was slated by statute in the mid-
nineteenth century to serve on the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian. See, e.g., 
HAROLD C. RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE VICE PRESIDENCY: EVOLUTION OF 
THE MODERN OFFICE: 1933–2001, at 1–2 (2001); see also Relyea, supra, at 328–29 
(listing other commissions upon which the Vice President served). 
  In this regard, Franklin 
Roosevelt’s second Vice President, Henry Wallace, was the first 
to be delegated serious, formal authority within the executive 
308 See, e.g., IRVING G. WILLIAMS, THE AMERICAN VICE-PRESIDENCY: NEW LOOK 
3–4 (1954) (“The presiding officer’s role has been the main item of a Vice President’s 
constitutional work, and in general the standard by which he has been judged 
competent or not.”); H.B. Learned, Some Aspects of the Vice-Presidency, 8 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. SUPP. 162, 170 (1913) (“[T]he [vice presidential] office as constitutionally 
limited to legislative functions . . . [was an] assumption, although unacknowledged, 
[that] . . . has probably guided most of [Jefferson’s] successors.”); Reylea, supra note 
307, at 328 (“Throughout the nineteenth century, the vice presidency was regarded 
as a legislative position, the primary duty being to preside over deliberations of the 
Senate.”); infra note 323 (quoting Adams and Jefferson).  
309 See infra note 670. Vice President Marshall sat in on Cabinet meetings while 
President Wilson was in Europe at the Versailles peace conference, but Vice 
President Coolidge was the first to attend such gatherings as a matter of course. See, 
e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 136. The latter’s Vice President, Charles Dawes, 
refused to do so, but the practice was revived a few years later during Charles 
Curtis’s tenure. See 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS 
HISTORY AND PRACTICE 229 n.2 (1960 ed.); Hoover Aims To Reform Machinery for 
Enforcing Dry Law and Many Others, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1929, at 1. 
310 See, e.g., The Executive Office, supra note 307, at 329. 
311 Beginning in earnest with Wallace, the “constitutional aspect of his functions 
[were placed below] . . . his extraconstitutional ones.” WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 
37. 
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branch.312  Roosevelt appointed him head of the Economic 
Defense Board—later re-christened the Board of Economic 
Warfare (“BEW”).313
Gradually, this growing executive branch responsibility was 
matched by less emphasis on the Vice President’s legislative 
duties.  This political trend was underscored as a constitutional 
matter by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1967, which 
acknowledged the enhanced executive branch role played by the 
Vice President
   
314 and simultaneously raised his stature within 
the national government.315
B. The Vice President’s Enumerated Powers 
  Because of this history, it is not 
surprising that the issue of Vice Presidents withholding 
information arose infrequently in the first century and a quarter 
under the Constitution.  As the vice presidency has evolved in the 
past several decades to become more of an executive branch 
institution and undertaken more substantive duties, occupants of 
the office have inevitably and increasingly found themselves 
entangled in conflicts over access to information. 
Under the Constitution, the Vice President is granted no 
powers other than the authority to: (1) preside over the Senate,316 
except in the case of presidential impeachment317
 
312 See, e.g., MICHAEL DORMAN, THE SECOND MAN: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE 
VICE PRESIDENCY 152–53 (1968). 
—a power 
313 See id. at 152. 
314 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“The Vice 
President is part of the official family of the President . . . . He is essential, I would 
say, in present-day government.”); 110 CONG. REC. 22,993–94 (1964) (statement of 
Sen. Fong) (“The Vice-Presidential office under our system of government is tied 
very closely with the Presidency.”); Amar, supra note 7, at 207 (concluding that the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment “formally concretizes an evolving importance of the vice 
presidency to the executive branch”); Goldstein, supra note 2, at 181 (“Bayh and his 
colleagues viewed the vice president as part of the executive branch.”). 
315 See, e.g., Richard Albert, The Evolving Vice Presidency, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 811, 
870 (2005) (“Structurally, constitutional amendments have changed the face of the 
office [of vice president] and catapulted the Vice Presidency into the pantheon of 
American domestic and foreign influence.”); Goldstein, supra note 297, at 792 (“The 
legislative history of the twenty-fifth amendment overflows with assertions of the 
significance of the [vice presidential] office. Indeed, that amendment both recognized 
the growth of the Vice-Presidency in section two and contributed to its prominence in 
sections three and four.” (emphasis added)). 
316 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. 
317 See id. cl. 6. 
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which is typically ceremonial;318 (2) vote to break ties as the 
Senate’s presiding officer;319 (3) open certified listings of 
presidential electors and—presumably—be involved in the 
counting, a responsibility that no longer entails substantive 
authority;320 (4) succeed the President should he die;321
 
318 This was not always so. Early Senate rules and customs left the Vice 
President with considerable authority as far as maintaining order in the upper 
chamber. See MARK O. HATFIELD, VICE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789–
1993, S. Doc. No. 104-26, at xvi (1997) [hereinafter HATFIELD]; see also JULES 
WITCOVER, CRAP SHOOT: ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 19 (1992) 
(likening Vice President Adams to a “majority leader” during his tenure as presiding 
officer); Michael Nelson, Background Paper, in A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 62 (Michael 
Nelson rapporteur, 1988) [hereinafter TASK FORCE] (“The first vice president, John 
Adams, operated in a manner not unlike a modern Senate majority leader, helping 
to shape the Senate’s agenda and organizing and intervening in debate.”); 
Memorandum from Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to the Vice President 3 (Mar. 9, 1961) [hereinafter Katzenbach Memo] 
(“John Adams . . . originally conceived of his Constitutional duties in the Chair of the 
Senate as tantamount to leadership . . . [, and he] played a decisive part in its work 
during the first few years of its existence.”); Oliver P. Field, The Vice-Presidency of 
the United States, 56 AM. L. REV. 365, 376 (1922) (“Adams was an important figure 
in the Senate during these first sessions.”); cf. 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 220 
(“Early Presidents of the Senate [such as Adams and Burr] assumed some 
responsibility for the members’ procedure in debate.”).  
 and (5) fill 
in for the President should he become unable to fulfill his duties, 
319 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. In reality, the power to break ties is less 
than it appears, as a tie vote means the matter under consideration automatically 
fails. See, e.g., 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 232–33; WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 
39. That said, the Vice President appears to be able to break ties even in a contested 
vice presidential election decided by the Senate. See William Josephson, Senate 
Election of the Vice President and the House of Representatives Election of the 
President, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 597, 618–20 (2009). 
320 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII (“The President of the Senate shall, in the 
presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and 
the votes shall then be counted.”). That the counting of the votes is in the passive 
voice raises some question as to whom the Framers entrusted this authority. See 
Bruce Ackerman & David Fontana, Thomas Jefferson Counts Himself into the 
Presidency, 90 VA. L. REV. 551, 552, 608, 636 (2004). In the early years under the 
Constitution, tabulating electoral votes placed some discretion in the hands of the 
Vice President. See WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 5. Both Adams and Jefferson made 
decisions regarding whether a handful of votes should be counted and Congress 
acquiesced. See id.; see also Ackerman & Fontana, supra, at 553–54 (“Without the 
decisive use of his power as President of the Senate, Jefferson might never have 
become President of the United States.”). In the years since, Congress has appeared 
to occupy the field. See id. at 636, 640–42; see also 3 U.S.C. §§ 12–18 (2006) (defining 
in statute the Vice President’s duties). 
321 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1; see also id. amend. XX, § 3 (detailing 
procedures for the Vice President elect to become President upon death of the 
President elect). 
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and help make a determination as to the President’s inability 
should there be uncertainty in this regard.322
For purposes of this Article, there are three distinctive 
features about the vice presidency under the Constitution.  First, 
the Vice President is not assigned to a single branch of the 
federal government, even though as a practical matter almost all 
of his time is spent completing tasks assigned by the President.
  The only other 
constitutional clauses related to the Vice President concern 
election and selection procedure. 
323
 
322 See id. amend. XXV, §§ 3–4. 
  
Article I, Section 3 provides that the  
323 There are four potential answers to the question: to which branch—or 
branches—does the Vice President belong? They are: (1) that he is solely a part of 
the legislative branch; (2) that he is a solely a part of the executive branch; (3) that 
he is a part of neither; and (4) that he is a part of both the executive and legislative 
branches with his exact location depending on the function he is performing at the 
time—consequently he would be either evenly split between the two branches, 
primarily legislative or primarily executive. In light of the clear textual commitment 
of the Vice President to preside over the Senate and at the same time the fact that 
modern Vice Presidents spend almost all of their time on executive branch matters, 
the fourth of these positions is the most persuasive. Thus, the Vice President is 
primarily—but not exclusively—an executive branch official since that is where he 
spends most of his time. 
With regard to the first position—that the Vice President is solely a part of the 
legislative branch—there is some judicial dicta to support it. See FDIC v. Hurwitz, 
384 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1098 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (“The Vice President of the United 
States is an officer of the legislative branch. His official function is to preside in the 
Senate.”), rev’d in part sub nom. on other grounds, FDIC v. Maxxam, 523 F.3d 566 
(5th Cir. 2008); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 958 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (“[I]t is impossible to say that we intrude upon the prerogatives of the 
Legislative Branch less severely when we resolve, for example, an internal dispute 
regarding the provision that ‘[t]he Vice President of the United States shall be 
President of the Senate,’ than we do when we resolve an internal dispute regarding 
the provision that ‘[n]either House, during the Session of Congress shall, without the 
Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days’ . . . .” (citations omitted)); cf. 
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722 (1986) (“[I]n the impeachment of a President 
the presiding officer of the ultimate tribunal is not a member of the Legislative 
Branch, but the Chief Justice of the United States.” (emphasis added)). Moreover, 
many prominent early authorities viewed the Vice President to be solely part of the 
legislative branch. For instance, the first Vice President, John Adams, wrote in 1790 
that the Vice President was “totally detached from the executive authority and 
confined to the legislative.” HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 7. The second Vice 
President, Thomas Jefferson, concurred. See infra notes 657–58 and accompanying 
text. This view, while likely valid in the 1790s, now confronts the reality that the 
modern Vice President spends little time presiding over the Senate and most of his 
energies on executive branch duties. Moreover, it overlooks that he is elected 
alongside the President and can only be removed during his term through 
impeachment, a mode of removal reserved for executive and judicial branch officials. 
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Neither does it account for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which both recognized and 
formalized the Vice President’s executive branch role. See, e.g., supra note 314.    
The second position—that the Vice President is solely a part of the executive 
branch—is supported by an even greater body of dicta. See Cheney v. U.S. Dist. 
Court, 542 U.S. 367, 385 (2004) (“The discovery requests are directed to the Vice 
President . . . . The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of the 
courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives . . . . [S]pecial considerations control 
when the Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and 
safeguarding the confidentiality of its communication are implicated.” (emphasis 
added)); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 508 (1977) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting) (“[E]xecutive power was vested in the President; no other offices in the 
Executive Branch, other than the Presidency and Vice Presidency, were mandated 
by the Constitution. Only two Executive Branch offices, therefore, are creatures of 
the constitution; all other departments and agencies . . . are creatures of the 
Congress . . . .”); Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Defendants 
are the United States and four Executive Branch officials—Vice President Richard 
B. Cheney [among others].”), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2825 (2009); Williams v. United 
States, 240 F.3d 1019, 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“It is worth noting that the ‘high-level’ 
officials to which the Commission’s recommendations are addressed includes [sic] 
the Vice President and 833 other Executive Branch positions . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); United States v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 148 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“The 
President, Vice President, and other Executive Branch officials file their disclosure 
reports with the Director of the Office of Government Ethics. . . . Members of the 
Senate file their disclosure statements with the Secretary of the Senate . . . .” 
(emphasis added)); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The Vice 
President is the only senior official in the executive branch totally protected from the 
President’s removal power.” (emphasis added)); New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 
1150 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“The Council [on Competitiveness] . . . is chaired by the 
Vice President and its members include other executive branch officials.” (emphasis 
added)); Sykes v. Frank, No. 8:08-4049-GRA-BHH, 2009 WL 614806, at *8 (D.S.C. 
Mar. 6, 2009) (“[T]he former President and Vice President of the United States [are] 
officials in the executive branch of the federal government.”); Walker v. Cheney, 230 
F. Supp. 2d 51, 74–75 (D.D.C. 2002) (“This rigorous standing assessment may seem 
overly protective of the Vice President, and hence of the Executive Branch, at the 
expense of the statutory responsibilities of the Comptroller General and the 
constitutional obligations of Congress.”).  
This position, however, overlooks the Vice President’s most clearly assigned 
constitutional duty, which is to preside over the Senate. It also ignores his role in 
presiding over the counting of electoral votes, see, e.g., Ackerman & Fontana, supra 
note 320, at 552, as well as a host of other structural factors that imply he should 
not be considered exclusively part of the executive branch. For example, unlike the 
President, the Vice President is not term limited; he can have his salary lowered; he 
can participate in the consideration of constitutional amendments; he can vote on 
unicameral resolutions; and he can vote on matters involving internal Senate 
organization. 
Third, some have apparently taken the view that the Vice President, as a 
constitutional matter, belongs to neither the legislative nor the executive branch. 
See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT 162 (Johns Hopkins Univ. 
Press 1981) (1885) (“[The Vice President’s] position is one of anomalous 
insignificance and curious uncertainty. Apparently he is not, strictly speaking, a 
part of the legislature,—he is clearly not a member,—yet neither is he an officer of 
the executive. It is one of the remarkable things about him, that it is hard to find in 
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sketching the government any proper place to discuss him. He comes in most 
naturally along with the Senate to which he is tacked; but he does not come in there 
for any great consideration. He is simply a judicial officer set to moderate the 
proceedings . . . . So long as he is Vice-President, he is inseparable officially from the 
Senate . . . .”). Such a view clearly does violence to constitutional text, which admits 
of only three branches of government. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1, 
cl. 1; id. art. III, § 1; United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974) (“In 
designing the structure of our Government and dividing and allocating the sovereign 
power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the Constitution sought to 
provide a comprehensive system . . . .”). 
Finally, with respect to the fourth position—that the Vice President is a part of both 
political branches—there is dictum that is supportive. See Estate of Rockefeller v. 
Comm’r, 83 T.C. 368, 376 (1984) (“[T]he office of Vice President is a unique 
position . . . . The Vice President stands by to succeed the President in case of death, 
resignation, or removal from office. He holds the position of President of the Senate, 
and serves as alter ego for the President of the United States on many occasions. In 
addition, the Vice President has, in recent years, carried a heavy load of 
responsibilities in the administration of the executive branch of the Government.” 
(citations omitted)). Moreover, numerous authorities shared this view even before 
the advent of the modern vice presidency. See, e.g., 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 639 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter 2 
FARRAND] (quoting George Mason as stating that the holder of the vice presidency is 
a “dangerous . . . officer . . . who . . . is made president of the Senate, thereby 
dangerously blending the executive and legislative powers”); id. at 536–37 (“We 
might as well put the President himself at the head of the Legislature. The close 
intimacy that must subsist between the President & vice-president makes it 
absolutely improper.”). Authorities in more recent times have also adopted this view. 
See, e.g., Memorandum from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to the Honorable Edward L. Morgan, Deputy Counsel to the 
President 2 (Feb. 7, 1969) (on file with author) (“The Vice President, of course, 
occupies a unique position under the Constitution. For some purposes, he is an 
officer of the Legislative Branch, and his status in the Executive Branch is not 
altogether clear. . . . [H]is status may be characterized as Legislative or Executive 
depending on the context . . . .”). The view that the Vice President is part of both 
branches—his exact locus varying according to the duties he is carrying out at the 
time—largely reconciles the first two positions discussed above. More importantly, it 
reflects the reality that the Vice President plays constitutional roles in both political 
branches.   
One potential counter to the fourth position is Article I, Section 6, Clause 2, which 
prohibits members of Congress from serving in the executive branch or from 
receiving tasks delegated by the executive branch. See, e.g., Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Is Dick Cheney Unconstitutional?, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1539, 1542 (2008). The 
argument would be that this prohibition precludes the Vice President from serving 
in both branches. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE 
POWER THREATENS AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 228 n.60 (2009). Such a position is likely 
to fail for several reasons. First, it presumes that the Vice President is a member of 
Congress, which he clearly is not—he is part of the legislative branch but not a 
member. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Some Modest Proposals on the Vice-
Presidency, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1703, 1720, 1731–34 (1988); Letter from Harold F. 
Reis, Acting Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
the Honorable Walter Jenkins, Admin. Assistant, Office of the Vice President 4 (July 
24, 1962) [hereinafter Reis Letter] (“[T]he Vice President has a unique status in the 
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Vice President of the United States shall be President of the 
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.  
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a 
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or 
when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United 
States.324
Thus, the Vice President’s most tangible constitutional 
assignment involves the legislative branch where he has the 
authority to preside over the Senate and to break ties. 
 
At the same time, the Vice President’s term of office is 
obviously linked to the President under Article II and not to the 
Senate under Article I.325
 
legislative branch.”); Letter from Laurence H. Silberman, Acting Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Howard W. Cannon, Chairman, Comm. on Rules 
and Admin., U.S. Senate 6 (Sept. 20, 1974) (on file with author) (“Considered as a 
whole, [the Constitution] indicate[s] that the Vice President has a unique status in 
the Legislative branch, but not the status of a ‘Member’ of the Congress within the 
meaning of the Constitution.”); infra Part VII.A.1.b. Second, his status as part of 
both legislative and executive branches is part of the text of the Constitution. See 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4–5; id. amend. XII; id. amend. XXV. In order to reconcile 
these provisions, rather than read one or more of them completely out of the 
Constitution, the better view is to interpret Article I, the Twelfth Amendment and 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as placing the Vice President in both branches and 
having Article I, Section 6, preclude lawmakers—but not the Vice President—from 
serving in the executive branch. 
  A similar pattern of vice presidential 
selection is followed under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
whereby the President nominates the Vice President, not 
For more on the question of which branch the Vice President belongs to, see the 
author’s forthcoming article, “Constitutional Chameleon: The Vice President’s Place 
in Both the Executive and Legislative Branches.” See also Myers, supra note 45, at 
906–11; Todd Garvey, Note, A Constitutional Anomaly: Safeguarding Confidential 
National Security Information Within the Enigma That Is the American Vice 
Presidency, 17 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 565 (2008); Aryn Subhawong, Comment, A 
Realistic Look at the Vice Presidency: Why Dick Cheney Is an “Entity Within the 
Executive Branch,” 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 281 (2008). 
324 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cls. 4–5. 
325 See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The . . . President of the United States of 
America . . . shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years . . . together with the 
Vice President, chosen for the same Term . . . .”). The term is further defined by the 
Twentieth Amendment. See id. amend. XX, § 1 (“The terms of the President and the 
Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of 
Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January . . . .”). The Vice 
President’s election is also linked to that of the President under the Twelfth 
Amendment—which amended Article II in this regard—and not to that of the Senate 
under Article I. See id. amend. XII. Likewise, his qualifications reflect those of the 
President, not those of Senators. See id. The author would like to thank Joel 
Goldstein for many keen observations in this area. 
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Congress.326  Removal of the Vice President is governed by Article 
II,327 not by Article I as it is for federal lawmakers.328  Similarly, 
when determining presidential inability, the Vice President must 
consult with the President’s Cabinet,329 which again implies a 
vice presidential bond with the executive branch.330  While the 
Vice President’s duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
involve the executive branch, they do not implicate constitutional 
executive power as defined under Article II.  And, of course, the 
Vice President takes over for the President as head of the 
executive branch should the latter office become vacant.331
Second, as a legal matter, the President may not remove the 
Vice President from office during his term, rendering him 
independent from the President from a constitutional 
standpoint.
   
332  Removal, of course, is one of the primary means at 
the President’s disposal to control the executive branch.  Thus, 
the Vice President’s status is unlike that of a Cabinet secretary 
who can be both relieved from office by the President and 
expelled through the impeachment process.333  The Vice 
President can be removed only through the latter mechanism.334
 
326 See id. amend. XXV, § 2 (“Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the 
Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office 
upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.”). 
  
Late in his first term, the President may, of course, select 
327 See id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the 
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, 
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
328 See id. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may . . . , with the Concurrence of two 
thirds, expel a Member.”). 
329 “Cabinet” will be used in this Article to denote the “principal officers of the 
executive departments.” See Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 & 887 n.4 
(1991); see also Scott E. Gant, Presidential Inability and the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment’s Unexplored Removal Provisions, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 
791, 794 n.12. 
330 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4.  
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers 
of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law 
provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the 
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the 
office as Acting President.  
Id.  
331 See id. § 1. 
332 See, e.g., Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993).  
333 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926). 
334 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4. 
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another running mate.  That does not constitute removal from 
office, however, since the sitting Vice President legally may 
complete his four-year term.  Therefore, the Vice President is 
independent of the President as a constitutional matter.335  This 
vice presidential independence is underscored by the fact that 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which governs the 
making of a presidential inability determination, anticipates that 
the Vice President may be pitted directly against the President in 
such a scenario.336
Third, there is essentially no case law discussing the 
constitutional power of the Vice President.
   
337
VI. INVESTIGATIONS INVOLVING VICE PRESIDENTS AND 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE 
  Thus, analysis of 
vice presidential authority relies heavily on constitutional 
structure on one hand and past practice and opinion on the other. 
It bears noting up front that no Vice President has ever 
formally invoked VPP.  That said, former Vice President Cheney 
took positions that came close to or alluded to the possibility of 
such a doctrine.338
 
335 See infra notes 652–97 and accompanying text. 
  Vice Presidents prior to Cheney made similar 
336 See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 323, at 1727 n.101 (“[T]o make a disability 
determination stick against an unwilling president, he would have to be opposed not 
only by the vice-president but also by two-thirds of each house and, unless Congress 
designates a different group, a majority of the department heads.”); Goldstein, supra 
note 2, at 190 (“Transfer under Section 4 [of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment] comes 
without presidential sanction. Section 4 authorizes involuntary transfer of power to 
the vice president under a range of circumstances.”). While Cabinet officers are also 
included in the inability determination process under current law, their role can be 
revoked by statute. The Vice President is the one actor in the process who may not 
be replaced.      
337 See generally CRS, supra note 12, at 123–24, 457, 1654, 2087, 2103–04, 2109–
11.   
338 Aside from written positions tied to disputes over access to information, 
public statements from Vice President Cheney’s office at times seemed to assert a 
form of vice presidential privilege. See, e.g., Dana Milbank & Justin Blum, Document 
Says Oil Chiefs Met with Cheney Task Force, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2005, at A1 
(quoting the Vice President’s spokeswoman who referred to “the constitutional right 
of the president and vice president to obtain information in confidentiality” 
(emphasis added)); LOU DUBOSE & JAKE BERNSTEIN, VICE: DICK CHENEY AND THE 
HIJACKING OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 12 (2006) (“I’m a duly elected 
constitutional officer. The idea that any member of Congress can demand from me a 
list of everybody I meet with and what they say strikes me as—as inappropriate, 
and not in keeping with the Constitution.” (quoting Vice President Cheney) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).    
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assertions but, like him, never officially took steps to back up 
their intimations of privilege.  The history of the office not only 
reflects a number of instances of Vice Presidents implying they 
held a privilege of nondisclosure, but it also demonstrates that no 
congressional committee has ever successfully compelled the Vice 
President’s appearance.339
 
339 No President has ever been forced to appear before a congressional 
committee although some have done so voluntarily. See Sitting Presidents and Vice 
Presidents Who Have Testified Before Congressional Committees, prepared by the 
Senate Historical Office and Senate Library, 2004, available at 
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/resources/pdf/PresidentsTestify.pdf [hereinafter 
Sitting Presidents and Vice Presidents Who Have Testified] (noting that Presidents 
Lincoln, Wilson, and Ford testified voluntarily as sitting Presidents); cf. Clinton v. 
Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 692 n.14 (1997) (“[N]o sitting President has ever testified, or 
been ordered to testify, in open court.” (emphasis added)). Despite never having been 
asked to testify before the Senate Watergate Committee, Nixon preemptively 
announced he would not make an appearance. See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 
45, at 949–50. Truman, as a former President, declined to appear before the House 
Committee on Un-American Activities in 1953 when subpoenaed. See id. at 949–51.   
   
On the other side of the ledger, former Presidents John Quincy Adams and John 
Tyler complied to varying degrees with subpoenas issued by select committees in 
1846 about their use of secret funds while in office. See id. at 948–49. Theodore 
Roosevelt appeared voluntarily before a House investigative committee in 1911 and 
did the same before a Senate panel in 1912. See Senate Historical Office & the 
Senate Library, Former Presidents Who Have Testified Before Congressional 
Committees, 2004. Truman made an appearance before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1955 to discuss the U.N. charter and Ford testified on the 
U.S. Constitution’s bicentennial in 1983. See id. 
On a related note, several former Vice Presidents have appeared voluntarily before 
congressional committees to testify about public policy concerns. Henry Wallace 
appeared before the Senate Commerce Committee under unique circumstances in 
January 1945. His term as Vice President had just concluded and President 
Roosevelt had nominated him to serve as Secretary of Commerce. Wallace’s 
appearance before the panel served essentially as a confirmation hearing. See John 
H. Crider, Wallace To Accept If Post Is Divided, Urges Sift of RFC, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
26, 1945, at 1. His actions as Vice President, however, were only indirectly raised in 
the hearing and none of the discussion delved into Wallace’s decisionmaking while in 
that position. See Hearings on S. 375 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, 79th Cong. 
71–134 (1945) (providing a transcript of Wallace’s appearance and questioning 
before the committee). Following Senate confirmation as secretary, Wallace testified 
on a number of occasions before various congressional committees. See, e.g., 
Frederick R. Barkley, Employment Bill Urged by Wallace, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 31, 1945, 
at 15; Wallace Clashes on Tariff Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1945, at 40. In 1964, 
Richard Nixon testified before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee about presidential 
succession and inability. See, e.g., Nixon Asks Speed on Vice President, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 6, 1964, at 1. Walter Mondale testified before the Senate Government Affairs 
Committee in favor of campaign finance reform in 1997. See David E. Rosenbaum, 
Pair of Elder Statesmen Urge That Soft Money Be Outlawed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
1997, at A20. He also appeared before the Senate Rules Committee in 1988 to talk 
about reforming the presidential nomination process. See Mondale Urges Primary 
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Should the broad trend toward greater vice presidential 
responsibility in the executive branch continue and should Vice 
Presidents continue to play an increasingly prominent role in 
public affairs, it is possible, if not likely, that future Vice 
Presidents could build upon these earlier “not-quite VPP” 
assertions and actually invoke a constitutional privilege of their 
own.340  This Part will review the history of investigations 
involving Vice Presidents and examine to what extent, if at all, 
Vice Presidents have raised their own confidentiality concerns.  
Because of the importance of past practice in constitutional 
interpretation,341
Since Vice Presidents have only within the past several 
decades become involved in the day-to-day activities of the 
executive branch, much of the political precedent regarding 
demands for information from them has been tied to perceived 
impropriety and less to policy disputes.
 this Part will inform discussion over whether 
VPP should be recognized. 
342  As Vice Presidents 
over time have assumed greater duties within the executive 
branch, these demands for information have become more related 
to policy matters and increasingly relevant to the inquiry at 
hand.  Prior to the vice presidency of Richard Cheney, several 
Vice Presidents had become entangled in conflicts that involved 
congressional or judicial requests for information.  They include 
Vice Presidents Tompkins, Calhoun, Colfax, Wallace, Humphrey, 
Agnew, Ford, Rockefeller, Bush, Quayle, and Gore.343
 
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1988, at B10. In 2009, Al Gore testified before committees 
in both houses about climate change. See, e.g., Gore Testifies on Climate Change on 
Capitol Hill, NPR (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story. 
php?storyId=99952240; Gore Testifies on Climate Change, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Apr. 
24, 2009), http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/04/24/Gore-testifies-on-climate-
change/UPI-50791240603208.  
   
340 See infra note 834. 
341 See supra note 137. 
342 See David Nather, How Cheney Has Used His Clout, CQ WEEKLY, June 11, 
2007, at 1739 (“There hasn’t been much [congressional] oversight [of the Vice 
President] because there hasn’t been a lot to oversee.” (quoting Professor Andrew 
Rudalevige)); see id. (“[U]ntil Dick Cheney, the vice presidency had been somewhat 
shielded from congressional scrutiny because the notion of a vice president being 
involved in anything worth Congress’ attention was laughable.”). 
343 While Vice President, Aaron Burr was indicted in New Jersey for criminal 
homicide following his shooting of Alexander Hamilton in their infamous duel. See, 
e.g., ROGER G. KENNEDY, BURR, HAMILTON, AND JEFFERSON: A STUDY IN 
CHARACTER 187 (2000). In the ensuing investigation, there does not seem to have 
been any dispute over access to materials in the Vice President’s possession, 
however. Even had there been, it is difficult to see how the materials could have 
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A. Daniel Tompkins 
Daniel Tompkins is a largely forgotten Vice President, 
having served with President James Monroe from 1817 to 1825.  
Prior to his tenure as Vice President, he had been Governor of 
New York, holding office during the War of 1812.  In the whirl of 
events associated with the conflict, Tompkins had used his own 
personal funds to help advance the military effort.344  During this 
time, he carelessly blended his own assets with public funds—
both state and federal—and emerged from the governorship in 
dire financial straits.345  As a result, Tompkins spent a good part 
of his vice presidency trying to recoup what both the federal and 
state governments owed him.346  In so doing he became enmeshed 
in litigation in the federal courts347
 
been tied to Burr’s official duties. Nor were any analogous issues of immunity 
apparently raised. See Eric M. Freedman, The Law as King and the King as Law: Is 
a President Immune from Criminal Prosecution Before Impeachment?, 20 HASTINGS 
CON. L.Q. 7, 22–24 (1992). For a discussion of the legal proceedings, see id. at 22–25.   
 and cooperated with 
Burr later became embroiled in a clash over documents in the possession of 
President Jefferson. The third Vice President was out of office when he was put on 
trial for treason for his part in an apparent filibustering campaign. Burr requested 
the court issue a subpoena duces tecum to the President in order to introduce letters 
Burr claimed would support his innocence. This touched off a constitutional 
confrontation over whether Jefferson could be compelled to produce such documents. 
For a discussion, see, for example, BERGER, supra note 6, at 187–94; John C. Yoo, 
The First Claim: The Burr Trial, United States v. Nixon, and Presidential Power, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 1435 (1999); see also LOUIS FISHER, IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY: UNCHECKED PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE REYNOLDS CASE 212–21 
(2006). 
In the resulting case, United States v. Burr, Chief Justice John Marshall, riding 
circuit, concluded that the President needed to turn over the materials. See F. Cas. 
30 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,692d). Jefferson wound up largely complying, providing 
partially redacted materials. See BERGER, supra note 6, at 191 n.157. With respect to 
VPP, there does not appear to have been any consideration of vice presidential 
prerogatives since the documents in question were drafted following Burr’s 
departure from office. Moreover, Burr was advocating for the documents to be 
released, not withheld. Nonetheless, the Burr-Jefferson episode does provide a 
unique example of a President and his former Vice President taking conflicting 
positions about disclosure of information.   
344 See, e.g., Gaspare J. Saladino, Daniel D. Tompkins, in VICE PRESIDENTS: A 
BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 52, 56 (L. Edward Purcell ed., 3d ed. 1998).  
345 See id. 
346 See id. 
347 See RAY W. IRWIN, DANIEL D. TOMPKINS, GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK AND VICE 
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 285–94 (1968). 
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investigations conducted by both congressional and state 
legislative committees.348
In Tompkins’s first term as Vice President, the New York 
legislature, led by then state Senator Martin Van Buren, began 
an investigation into the accounts during Tompkins’s 
governorship.
 
349  Ultimately, the legislature took action to resolve 
Tompkins’s financial matters to the extent they involved state 
monies.350
In 1822, suit was brought in federal court against Tompkins 
involving his financial situation.
 
351  The Vice President in fact 
made a personal appearance in court to defend himself.352  In the 
end, he was vindicated and used his legal victory to try to secure 
the federal funds he felt Congress owed him.353  Both houses of 
Congress established committees to look into the merits of the 
Vice President’s claims.354
The events surrounding the Tompkins litigation and 
legislative investigations are instructive, but they yield little 
affirmative evidence to indicate a Vice President possesses a 
constitutional privilege.  That said, it seems clear that it would 
have been counterproductive for Tompkins to assert such a 
privilege since he was actively encouraging all of these 
investigations as part of a broader effort to redeem himself 
financially.  Moreover, none of the materials provided by 
Tompkins was tied to his official duties as Vice President, all of 
  There does not seem to be anything in 
the historical record indicating that Tompkins failed to cooperate 
with the two committees—indeed it was in his interest to do so. 
 
348 See id. at 231, 250–53, 295–97. His financial situation grew so desperate 
there is evidence he was jailed for his debts during his tenure as Vice President. See 
id. at 297–98. John Quincy Adams noted at the time that he had heard rumors to 
this effect. See 6 MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, COMPRISING PORTIONS OF HIS 
DIARY FROM 1795 TO 1848, at 216–17 (Charles Francis Adams ed., 1874–77, rep. 
1969) (noting that a friend had passed “through the city of New York [and he had] 
heard that [Vice President Tompkins] was in prison for ten thousand dollars at the 
suit of Peter Jay Munro. It was for money that Munro had been compelled to pay as 
bondsman or endorser for Tompkins; but he understood it was probable the affair 
would be adjusted.”). If this rumor was true, then perhaps the Vice President would 
not enjoy the protections from civil arrest that lawmakers enjoy.    
349 See IRWIN, supra note 347, at 250–53. 
350 See id. at 262–63. 
351 See id. at 286–87. 
352 See id. at 287–88. 
353 See id. at 293–94. 
354 See id. at 295–97; see also 40 ANNALS OF CONG. 253, 259–60, 543, 906–10 
(1823). 
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them predating his tenure.  Thus, the Tompkins precedent sheds 
only a little light on the question of VPP. 
B. John C. Calhoun 
In 1826, while serving with President John Quincy Adams, 
Vice President John C. Calhoun was accused of benefiting from a 
contract awarded during his tenure as Secretary of War.355  Not 
only did Calhoun submit to a House Select Committee 
investigation into the matter,356
[T]he conduct of public servants is a fair subject of the closest 
scrutiny and the freest remarks . . . .  [W]hen such attacks 
assume the character of impeachable offense and become, in 
some degree, official by being placed among the public records, 
an officer thus assailed . . . can look for refuge only to the hall of 
the immediate Representatives of the People.
 he requested the inquiry in the 
first place.  Hoping the investigation would clear his name, 
Calhoun wrote:  
357
During the investigation, Calhoun refused to sit in the 
President’s chair.
   
358  He stated that a “sense of propriety forbids 
me from resuming my station till the House has disposed of this 
subject.”359
In its proceedings, the committee does not appear to  
have subpoenaed Calhoun or materials directly from him.
   
360   
The committee members “immediately after they 
assembled . . . informed the Vice President of their being 
organized, and of their readiness to receive any communication 
which he might see fit to make.”361
 
355 See, e.g., RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE 
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 255 (1974). 
  Instead of appearing in 
person, Calhoun sent a personal representative, George 
McDuffie.  The committee noted that “Mr. McDuffie, as the friend 
and representative of the Vice President, was admitted before the 
committee, and attended throughout the examination which 
356 See id. 
357 Id. 
358 See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 93. 
359 Id. 
360 In fact, the committee permitted witnesses to be subpoenaed at the request of 
Calhoun’s representative. See 3 REG. DEB. 1127–29 (1827). 
361 See id. at 1123. 
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followed.”362  In effect, McDuffie provided what amounted to 
Calhoun’s testimony.363
Through McDuffie, Calhoun registered a number of protests 
as to how the committee proceedings were being conducted, 
though his concerns did not involve matters of constitutional 
privilege.
 
364  Calhoun was forthcoming to the committee and was 
ultimately exculpated.365
Thus, in this second instance of an investigation involving a 
Vice President, there was no claim of privilege cited.  Calhoun 
did not appear before the committee in person, however, and the 
panel does not seem to have insisted upon it.  This apparent 
deference could have been a reflection of his status as Vice 
President.  As with the example of Tompkins, the question 
underlying the Calhoun investigation did not involve his vice 
presidential duties, therefore, this precedent carries less weight 
than it might appear at first blush. 
  
C. Schuyler Colfax 
Toward the end of his term as Ulysses Grant’s first Vice 
President, Schuyler Colfax became embroiled in the infamous 
Credit Mobilier financial scandal, which shook the nation in the 
early 1870s.366  A House Select Committee was established to 
investigate the matter and, on December 16, 1872, Colfax 
voluntarily made an appearance before the committee.367  A few 
months later, on January 6, 1873, Colfax appeared again on his 
own volition, but this time he testified under oath about his 




  The Vice President returned repeatedly 
363 See, e.g., id. at 1127–35. 
364 See, e.g., id. at 1127–32. 
365 See COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 255–56. 
366 See Sitting Presidents and Vice Presidents Who Have Testified, supra note 
339. Vice President elect Henry Wilson was also investigated by the committee for 
his role in the scandal. See, e.g., RICHARD H. ABBOTT, COBBLER IN CONGRESS: THE 
LIFE OF HENRY WILSON, 1812–1875, at 247–48 (1972); ERNEST MCKAY, HENRY 
WILSON: PRACTICAL RADICAL, A PORTRAIT OF A POLITICIAN 232–33 (1971). 
Obviously, this investigation had nothing to do with his impending official duties. 
367 See 1 REP. OF COMMS. OF HOUSE OF REP. 42d Cong. 81 (1873) [hereinafter 
HOUSE REPORT]. 
368 See id.  
369 See id. at 481 (characterizing Colfax’s appearance on February 11, 1873 as 
his being “recalled at his own instance”). 
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in an attempt to clear his name after evidence came to light 
about his apparently inappropriate financial ties to Credit 
Mobilier prior to his vice presidency.370
While it does not appear that Colfax raised an issue of 
privilege during his testimony, it has been contended by his 
biographer that the committee investigating the scandal 
recognized that it could not compel his appearance.
 
371  Colfax, 
however, seemed to implicitly concede that the committee might 
have been able to force his attendance.  He stated during his 
testimony that “I wish to say that, if any further testimony 
should be desired of me, I shall be ready to respond to the 
invitation of the committee at any time, without the formality of 
a summons.”372
Colfax later addressed the upper chamber on the matter and 
then requested that a Senate committee be established 
specifically to look into his conduct.
 
373  The Senate, however, 
declined Colfax’s request.374  Meanwhile, the House considered 
impeachment proceedings, but ultimately chose not to pursue 
them,375 perhaps in part because the alleged malfeasance took 
place prior to his vice presidency.376
 
370 See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION: FORD, ROCKEFELLER & THE 25TH 
AMENDMENT 36 n.** (Lester A. Sobel ed., 1975) [hereinafter SOBEL]. 
  If Colfax’s biographer is 
correct—that the House committee believed it lacked the 
authority to compel the attendance of the Vice President—then 
the Colfax example could be read to provide support for VPP.  
The historical record on this question seems less clear cut, 
however; in fact, Colfax himself raised the possibility of being 
formally summoned to the committee.  As with the Tompkins and 
Calhoun examples, the action for which Colfax was being 
investigated did not involve either his duties as Vice President or 
his actions while serving in the position; therefore, again, the 
precedential value of the episode should not be overstated.   
371 See WILLARD H. SMITH, SCHUYLER COLFAX: THE CHANGING FORTUNES OF A 
POLITICAL IDOL 376 (1952) (“[A]s Vice-President, the . . . committee had no 
jurisdiction over him, [so] he appeared voluntarily . . . on January 7.”). There is no 
citation supporting the author’s assertion to this effect.  
372 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 367, at 84 (emphasis added). 
373 See SMITH, supra note 371, at 398. 
374 See id.  
375 See e.g., id. at 398–99. 
376 See id.  
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D. Henry Wallace 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s second Vice President was Henry 
Wallace, who served in the post from 1941 to 1945.  During this 
period, Roosevelt delegated hitherto unprecedented authority to 
his Vice President.  The most prominent of these delegations was 
for Wallace to serve as the head of the BEW.  In this vein, 
Wallace was entrusted with policymaking authority to secure the 
necessary goods from abroad to support the American war 
effort.377  Two problems existed with this delegation: (1) it 
conflicted with existing authority enjoyed by the Departments of 
State and Commerce, both of which had strong allies on Capitol 
Hill;378 and (2) it involved Wallace who, as one of the most 
prominent liberals in the Roosevelt administration, was widely 
distrusted by conservatives in Congress.379
Martin Dies was a conservative Democratic congressman 
from Texas who chaired the HUAC in the 1940s.  Dies detested 
Wallace and the liberals that the Vice President used to staff the 
BEW.
  Because of these 
concerns, one FBI investigation was undertaken that involved 
Wallace’s personnel at the BEW and two congressional 
investigations directly involving Wallace were only narrowly 
averted. 
380  In March 1942, in an open letter addressed to Wallace, 
Dies accused thirty-five BEW staffers of links to Communist-run 
organizations.381  Dies focused in particular on Maurice 
Parmalee, who had written a book on nudism.  “[T]here is no 
place in such an agency for an outstanding advocate of nudism,” 
Dies thundered.382  Wallace counterattacked Dies in the press383 
but nonetheless agreed to have the FBI look into the officials 
cited in Dies’s letter.384
 
377 See, e.g., EDWARD L. SCHAPSMEIER & FREDERICK H. SCHAPSMEIER, PROPHET 
IN POLITICS: HENRY A. WALLACE AND THE WAR YEARS, 1940–1965, at 20 (1970).  
  Every one of the BEW staffers was later 
378 See, e.g., NORMAN D. MARKOWITZ, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE PEOPLE’S 
CENTURY: HENRY A. WALLACE AND AMERICAN LIBERALISM, 1941–1948, at 66–74 
(1973).    
379 See e.g., SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 50–52, 55–71. 
380 See, e.g., HOWARD B. SCHONBERGER, AFTERMATH OF WAR: AMERICANS AND 
THE REMAKING OF JAPAN, 1945–1952, at 94 (Lawrence S. Kaplan ed., 1989). 
381 See WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF 
THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES 131 (1968); see also 
SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 51–52. 
382 See GOODMAN, supra note 381, at 132. 
383 See Wallace Hits Dies as Aiding the Axis, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1942, at 1. 
384 See GOODMAN, supra note 381, at 132.     
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vindicated by the Bureau;385 yet, at least one other BEW 
employee was subpoenaed to appear before the HUAC.386
Wallace’s bureaucratic tensions within the Roosevelt 
administration were played out in Congress in another context as 
the Secretary of Commerce Jesse Jones and his allies combated 
the BEW’s undertakings.
  While 
this investigation involved staff under Wallace, it never involved 
the Vice President himself. 
387  Wallace and Jones exchanged angry 
accusations in the media over the alleged inefficiency of the 
other’s agency, leading committee chairmen sympathetic to the 
conservative secretary to begin to inquire during hearings into 
the executive branch discord.388  One such hearing of the Joint 
Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Federal Expenditures 
involved the voluntary testimony of Milo Perkins, the BEW’s 
executive secretary and a close aide to Wallace.389  Another 
involved Perkins’s appearance before the Senate Appropriations 
Committee.390
During the latter hearing, the committee requested of 
Perkins complete lists of participants in the meetings of the 
BEW, all of which were chaired by the Vice President.
   
391  These 
materials were provided to the committee.392  Perkins was asked 
about who had the authority at the BEW to issue certain 
directives.  He answered, “[i]n the last analysis, the Vice 
President has power to issue a directive to the R.F.C. on the 
programming and developing of foreign materials and he has 
power to delegate that authority to key men within B.E.W.”393
 
385 See id. at 133.    
  
The subsequent criticism directed at Perkins during the 
386 See SCHONBERGER, supra note 380, at 94; see also, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 282 
Before the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of 
Representatives, 78th Cong. 3467–80 (1943) (testimony of the BEW’s Thomas 
Bisson). 
387 See SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 55–71. 
388 See id. at 67. 
389 See id. at 62–65; see also Hearings Before the Joint Comm. on Reduction of 
Nonessential Federal Expenditures, 78th Cong. 2341–66 (1943). 
390 See, e.g., National War Agencies Appropriation Bill for 1944: Hearings on 
H.R. 2968 Before the S. Subcomm. of the Comm. on Appropriations, 78th Cong. 27–
44 (1943) (involving a close questioning of the BEW’s executive director about the 
composition of board meetings and the role of the Vice President in board 
decisionmaking).   
391 See id. at 28–38.   
392 See id.   
393 Id. at 41.     
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Appropriations Committee hearing prompted Wallace to submit 
a statement for placement in the committee record.394
The Wallace-Jones accusations reached such a fevered pitch 
there were serious discussions in both houses about 
congressional committee investigations devoted solely to the 
allegations.
  At no time 
in the hearing, however, did Perkins raise the issue of privilege.   
395  Republican Senator Styles Bridges thought that 
the Vice President and the Secretary should testify in front of a 
Senate committee in tandem due to the “very serious charges 
regarding the conduct of the war.”396
we have just witnessed the picture of two outstanding figures in 
this country, one the Vice President of the United States, head 
of the B.E.W., and the other the Secretary of Commerce . . . each 
one directing accusations against the other and challenging the 
other . . . .  I think the American public is entitled to know, who 
is right and who is wrong, and when the investigation shall 
have been completed, steps should be taken to correct the 
condition.
  Bridges argued that 
397
Bridges noted that both men “indicated a desire to have a 
congressional investigation of those very serious charges which 
concern the successful conduct of the war.”
   
398  The GOP Senator 
pursued an inquiry by urging adoption of a resolution.399  
Interestingly, Bridges’s resolution made no special allowances for 
the Vice President’s stature.400  The resolution was referred to 
the Senate Banking Committee, where it never reemerged.401
The Wallace-Jones tension aroused a similar reaction from 
House Republicans.  Representative Richard Wigglesworth also 
pursued an investigation, but his effort was defeated in the 
House Rules Committee on a party-line vote.
   
402
 
394 See id. at 359–62. 
  During the 
395 See SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 66–67.   
396 Id. at 6. 
397 89 CONG. REC. 7254–55 (1943) (statement of Sen. Bridges).   
398 Id. at 6934.   
399 See id. 
400 See id. at 6934–35 (referring S. Res. 165 to committee).    
401 The White House busily worked behind the scenes to scuttle the investigation 
and the relevant Senate committee chairman evinced little enthusiasm for such an 
effort. See, e.g., C.P. Trussell, Won’t Investigate BEW-RFC Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, July 
7, 1943, at 10; see also Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Sometimes “Easy Does It,” But 
Not in Wartime, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1943, at 20.   
402 See 89 CONG. REC. 7357 (1943) (statement of Rep. Wigglesworth); see also id. 
at 7398 (statement of Rep. Fish); id. at 7400 (statements of Reps. Hoffman and 
Wadsworth). Jones testified before the Rules Committee in favor of an inquiry. See 
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hearing, constitutional concerns were apparently raised about 
the House investigating the Vice President due to his role as 
President of the Senate.403
By this point, the conflict had caused Roosevelt sufficient 
embarrassment that he felt compelled to resolve the matter once 
and for all.
  This line of argumentation is 
noteworthy with respect to VPP in that it reflects an appreciation 
that the Vice President qua President of the Senate is likely 
immune from investigation by the House, at least outside of an 
impeachment inquiry.  
404  He dissolved the BEW and reassigned its 
responsibilities and employees to a new entity not under 
Wallace’s control.405  At the same time he removed authority from 
Jones as well.406  This reorganization and White House pressure 
assured no congressional investigation was undertaken.407
Wallace’s run-ins with Congress reflect the tensions that 
occur when a Vice President assumes an active policymaking role 
within the executive branch.  As would later prove to be the case 
with Vice Presidents Humphrey, Rockefeller, Bush, Quayle, and 
Cheney, Congress will take an interest in the activities of the 
Vice President if he becomes a major player in policy decisions.  
In the case of Wallace, the agency under his care came under 
scrutiny from the Congress, and despite his status as a 
constitutional officer there was even talk of his appearing before 
a congressional committee to answer questions.  Wallace’s 
actions, of course, involved authority delegated to him by 
Roosevelt and not his own constitutional power.   
 
E. Hubert Humphrey 
In early 1966, following a tour of Asia, Vice President 
Humphrey was asked to testify publicly before the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee to discuss his trip.408
 
Inquiry “Welcome,” Jones Tells Fish, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 1943, at 26. As with the 
Bridges resolution, the Wigglesworth measure made no allowances for or references 
to the Vice President’s status. See H.R. Res. 277, 78th Cong. (1945). 
  Humphrey 
refused, stating that “I do not believe it is desirable for the Vice 
403 See Trussell, supra note 401.      
404 See SCHAPSMEIER & SCHAPSMEIER, supra note 377, at 68–71. 
405 See id. at 71. 
406 See Mr. Wallace and Mr. Jones, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1943, at 12. 
407 See MARKOWITZ, supra note 378, at 72–73; Krock, supra note 401. 
408 See Fulbright Is “Surprised” Humphrey Won’t Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
1966, at 11 [hereinafter Humphrey Won’t Testify]. 
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President of the United States to testify.”409  Humphrey defended 
his position by using a familiar structural argument:  “The 
President does not testify and the Vice President has a role in 
government that I think precludes his formal testimony before a 
committee.”410  The Vice President expressed concern that doing 
so would “violate a long-established precedent.”411  The 
Committee Chairman, J. William Fulbright, feigned surprise at 
Humphrey’s stance.412
Meanwhile, another Committee member, Senator Wayne 
Morse, thought it would have been politically wise for Humphrey 
to have appeared before the Committee but defended the Vice 
President’s decision on constitutional grounds.
   
413  Morse 
contended that Humphrey could exercise an “executive privilege” 
akin to that of the President, which permitted the Vice President 
to refuse to appear.414
 
409 Id.; see also Robert C. Albright & Bryce Nelson, Fulbright Sees Continued 
Viet Probe; Hartke, Church Hit Johnson Policy, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1966, at A1. 
Years later, Fulbright attempted to get Vice President Agnew to testify before his 
panel following the latter’s completion of an Asian tour. See SEYMOUR K. FREIDIN, A 
SENSE OF THE SENATE 197 (1972). Noted constitutional authority Senator Sam Ervin 
questioned the legality of such a gambit, however. See id. Fulbright’s efforts in 
regard to Agnew’s testifying seem to have been less serious than with respect to 
Humphrey as there do not appear to be any references to the invitation in the major 
newspapers at the time. 
  Undeterred, on February 25, Fulbright 
410 Humphrey Will Refuse Testimony at Hearing, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 1966, at 
A9.   
411 Id. A Vice President voluntarily testifying before a congressional committee 
was not without precedent, however. As noted above, Vice President Colfax testified 
before a House select committee. See supra Part VI.C. Vice President Lyndon 
Johnson appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in closed session 
to brief members on a trip to Asia he had taken in 1961. See The Proceedings in 
Washington, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1961, at 13. Johnson also appeared before the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs under similar circumstances. See Washington 
Proceedings, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1961, at 12. The Johnson precedent regarding the 
Senate panel was cited by Fulbright during his committee’s conflict with Humphrey 
as a way to convince the Vice President to make an appearance. See Robert C. 
Albright, Humphrey Declines New Bid To Testify, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1966, at A8. 
Johnson’s appearance had been characterized at the time as “informal and private,” 
however, and did not involve Johnson appearing against his will. See Humphrey 
Agrees to Private Session, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 1966, at A7 [hereinafter Humphrey 
Agrees]. To the contrary, it had been undertaken at Vice President Johnson’s behest. 
See Albright & Nelson, supra note 409, at A9. Interestingly, during the Humphrey 
controversy, President Johnson declined to release the testimony he had delivered to 
the committee five years before as Vice President. See Humphrey Agrees, supra.  
412 See Humphrey Will Refuse Testimony at Hearing, supra note 410. 
413 See id. 
414 See id. 
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pressed ahead, sending Humphrey a formal “invitation” to 
appear before his committee, this time in closed session.415  When 
asked why he would not testify before the committee when 
Lyndon Johnson as Vice President had made an informal 
appearance a few years before, Humphrey remarked, “That’s his 
privilege.  My name is Hubert Humphrey.”416  He further noted, 
“as Vice President, I ought to examine the precedents.  You can’t 
tell where this will start—or stop.”417  A compromise was finally 
reached whereby Humphrey briefed committee members in the 
Senate Majority Leader’s office—as opposed to the committee 
room; he did so in a private setting, not in an open hearing, and 
the meeting included Senators who were not on the committee.418
Humphrey’s refusal to appear formally before the committee 
in open session is one of the most compelling political precedents 
for VPP prior to the Cheney vice presidency.  At a minimum, he 
seemed to believe that his status as a constitutional officer 
precluded his being forced to appear before the committee.  In 
this context, he also equated his office with the presidency.  
Thus, he raised constitutional concerns about testifying, 
although he did not fully develop them or at least did not express 
them publicly.  The Vice President’s arguments also seem to have 
been grudgingly accepted by Fulbright since the latter made 
serious concessions to coax Humphrey to appear before his panel.  
Moreover, Senator Morse spelled out even more explicitly than 
Humphrey that the Vice President holds a constitutional 
privilege similar to the President’s and could therefore decline to 
appear.  That said, Humphrey never made a formal claim of 
privilege and later appeared before the committee as part of a 
compromise.  In addition, Humphrey testified about a diplomatic 




415 See Letter from Sen. J.W. Fulbright to Vice President Hubert Humphrey 
(Feb. 25, 1966) (on file with author); see also Albright, supra note 411, at A1. 
 not 
416 Don Irwin, Humphrey Balks at Bid by Fulbright Group: But Vice President 
Doesn’t Flatly Reject Request To Discuss Recent Far East Tour, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 
1966, at 10. 
417 Id. 
418 See E.W. Kenworthy, Senators Hear Vice President Defend War Policy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 3, 1966, at 16; see also Bryce Nelson, Humphrey Faces Fulbright Unit—
And Can Smile, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 1966, at A15; Humphrey Agrees, supra note 
411. 
419 Told of Asia Loans, Fulbright Aide Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1966, at A18 
(noting that the President granted authority to the Vice President on the trip). 
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his own.  So while the precedent provides a useful parallel to 
VPP, it is not completely “on all fours.” 
F. Spiro Agnew 
President Nixon’s Vice President, Spiro Agnew, became 
embroiled in a scandal that forced him to resign from office.  In 
1973, Agnew left the vice presidency after pleading no contest to 
income tax evasion.420
In early August 1973, federal officials approached Agnew 
and told him he was under investigation.  Officials requested 
personal documents from him,
  During the investigation surrounding the 
charges, which stemmed from his acceptance of bribes prior to 
and during his vice presidency, Agnew offered mixed signals 
regarding a potential constitutional privilege but ultimately did 
not formally make an assertion.  Interestingly, the President’s 
office and the DOJ appeared to doubt the legitimacy of such an 
invocation.   
421 the lion’s share of which 
involved actions prior to his vice presidency.422  Initially, Agnew’s 
attorneys raised the question of whether the Vice President had 
to provide the materials, which consisted of his financial 
records.423  It was thought at the time that his lawyers would 
urge Agnew to claim a constitutional privilege to withhold these 
papers.424  When asked whether he would release the materials, 
Agnew conceded that he was not a “profound constitutional 
scholar”;425 however, he made clear that he would not “blindly 
follow” the recommendation of his attorneys either.426
Agnew’s potential assertion of a constitutional privilege with 
regard to his financial records was met with skepticism among 




420 See, e.g., KYVIG, supra note 12, at 137–38.   
421 See A Chronology of Events in Agnew Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 34. 
422 See Warren Weaver, Jr., Agnew Suddenly Shares in Nixon Legal Dilemma, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1973, at 1, 20. The documents requested were from 1967, two 
years before his vice presidency, to August 1973. See Ben A. Franklin, Agnew 
Granted Extension on Turning over Records, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1973, at 1. 
423 See Edward Walsh & Richard M. Cohen, Agnew Lawyers Study Stand on 
Executive Privilege, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1973, at B1. 
424 See id. 
425 Weaver, supra note 422. 
426 Walsh & Cohen, supra note 423. 
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[F]or Mr. Agnew to contend in court that he was entitled to 
invoke the doctrine of executive privilege to keep confidential 
his personal records, he would presumably have to demonstrate 
that he was inextricably involved at the highest level in 
executive branch decisions . . . .  The Vice President’s position is 
considerably different from the President’s, however, in that the 
grand jury inquiry in which he is involved deals largely with 
events during his service [in state government].427
Not long afterward, Agnew wrote the U.S. Attorney in 
charge of his case.  In the letter, the Vice President indicated he 
would turn over all his financial records to investigators.
 
428
[i]n your letter . . . you request that I make certain of my 
personal records available to you.  I am prepared to do so 
immediately. . . .  You understand that, by making these records 
available to you, I do not acknowledge that you or any grand 
jury have any right to records of the Vice President.  Nor do I 
acknowledge the propriety of any grand jury investigation of 
possible wrongdoing on the part of the Vice President so long as 
he occupies that office.  These are difficult Constitutional 
questions which need not at this moment be confronted.
  He 
declined, however, to turn over any official, vice presidential 
papers to the DOJ, asserting that  
429
Agnew’s statement in this regard clearly reflects the view that 
the Vice President does possess a constitutional privilege of some 
sort.  That said, his pronouncement is somewhat less than meets 
the eye since investigators were in fact not seeking his official 
records. 
   
At the time, one observer raised the question of whether a 
precedent was actually being set: 
There were several important sidelights on questions that have 
held the center stage during the Watergate case and have 
reappeared in the Vice President’s case.  One is the question of 
executive privilige [sic] . . . .  Mr. Agnew’s aides said his 
records—financial and tax papers—are personal and not Vice 
 
427 See Weaver, supra note 422, at 20. 
428 See Agnew Reply to Letter from Beall, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1973, at A8 
[hereinafter Agnew Reply]. 
429 Id. (emphasis added). Agnew’s decision to cooperate with prosecutors and not 
invoke a privilege was applauded at the time, in large part because it was a 
departure from Nixon’s aggressive use of executive privilege. See The Vice President 
and the Investigation, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1973, at A18 (“It appears that [Agnew] 
does not choose to wrap himself in dubious interpretations of the Constitution, or in 
privileges questionably extracted from it.”).  
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Presidential, thus avoiding a constitutional confrontation over 
the question.  Because there is so much unplowed legal ground 
in the matter, it was not clear if any precedents were being set 
by the Vice President’s action.430
Even though Nixon thought Agnew should not turn over his 
records,
  
431 it became clear that the President’s lawyers were not 
prepared to go so far as to assist Agnew with respect to claiming 
executive privilege.  They declined “to let Agnew share the legal 
shelter [the President] had constructed for himself”432 for 
Watergate.  Apparently an attempt at a “joint legal strategy” 
between the President and the Vice President as to executive 
privilege was shot down by the White House.433
Contemporary DOJ analysis about whether the Vice 
President enjoyed immunity from the criminal justice process 
while in office was equally unhelpful to Agnew.  An internal 
memorandum on the question of immunity briefly touched on the 
Vice President and executive privilege.  The memorandum 
concluded that  
   
[w]e based the President’s immunity from criminal proceedings 
essentially on two grounds.  First, that the person who controls 
criminal prosecutions as the head of the Executive branch, 
controls part of the evidence as holder of the power of Executive 
privilege, and is vested with the pardoning power under Article 
II, section 2, clause 1 of the Constitution . . . .  This set of 
considerations obviously is not applicable to the Vice 
President.434
 
430 Anthony Ripley, Agnew; Waiting To See If the Shoe Drops, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
19, 1973, at 178. 
  
431 Apparently, Nixon vigorously opposed Agnew’s compliance with the 
document request because it differed from his own less accommodating legal position 
during the Watergate investigations. See Christopher Lydon, Aides Hint Agnew Will 
Cooperate, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1973, at 1, 21.  
432 COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 204.    
433 See id. at 203–04; see also Christopher Lydon, Nixon’s Support of Agnew 
Falls Short, In View of Vice President’s Associates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1973, at 13. 
434 Memorandum from Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Regarding the Amenability of the President, Vice 
President and Other Civil Officers to Federal Criminal Prosecution While in Office 
34 (Sept. 24, 1973) [hereinafter Dixon Memo] (emphasis added). The Solicitor 
General filed a memorandum with the court consistent with the OLC opinion. See 
CRS, supra note 12, at 603. The DOJ’s position in 1973 regarding a Vice President’s 
immunity from criminal process was reaffirmed a quarter century later. See 
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
A Sitting President’s Amenability to Indictment and Criminal Prosecution (Oct. 16, 
2000) (“[W]e conclude that the determinations made by the Department in 
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Thus, in part because the Vice President is not the holder of 
executive privilege, the DOJ reasoned he should not be shielded 
with criminal immunity.  The Department also concluded in the 
context of the investigation that  
[t]he prosecution . . . would be severely hampered by the 
withholding from the grand jury of those elements of the alleged 
conspiracy linked to the Vice President.  As a result the 
activities of the alleged co-conspirators could not be fully 
disclosed and evaluated, which might redound unfairly to their 
benefit.  At the same time, the Vice President might be unfairly 
linked by innuendo or incomplete disclosure of facts to the 
alleged conspiracy.  In short any resultant delay in the 
proceedings would benefit the co-conspirators, hamper the 
prosecution, and postpone a possible exoneration of the Vice 
President.435
Clearly, the Department was not of the view that the Vice 
President had recourse to executive privilege, at least in a 
criminal proceeding.  Even if the DOJ’s reasoning is accepted as 
valid, such a conclusion would not preclude the Vice President 
from exercising a privilege pursuant to his own constitutional 
duties in the context of a civil lawsuit or a congressional 
investigation. 
 
Of perhaps even more interest was that the White House 
offered to help the DOJ secure logs of meetings Agnew had 
conducted and to help determine whether the Vice President had 
his own internal taping system.436
In late September, following the surrender of his personal 
records, Agnew pursued a new gambit.  He attempted to mimic 
  If Agnew believed he had his 
own recognized constitutional privilege, at least with regard to 
his executive branch duties as delegated by the President or by 
statute, President Nixon’s lawyers seemed to disagree since they 
presumably would have felt constrained from making the DOJ 
such an offer.   
 
1973 . . . remain sound and that subsequent developments in the law validate both 
the analytical framework applied and the conclusions reached at that time.”); cf. 
Memorandum from Randolph D. Moss, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
Whether a Former President May Be Indicted and Tried for the Same Offenses for 
Which He Was Impeached by the House and Acquitted by the Senate (Aug. 18, 
2000). For an argument in favor of a sitting Vice President having immunity from 
the criminal justice process prior to impeachment, see Alexander M. Bickel, The 
Constitutional Tangle, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 1973, at 14–15.   
435 Dixon Memo, supra note 434, at 41. 
436 See COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 177–78. 
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the Calhoun precedent and asked Speaker Carl Albert that a 
House committee look into the matter.437  In so doing, he acted 
without seeking the approval of the President, reflecting in no 
small part the constitutional independence of the Vice 
President.438  Agnew’s letter to Speaker Albert seeking an 
investigation gave little hint that he might possess a 
constitutional privilege, at least in this context.  The Vice 
President quoted Calhoun: “ ‘In claiming the investigation of the 
House, I am sensible that, under our free and happy institutions, 
the conduct of public servants is a fair subject of the closest 
scrutiny . . . .’ ”439  In fact, he acknowledged the House’s authority 
to investigate his conduct and to have access to his personal 
records, writing, “the House [is] the only proper agency to 
investigate the conduct of a president or vice president.”440  He 
promised he would “of course, cooperate fully [with the 
House] . . . .  I have directed my counsel to deliver forthwith to 
the clerk of the House all of my original records of which copies 
have previously been furnished to the United States attorney.”441  
The House leadership, however, declined to permit such an 
investigation.442
In sum, Agnew’s example provides further support for VPP, 
but that support is not unqualified.  While his private lawyers 
wrote to the U.S. attorney hinting at a vice presidential privilege 
of some sort, and while Agnew expressly reserved the right to 
control his own official papers, the Vice President never actually 
invoked the privilege because no official records were ever 
implicated in the investigation.  At the same time, the DOJ in its 
analysis of the related question of immunity expressed 
skepticism about a vice presidential executive privilege claim, at 
least in the context of a criminal probe.  Similarly, White House 
   
 
437 See id. at 255. 
438 See id. at 253. See generally infra notes 652–97 and accompanying text 
(regarding the Vice President’s constitutional independence). Underscoring this 
point, Agnew during a press conference noted that “I think the Vice President of the 
United States should stand on his own two feet . . . . It really isn’t that important 
what a President says.” See Lou Cannon, Offers To Let Prosecutors Interview Him, 
WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 1973, at A1. Lou Cannon analyzed the situation as such: 
“Agnew[ ] . . . continued a policy of newly asserted vice presidential independence 
from the White House . . . .” See id.  
439 SOBEL, supra note 370, at 37. 
440 Id. 
441 Id. 
442 See, e.g., COHEN & WITCOVER, supra note 355, at 256–57.   
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lawyers offered to help secure vice presidential records for the 
prosecutors.  Agnew even indicated he would subject himself to a 
House investigation.  Finally, the Vice President volunteered to 
be interviewed by the DOJ and hinted he might appear before a 
grand jury.443
G. Gerald Ford 
  None of these factors would seem to be wholly 
consistent with the Vice President possessing a constitutional 
privilege. 
A few weeks after his elevation from the vice presidency to 
the Oval Office in 1974, Gerald Ford pardoned his predecessor, 
Richard Nixon.  This prompted an outcry, as many suspected 
Ford had cut a deal whereby, in exchange for the presidency, 
Ford had agreed to grant clemency to his predecessor.  
Resolutions of inquiry were introduced in the House of 
Representatives.444
[T]he Chairman and others in their questioning have 
established very clearly that [your] appearance here today is an 
entirely voluntary one on your part, that it was your idea, that 
you had not been requested by the committee to come in person, 
that we had indicated that it would be entirely satisfactory as 
far as we were concerned, if some assistant appeared instead.
  To quell the torrent of criticism, Ford hit 
upon the idea of testifying before a House Judiciary 
subcommittee.  As Representative Wiley Mayne confirmed with 
the President during the hearing: 
445
Instead of claiming executive privilege or VPP and qualifying the 
scope of his examination, Ford freely testified in open session 
regarding specific conversations he had had while Vice 
President.
   
446
President Ford stated in his testimony before the 
subcommittee that “I shall proceed to explain as fully as I can in 
 
 
443 See id. at 172. The former Vice President ultimately became embroiled in 
litigation over privilege, but it was attorney-client privilege and not a constitutional 
claim. See Agnew v. State, 446 A.2d 425 (Md. 1982). 
444 Two resolutions were introduced in the House in an attempt to establish a 
House investigatory committee but neither was adopted. See SOBEL, supra note 370, 
at 36. 
445 Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and Related Matters: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 105 
(1974) [hereinafter Pardon Hearings]. 
446 For what it is worth, Ford asserted that no precedent should attach to his 
appearance. Of course, like it or not, a precedent is a precedent.   
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my present answers the facts and the circumstances covered by 
the present resolutions of inquiry.  I shall start with an 
explanation of these events which were the first to 
occur . . . before I became President.”447  Ford noted that one of 
the House resolutions sought “information about certain 
conversations that may have occurred over a period that includes 
when I was a Member of Congress or the Vice President.  In that 
entire period no references or discussions on a possible pardon for 
then President Nixon occurred until August 1 and 2, 1974.”448  In 
his statement, the President proceeded to go into detail about 
conversations he had had with Nixon’s Chief of Staff, Alexander 
Haig, while Ford had served as Vice President.  During these 
talks the two men discussed a number of issues related to a 
potential presidential succession, one of the central components 
of VPP.449
Ford told the committee: 
 
[General Haig] came to my office about 3:30 p.m. [on August 1] 
for a meeting that was to last for approximately three-quarters 
of an hour.  
. . . .  
Based on what he had learned of the conversation on the [soon-
to-be released Nixon] tape, he wanted to know whether I was 
prepared to assume the Presidency within a very short period of 
time, and whether I would be willing to make recommendations 
to the President as to what course he should now follow. 
. . . .  
General Haig asked for my assessment of the whole situation.  
He wanted my thoughts about the timing of a resignation, if 
that decision were to be made, and about how to do it and 
accomplish an orderly change of the administration.  We 
discussed what scheduling problems there might be and what 
the early organizational problems would be. 
. . . .  
On the resignation issue, there were put forth a number of 
options which General Haig reviewed with me.  As I recall his 
conversation, various possible options being considered 
included: (1) The President temporarily step aside under the 
 
447 Pardon Hearings, supra note 445, at 93. 
448 Id. 
449 See id. at 93–95. For more on these conversations and related deliberations, 
see BOB WOODWARD & CARL BERNSTEIN, THE FINAL DAYS 325–27, 332–35, 399–401 
(1976); BOB WOODWARD, SHADOW: FIVE PRESIDENTS AND THE LEGACY OF 
WATERGATE 3–14 (1999); FEERICK, supra note 18, at 156–60. 
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25th Amendment. (2) Delaying resignation until further along 
the impeachment process. (3) Trying first to settle for a censure 
vote as a means of avoiding either impeachment or a need to 
resign. (4) The question of whether the President could pardon 
himself. (5) Pardoning various Watergate defendants, then 
himself, followed by resignation. (6) A pardon to the President 
himself, should he resign.  I told General Haig I had to have 
some time to think. 
. . . .  
[The next day I called] General Haig . . . and told him I wanted 
him to understand that I had no intention of recommending 
what President Nixon should do about resigning or not 
resigning, and that nothing we had talked about the previous 
afternoon should be given any consideration in whatever 
decision the President might make.  General Haig told me he 
was in full agreement with this position.450
Following his opening statement, Ford then answered 
questions from members on an assortment of conversations he 
had had, including two that had taken place while he was still 
Vice President.  From a strictly legal standpoint, if there ever 
was a golden opportunity to assert VPP it would have been 
here.
 
451  A former Vice President was getting asked about highly 
sensitive conversations he had had involving his constitutional 
duty to prepare for succession, and Ford answered the questions 
without invoking VPP—or traditional executive privilege for that 
matter.452
President Ford’s exchange with Representative Don 
Edwards is instructive in this vein: 
  
Mr. EDWARDS. . . . you indicate that there were some general 
discussions with General Haig and [Nixon’s attorney] before the 
resignation about the pardon power in general.  
Did they have any reason to carry a message to then President 
Nixon that this pardon power could possibly be used on his 
behalf if he resigned? 
President FORD. None whatsoever.  Categorically no. 
 
450 Pardon Hearings, supra note 445, at 93–95. 
451 Of course, as a political matter, it would have been exceedingly difficult for 
Ford to make such a claim because of the political pressure he faced following the 
pardon and because of the defeat of Nixon’s Watergate-related claim of executive 
privilege just weeks before in the Supreme Court. 
452 See supra Part VII.A.2 (discussing the constitutional basis for invocation of 
VPP in the context of succession and presidential inability). 
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Mr. EDWARDS. Then why, Mr. President, were there those 
general discussions about [sic] pardon? 
President FORD. Well, as I indicated in my prepared statement, 
General Haig came to me first to apprise me of the dramatic 
change in the situation.  And as I indicated in the prepared 
statement, he told me that I should be prepared to assume the 
Presidency very quickly, and wanted to know whether I was 
ready to do that. 
Second, he indicated that in the White House, among the 
President’s advisors, there were many options being discussed 
as to what course of action the President should take . . . .453
Ford’s exchange with Representative David Dennis also 
delved into the details of his vice presidential conversations: 
 
Mr. DENNIS. . . . Mr. President, on page 7 of your statement 
where you were talking about your first or your second 
interview with General Haig on the afternoon of August 1, you 
stated that “I describe this meeting because at one point it did 
include references to a possible pardon for Mr. Nixon.”  I take it 
that you have spelled out what those references were over on 
pages 9, where the options are spelled out, and 10, where you 
state that you inquired as to what was the President’s 
pardoning power, is that correct?  
President FORD. Yes.  It is spelled out in the itemed instances, 1 
through 6, eight various options involving a pardon. 
Mr. DENNIS. And does that include everything that was said at 
that time on the subject of pardon, substantially? 
President FORD. Yes, sir.454
While most of the questioning by the subcommittee involved 
issues related to the Nixon pardon which took place after Ford 
had become President, as Ford’s exchanges with Representatives 
Edwards and Dennis reflect, he was asked about preparation for 
succession while Vice President as well.  Even though Ford 
appeared voluntarily before the subcommittee, it is difficult to 





453 Pardon Hearings, supra note 445, at 102. 
 
454 Id. at 103. 
455 At the same time, Ford’s appearance argues against the existence of 
executive privilege as well, but few would doubt that doctrine’s legitimacy and the 
authority of the President to decline to appear before a congressional committee. 
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H. Nelson Rockefeller 
The vice presidency of Nelson Rockefeller provides three 
episodes that inform notions of VPP.  The first instance involved 
his role as head of an executive branch body investigating the 
intelligence community.  The second and third instances involved 
the Vice President providing testimony in court and to state 
investigative panels about actions he took while Governor of New 
York. 
1. The Rockefeller Commission 
In late 1974, following media disclosure of controversial 
intelligence activities carried out within the U.S. by the federal 
government, there was a great hue and cry for a thorough review 
of how the intelligence community had conducted itself.456
The Rockefeller Commission was established by executive 
order pursuant to the President’s power under the Constitution 
and various unspecified federal statutes.  President Ford 
declared that “by virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution and statutes of the United States, and as President 
of the United States, I hereby order” establishment of the 
Commission.
  In 
response, in early 1975, President Ford appointed a commission 
led by Vice President Rockefeller to investigate the intelligence 
community’s activities. 
457  There is no reference to vice presidential 
authority in the directive.458
Not long after the Commission began its work, committees in 
both houses of Congress undertook similar investigations.  In the 
Senate, this effort was led by a select committee chaired by 
Senator Frank Church.  During the Senate inquiry, the Church 
Committee requested information that had come into the 
possession of the Rockefeller Commission.  The leadership of the 
Committee met with the Vice President in May 1975,
  The order clearly reflects that Vice 




456 See, e.g., LOCH K. JOHNSON, A SEASON OF INQUIRY: THE SENATE 
INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION 9 (1985). 
 urging 
him to provide the committee with the necessary documents.  
Rockefeller politely declined, stating that “of course, I can’t—not 
457 Exec. Order No. 11,828, 40 Fed. Reg. 1219 (Jan. 4, 1975). 
458 See id. 
459 See JOHNSON, supra note 456, at 41. 
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until we’ve finished our work and the president approves it.”460  
It appeared to the author of the history of the Church Committee 
that the Vice President believed that “[s]ince the president had 
appointed the commission in the first place, he ultimately would 
have to decide which of its materials could be transferred to 
Congress.”461
While Rockefeller did not explicitly claim a privilege over the 
materials, he did refuse to produce the documents.  If the Vice 
President enjoyed his own constitutional privilege over executive 
branch functions delegated to him by the President, Rockefeller 
certainly could have asserted such a power at this time.  Instead, 
the Vice President made clear that the ultimate authority over 
the materials in question lay with the President and not with 
him.  Rockefeller’s failure to invoke a privilege is of only modest 
precedential value, however, because the authority being 
exercised by the Vice President was not his own. 
  
2. Testifying as to Actions While Governor 
Despite his status as Vice President, Rockefeller testified on 
several occasions before state entities as to actions he had taken 
while Governor.462  One instance involved matters stemming 
from Rockefeller’s role in the Attica prison riot of 1971.463  In a 
1975 murder trial stemming from the riot, the defendants 
attempted to subpoena Rockefeller, who had since become Vice 
President.464  Notably, during his argument to try to convince the 
court that Rockefeller should be compelled to appear, defense 
counsel contended that any assertion of “executive privilege” by 
the Vice President would be illegitimate.465  Rockefeller’s lawyer, 
however, specifically declined to invoke a constitutional 
privilege.466
 
460 Id. at 41–42 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
  The court was informed by Rockefeller’s counsel that 
461 Id. at 42; see also Mary Perot Nichols, Frank Church: The Hottest Liberal 
Dark Horse, VILLAGE VOICE, June 2, 1975, at 7. 
462 As noted earlier, Vice President Tompkins also cooperated with a state 
Senate investigative body looking into activities during his term as New York 
Governor. See IRWIN, supra note 347, at 231, 250–53. 
463 See Michael T. Kaufman, Defense in Attica Trial Moves To Subpoena 
Rockefeller as Witness, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1975, at 15. 
464 See id. 
465 See Michael T. Kaufman, Lawyer Defends Rockefeller Against Testifying on 
Attica, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1975, at 19. 
466 Id. 
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“what is not at issue is any claim of privilege or immunity.”467  
Counsel for the Vice President contended that no subpoena was 
necessary because the Vice President’s testimony would have 
constituted inadmissible hearsay.468  The state court judge ruled 
against subpoenaing Rockefeller, but he did not base his ruling 
on constitutional privilege; instead, the judge accepted the view 
of Rockefeller’s lawyers that his testimony would have amounted 
to inadmissible hearsay.469  The judge explained that “the present 
or former governmental position of the prospective witness 
matters not one whit.”470
Although excused from testifying in this particular instance, 
Rockefeller did in fact testify in other fora that same year to 
discuss his role in the Attica riot.  For instance, Rockefeller 
appeared in front of a grand jury on the matter.
  While a vice presidential privilege was 
not invoked by Rockefeller, what stands out is that defense 
counsel anticipated that the Vice President might claim such a 
privilege and therefore the attorney prepared accordingly.  
Clearly, a vice presidential privilege was viewed as very much 
within the realm of possible legal arguments.  
471  In so doing, 
Rockefeller testified voluntarily.472  His spokesperson said, “they 
asked if he would help out and cooperate, and he said yes.”473  In 
addition, the Vice President testified before a state investigative 
body looking into the affair.474
Also in 1975, two New York investigative commissions 
requested that Rockefeller appear and discuss matters relating to 
the administration of state nursing homes and urban 





  The 
question was immediately raised whether Rockefeller could be 
compelled to testify if he declined their requests.  For his part, 
468 See id. 
469 See Michael T. Kaufman, Attica Defense Loses on Rockefeller, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 22, 1975, at 63. 
470 Id. 
471 See Tom Goldstein, Rockefeller Due at Attica Hearing: Vice President To 
Testify Before Jury Tomorrow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1975, at 39 [hereinafter 
Rockefeller Due]. 
472 See Tom Goldstein, Rockefeller Testifies on Attica for 3 Hours Before Grand 
Jury, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1975, at 16. 
473 Rockefeller Due, supra note 471. 
474 See id. 
475 See e.g., Edith Evans Asbury, Moreland Panel Seeks Rockefeller, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 25, 1975, at 1. 
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the nursing home commission chairman replied that the panel 
would “cross that bridge when we come to it.”476  The chairman 
indicated that the panel’s legal analysis had concluded that it 
could indeed subpoena the Vice President for information 
relating to his time as Governor but could not take the same 
steps regarding his actions as Vice President.477  The conclusion 
of the nursing home commission chairman—that his panel could 
not force Rockefeller to appear to discuss his actions as Vice 
President—dovetails with the prevailing view that congressional 
committees may not compel a Vice President’s attendance.478  As 
in the Attica criminal proceedings, the party trying to require 
Rockefeller’s attendance recognized his status as a constitutional 
officer and conducted research to determine if, in fact, he could be 
forced to appear.  If a vice presidential privilege were an absurd 
notion—truly beyond the pale as a legal matter—the commission 
presumably would not have even thought to conduct such 
research.  In the end, Rockefeller testified voluntarily before both 
commissions about his actions while Governor.479
At first blush, these episodes involving Vice President 
Rockefeller testifying before state bodies could be seen to counsel 
against VPP.  After all, if a Vice President can appear before a 
state panel, it could be argued that a fortiori he can be brought 
before a federal entity.  Four important caveats must be kept in 
mind, however, when considering Rockefeller’s testimony before 
these state bodies.  First, these appearances dealt with matters 
that occurred prior to his tenure as Vice President and were 
therefore unrelated to his duties in that capacity.  Second, the 
matters involved state, not federal, issues.  Under the American 
system of federalism, national and state authorities are often 
viewed as separate and distinct sovereigns.  Because the Vice 
President’s legal status falls under the federal government, 
theoretically he might not benefit from a privilege under state 
law.  Third, Rockefeller seems to have testified voluntarily in 
   
 
476 Id. 
477 See id. 
478 Issues of federalism almost certainly also came into play in the commission’s 
conclusion that it, as a state body, could not force the Vice President to discuss 
national issues.     
479 See Frank J. Prial, Rockefeller Knew of Nursing Abuse: Tells Inquiry State 
Budget Restrictions Hampered Audits and Inspections, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1975, at 
1; Edith Evans Asbury, Rockefeller Backs U.D.C.: Says Audit Will Praise It, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1975, at 45. 
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these instances and was not forced to appear.  Finally, as 
outlined above, the underlying assumptions by both defense 
counsel in the Attica case and by the state investigative 
commission were that there was at least a chance Rockefeller 
might claim a vice presidential privilege of some sort.  Had the 
prospect of such a privilege been wholly novel or outlandish 
neither party would presumably have bothered to pursue the 
matter or even thought to look into it.  
I. George H.W. Bush 
During his vice presidency, George H.W. Bush was asked to 
provide information to Independent Counsel Lawrence Walsh 
and a congressional investigative committee about his alleged 
role in the Iran-Contra affair.480  Apparently, at no time did Bush 
assert his own constitutional privilege.481
 
480 Two congressional investigations looked into the 1980 “October Surprise” 
controversy. These panels examined, among other things, whether in 1980 then vice 
presidential candidate George H.W. Bush tried to convince the revolutionary Iranian 
regime to continue to hold the U.S. hostages until the American election had taken 
place, thus, precluding the Carter administration from unveiling an “October 
Surprise.” See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 343, at 8–9 n.3. The Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations reviewed the matter. See SPECIAL COUNSEL TO SENATOR TERRY 
SANFORD AND SENATOR JAMES M. JEFFORDS OF THE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
102D CONG., THE “OCTOBER SURPRISE” ALLEGATIONS AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
SURROUNDING THE RELEASE OF THE AMERICAN HOSTAGES HELD IN IRAN (Comm. 
Print 1992). While the investigation interviewed members of the secret service 
detailed to then vice presidential candidate Bush, it did not interview Bush himself 
who was President at the time. See id. at 10, 78. The House looked into the matter 
more thoroughly, but it did not discuss the matter with Bush either. See H.R. REP. 
No. 102-1102, at 172–73, 180 n.278 (1993). Bush flatly rejected these charges. See, 
e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Panel Rejects Theory Bush Met With Iranians in Paris in ‘80, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 2, 1992, at A16. These investigations obviously implicated the actions of 
a vice presidential candidate and not a sitting Vice President or even a Vice 
President elect.     
 
481 See Charles Tiefer, The Specially Investigated President, 5 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE: J. INTERDISC. LEGAL. STUD. 143, 171 n.134 (1998). See generally 
MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL CLAIMS OF EXECUTIVE 
PRIVILEGE: HISTORY, LAW, PRACTICE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 30 (2007) 
(making no reference to such an invocation). 
In United States v. Poindexter, a criminal proceeding stemming from the Iran-
Contra affair, the court held that there was no compelling need for the defendant to 
review Bush’s vice presidential records. See 725 F. Supp. 13, 21, 30 (D.D.C. 1989). 
The court’s rationale did not go to the question of the Vice President’s constitutional 
status, but instead centered around: (1) the defendant’s inability to “point to a Vice 
Presidential authorization of his activities as a defense”; (2) the Vice President’s 
records providing no new evidence; and (3) deference to Bush in his capacity at the 
time as President. See id. at 30. 
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The Vice President was not at the center of the congressional 
Iran-Contra hearings.482  Perhaps for this reason during the 
course of the congressional investigation, in the words of one of 
the senior committee counsels, Bush “never submitted to 
interviewing or questioning by the” committee.483  Bush aides, 
however, did testify before the joint investigative panel.484  
During their testimony, Bush staff members shared with the 
committee their recollection of discussions they had had with the 
Vice President.485  Far from claiming a constitutional privilege, 
the Office of the Counsel to the Vice President issued the 
following statement: “The Office of the Vice President has 
completed a comprehensive review of its files and records and 
has transmitted or made available all documents related to the 
Iran-Contra investigations to the Independent Counsel and the 
Congressional Committees investigating the Iran-Contra 
matter.”486
As the Vice President’s counsel noted, information related to 
presidential and vice presidential communications were also 
made available to the independent counsel.
  
487  In fact, Vice 
President Bush was deposed by the independent counsel’s office 
on January 11, 1988488 and interviewed by the FBI on December 
12, 1986.489  Instead of trying to limit the scope of inquiry 
through a claim of constitutional privilege, the Vice President 
told his staff to “just give them everything.”490
 
482 See WILLIAM S. COHEN & GEORGE J. MITCHELL, MEN OF ZEAL: A CANDID 
INSIDE STORY OF THE IRAN-CONTRA HEARINGS 264 (1988) (“The Committee did not 
focus on the role of Vice President George Bush.”). The chairman of the Iran-Contra 
Committee, Senator Dan Inouye, did not support subpoenaing the Vice President 
and trying to compel him to appear before the panel. See Steven V. Roberts, Reagan 
Would Turn over “Excerpts” from Notes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1987, at A14. 
  While White 
House counsel did invoke attorney-client privilege on behalf of 
483 CHARLES TIEFER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PRESIDENCY: THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION’S STRATEGY FOR GOVERNING WITHOUT CONGRESS 170 n.12 (1994).      
484 See CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY, THE IRAN-CONTRA PUZZLE 143–44 (1988). 
485 See id. 
486 Id. at D-20. 
487 See, e.g., LAWRENCE E. WALSH, IRAN-CONTRA: THE FINAL REPORT 443 (1994).   
488 See id. at 473. 
489 Id. After his 1992 pardons of Iran-Contra figures, Bush declined an 
additional interview unless it was restricted to questions of document production. 
See id. at 474. The independent counsel decided against pursuing a grand jury 
subpoena since Walsh “did not believe there was an appropriate likelihood of a 
criminal prosecution.” Id. 
490 Id. at 476.  
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Bush regarding some Iran-Contra matters,491 that is of course a 
nonconstitutional privilege.  Moreover, the privilege was not 
asserted by the Vice President himself, but by the President’s 
aides.492
In sum, there seems to be little indication that Bush believed 
he enjoyed a vice presidential privilege.
 
493
J. Dan Quayle 
  It should nevertheless 
be remembered that Bush’s role in the Iran-Contra affair 
involved delegated responsibilities and not his own constitutional 
duties. 
During the George H.W. Bush administration, Vice 
President Dan Quayle was charged by the President with 
heading up the Council on Competitiveness, which reviewed 
agency regulations before they were issued.494  This undertaking 
raised hackles from many in Congress who felt that this was an 
effort to evade legislative oversight.495  The Council was involved 
in a number of controversial regulatory decisions that prompted 
several congressional inquiries.496  Many members believed the 
Council was watering down the effect of federal statutes by 
promulgating rules that lowered environmental, safety, and 
health standards.497





491 See id. at 479 n.65; Tiefer, supra note 481. Bush invoked attorney-client 
privilege over some materials while former President but not apparently as Vice 
President. See WALSH, supra note 487, at 477.  
  The House Subcommittee on Health and 
the Environment held a series of such proceedings involving the 
492 See id. 
493 Interestingly, Vice President Bush did on at least one occasion make a 
statement about the privileged nature of his conversations; he stated that “who I 
talk to about what, again is privileged.” Dick Kirschten, George Bush—Keeping His 
Profile Low So He Can Keep His Influence High, NAT. J., June 20, 1981, at 1096, 
1097. Presumably, given the context of the interview, Bush was referring to the 
privacy of his conversations being governed by presidential communications 
privilege since Bush, as Vice President, would have been considered a presidential 
adviser. But it is at least conceivable he could have been alluding to his own 
privilege.     
494 See TIEFER, supra note 483, at 61–88.    
495 See id.     
496 See, e.g., id. at 61. 
497 See, e.g., id. at 68–85. 
498 See id. at 61.   
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Council.499  For a hearing in March 1991, the subcommittee 
invited the Council’s staff to appear.500  This request was 
denied.501  At another hearing in May, the same panel requested 
that Quayle himself appear, but the Vice President declined the 
offer.  Chairman Henry Waxman explained that “[w]e asked Mr. 
Quayle to come . . . or to send a representative to today’s hearing 
to tell the subcommittee about the Council . . . but he declined to 
do so.”502  In November, the panel again unsuccessfully sought to 
have Quayle testify.503
[t]he subcommittee invited Vice President Quayle to appear this 
morning and to discuss the activities of the council.  In 
particular, we seek his testimony on the council’s procedures 
and how they are consistent [with federal statutes] . . . .  
Unfortunately, the Vice President has once again refused to 
publicly answer questions regarding the council and its 
activities.
  During the hearing Waxman observed 
that  
504
At the time there was little reason to think that Waxman 
actually expected Quayle would attend.  A Washington Post 
reporter opined that the “request was an empty one, as the White 
House has a policy of allowing only administration employees 
subject to Senate confirmation to appear before Capitol Hill 
committees, a category Quayle does not fall into.”
   
505
Efforts by Representative David Skaggs, the chairman of a 
House Appropriations subcommittee, to secure similar 
information from the Vice President’s group were equally 
unavailing.  In response to his request for certain documents, the 
counsel for the Vice President, John Howard, contended that “our 
initial response [to congressional inquiries about communication 
   
 
499 See generally Clean Air Act Implementation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Health and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pt. 1), 102d 
Cong. (1991) [hereinafter Clean Air Hearings].   
500 See id. at 2 (“We asked Mr. Quayle to send a representative to today’s 
hearing to tell the subcommittee about the council and its actions, but he refused to 
do so.” (quoting subcommittee chairman Waxman)).   
501 See id.; see also TIEFER, supra note 483, at 69–70.    
502 Clean Air Hearings, supra note 499, at 203; see also TIEFER, supra note 483, 
at 74–76.   
503 See Clean Air Act Implementation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Health 
and the Env’t of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce (pt. 2), 102d Cong. 2 (1992). 
504 Id. 
505 Dana Priest, Competitiveness Council Under Scrutiny; Critics Charge Panel 
Lets Industry Exert Back-Door Influence on Implementing Laws, WASH. POST, Nov. 
26, 1991, at A19.   
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between the Council and outside parties] indicated Executive 
Branch confidentiality interests . . . [such as those that] are 
protected by separation of powers principles.”506  He emphasized 
that “[r]equiring disclosure of all communications received by the 
Council . . . would substantially impair the ability of the 
President and his principal advisors to receive confidential advice 
from private citizens.”507  With regard to communication among 
the Council and various regulatory agencies, Howard argued that 
“[r]equiring disclosure of all written communication by the 
Council or its staff would severely encroach upon the President’s 
constitutional authority to protect the confidentiality of 
Executive Branch deliberations.”508  Notably, Howard made no 
reference to vice presidential power in his correspondence.  The 
Quayle Council’s approach was summarized by Skaggs:  “The 
Council refuses to testify before Congress.  The Council refuses to 
provide Congress with requested information on its 
activities . . . .  [It] won’t even answer questions submitted to it 
by congressional committees . . . .”509
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs also tried to 
have Quayle testify at a hearing that fall.  The panel contacted 
the Vice President to request his appearance at an October 
hearing and was denied.
   
510  Chairman John Glenn discussed his 
efforts to get the Vice President to appear:  “[W]e did invite the 
administration to testify today.  We asked the Vice President, 
[and] the Council staff . . . .”511  Glenn, however, realized that the 
Vice President would not attend.512
 
506 138 CONG. REC. H8014, H8016–17 (1992) (statement of Rep. Skaggs) (quoting 
Letter from John L. Howard, Counsel to the Vice President, to Rep. David Skaggs 
(Aug. 3, 1992)).   
  Moreover, the chairman 
acknowledged the Vice President’s authority to receive advice in 
confidence even if he did not believe the circumstances were 
warranted in the case at hand, stating “I . . . believe the 
President and the Vice President require some protection so that 
advice and the development of administration policy can take 
place free of public scrutiny . . . .  [Nonetheless,] I do not believe 
507 Id. at H8017. 
508 Id. 
509 TIEFER, supra note 483, at 86. 
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that either executive privilege or respect for the deliberative 
process should be used [in this situation].”513
Glenn tried again to get the Vice President to appear at a 
hearing that next month.
  In this regard, 
Glenn seemed to echo Senator Morse’s views from a quarter 
century earlier about the Vice President enjoying some measure 
of his own privilege.   
514
Thank you for your letter to the Vice President dated November 
12 requesting that he or his designee testify before your 
committee tomorrow on the subject of regulatory review. 
  The head of White House legislative 
affairs responded to Glenn’s request:  
Unfortunately, due to longstanding tradition, and in accordance 
with the doctrine of separation of powers, neither the Vice 
President nor his staff will be able to testify, because they 
participate in the deliberative process through which Executive 
policy is developed.515
Again, even as the committee request was denied, no 
reference was made to the Vice President holding his own 
privilege.  Senator Glenn appeared resigned to the Vice 
President’s refusal to testify.  “We asked the Vice President, the 
Council staff [and] Council members . . .  [to appear but 
they] . . . declined to attend today . . . .”
  
516
During its tenure, the Council put forward a number of 
proposals involving the manner in which the Food and Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) reviewed pharmaceuticals.
 
517  As a 
result, a House Government Operations subcommittee looked 
into the Council’s interaction with the FDA.518  The FDA, 
however, declined to give the panel the information it desired.519  
At the behest of the Vice President’s Council staff, the FDA 
declined to hand over certain materials.520
 
513 Id.    
  In so doing, the FDA 
514 See id. at 341.    
515 Id. (Letter from Frederick C. McClure, Assistant to the President for 
Legislative Affairs, to John Glenn, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Governmental 
Affairs (Nov. 14, 1991)).     
516 Id. at 4. 
517 See ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 116. 
518 See id.   
519 See id.   
520 See TIEFER, supra note 483, at 81–83.    
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cited the importance of protecting internal communications.521  
The subcommittee responded by subpoenaing the materials.522
In the midst of this conflict, with an eye toward the FDA 
potentially invoking executive privilege, the subcommittee noted 
that the President alone had the authority to make such an 
assertion.
   
523  Once the issue came to a head, the administration 
refused to formally invoke executive privilege and the 
information was provided to the committee.524
For purposes of VPP, the Quayle Council experience is 
notable in two ways.  First, it reflects a tacit appreciation by 
congressional committees that they could not compel the 
attendance of the Vice President at their hearings.  Senator 
Glenn himself conceded that the Vice President seemed to enjoy 
some measure of privilege.  Second, in its dispute over access to 
documents, the Vice President’s office made no independent 
assertion of privilege, relying instead on the President to 
determine whether such invocation was warranted.
   
525
K. Al Gore 
  This was 
done presumably because the actions taken by the Vice President 
were not part of his own constitutional duties.   
Vice President Al Gore became embroiled in a controversy 
over whether he had committed violations of federal campaign 
finance laws.  Several investigations ensued, two of which 
involved questions of whether the Vice President would testify in 
person: one inquiry was conducted by the FBI and the other 
undertaken by a Senate committee.526
 
521 See ROZELL II, supra note 7, at 116.    
 
522 See id.    
523 See id.   
524 See id.; see also TIEFER, supra note 483, at 82.           
525 During the Clinton administration, a similar episode took place, although 
Vice President Gore was less directly involved. See Memorandum to the President 
from Janet Reno, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Assertion of Executive Privilege 
for Documents Concerning Conduct of Foreign Affairs With Respect to Haiti (Sept. 
20, 1996) (“The Counsel to the President and the National Security Adviser 
recommend that you assert executive privilege with respect to . . . documents 
[that] . . . constitute confidential communications from NSC or State Department 
officials to the President or the Vice President.” (emphasis added)). What stands out 
for purposes of this Article is that the Attorney General’s memorandum to President 
Clinton recommended that he claim executive privilege for the documents even 
though some of them involved the Vice President.  
526 A House committee looked into the Clinton administration’s campaign 
finance activity as well but does not appear to have pursued having Vice President 
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As part of its investigation into campaign finance activity, 
the FBI in November 1997527 and in April 2000 interviewed Gore 
at length.528  If the Vice President raised any concerns about 
constitutional privilege, there appears to be no public record of 
them.  His attorney certainly did not indicate as much.529
In 1997, a special panel of the Senate Committee on 
Government Affairs also pursued an investigation into, among 
other matters, Gore’s fundraising activities.
 
530  Over the course of 
its inquiry, the idea of Gore appearing before the committee was 
broached by at least two Senators on the committee, one of whom 
twice raised the question in public.  In July 1997, Senator Arlen 
Specter suggested that “the Vice President ought to give 
consideration to coming in himself [to appear before the 
committee], and the President.”531  The White House responded 
to this request in ambiguous fashion:  “Consistent with the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the White House will 
continue . . . to respond to requests from the committee for 
information necessary for it to complete its investigation.”532
In September 1997, Specter again noted that “it really may 




Gore testify. See Francis X. Clines, House Ready To Step in on Fund-Raising Cases, 
N.Y. TIMES, SEP. 16, 1997, at A20. 
  He proposed 
that the Vice President might want to appear voluntarily:  “I 
think Vice President Gore may be able to save his own political 
standing if he does that . . . [although the committee is not] 
527 See John M. Broder, Justice Dept. Investigators Question Clinton and Gore on 
‘96 Fund-Raising, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1997, at A20. 
528 See David Johnston & Don Van Natta, Jr., The 2000 Campaign: The 
Overview; an Angered Gore Defended ‘96 Role to Investigator, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 
2000, at A1.    
529 See Broder, supra note 527 (“The F.B.I. asked all the questions they wanted 
to ask, and the Vice President answered every one of them.” (quoting James Neal, 
Gore’s attorney) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Gore, along with Clinton, also 
provided transcripts of his FBI interview to the House Committee on Government 
Reform and Oversight. See infra note 612 and accompanying text.      
530 In the interest of full disclosure, the author worked as a law clerk on the 
Senate committee at the time but did not work on issues directly involving the Vice 
President. 
531 Eric Schmitt, Clinton and Gore are Urged To Testify on Fund-Raising, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 7, 1997, at B8. 
532 Id. 
533 Thomas B. Edsall, Senator Calls on Gore To Offer Hill Testimony; Specter 
Suggests Vice President Respond to “Mounting Evidence,” WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 1997, 
at A4.  
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prepared to call Vice President Gore at this stage.”534  The Vice 
President’s spokesperson indicated that Gore was not considering 
an appearance in front of the committee and had not been asked 
to testify.535  When questioned if Gore would accept the 
committee’s offer if asked, the spokesperson indicated she would 
not speculate on the matter.536
That next month, Senator Bob Smith proved to be even more 
adamant than Specter, arguing that both the President and Vice 
President should be subpoenaed by the committee.
 
537  Smith 
continued, if “they say that’s a separation of powers issue, then 
so be it.”538  The committee did not wind up calling the Vice 
President to testify although it did subpoena Gore’s former Chief 
of Staff, Jack Quinn.539  Former Deputy Chief of Staff David 
Strauss also appeared before the panel.540
The Gore episode reinforces the notion that the Vice 
President may not be compelled to appear before a congressional 
committee.  While other Vice Presidents, such as Tompkins, 
Calhoun, Colfax, Humphrey, and Agnew found it in their political 
interests to attempt to cooperate with congressional panels—and 
in Colfax’s case appear in person—there is little to indicate they 
could have been forced to testify against their will.  The Gore 
example, like several before it, is not quite on “all fours” with 
regard to VPP because the question at issue did not involve the 
Vice President’s official duties and the committee never formally 
tried to compel him to appear.  Nonetheless, like many of the 
other examples, the outcome reflects a healthy appreciation of 




535 See id. 
536 See id.  
537 See David Johnston, Campaign Finance: The Overview; Clinton Lawyer Is 
Subpoenaed on Tape Delay, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1997, at A1.  
538 Id.  
539 Quinn also testified in front of the Senate Special Committee to Investigate 
the Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters. See RELYEA & 
TATELMAN, supra note 11, at 16–17. 
540 See Eric Schmitt, Former Aide and Republicans Debate What Gore Knew, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 1997, at 12.  
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L. Richard B. Cheney 
It is generally accepted that Cheney was the nation’s most 
powerful Vice President.541  Therefore, it is not surprising that he 
became embroiled in more disputes over information than any of 
his predecessors.542
 
541 See, e.g., Nather, supra note 342, at 1734 (“[H]is status as the most powerful 
vice president in history isn’t seriously debated anymore.”); supra note 1. Prior to 
Cheney, Gore had generally been considered the most influential occupant of the 
office. See, e.g., KENGOR, supra note 136, at 214–15, 224.  
  The incidents involved: (1) two lawsuits over 
access to materials from an energy task force headed by Cheney; 
(2) an executive order that alluded to the possibility of a vice 
presidential privilege; (3) three congressional committee 
subpoenas issued to the Vice President’s office; and (4) the 9/11 
Commission. 
542 In addition to the conflicts discussed in this section, suit was brought against 
Vice President Cheney to compel his office to maintain its internal records. The 
litigation involved statutory interpretation of the Presidential Records Act and did 
not allege the withholding of information by the Vice President. Hence, a 
substantive discussion of the decision is outside the scope of this article. See Citizens 
for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Cheney, 593 F. Supp. 2d 194, 198–99 (D.D.C. 
2009). 
Cheney’s staff also was involved in at least one internal, executive branch clash over 
information. Cheney’s office and the National Archives crossed swords over whether 
the Vice President had to comply with an executive order purporting to give the 
Archives authority to review the way the Vice President’s office dealt with classified 
materials. See Scott Shane, Agency Is Target in Cheney Fight on Secrecy Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 2007, at A1; Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. 
Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to Alberto Gonzales, Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Jan. 9, 2007) (on file with author); Letter from J. William 
Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to David 
S. Addington, Assistant to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President 
(Aug. 23, 2006) (on file with author); Letter from J. William Leonard, Dir., Info. Sec. 
Oversight Office, Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., to David S. Addington, Assistant 
to the President and Chief of Staff to the Vice President (June 8, 2006) (on file with 
author). Cheney’s office refused to comply with the Archives’ interpretation of the 
executive order that governs classified material, arguing—among other things—that 
the Vice President was not part of the executive branch. See Shane, supra.  
In yet another vein, Cheney received criticism for keeping confidential his travel 
expenses. See Christopher Lee, Vice President’s Office Keeps Travel Expenses Under 
Wraps, WASH. POST, Nov. 29, 2005, at A19.  
Nonetheless, Cheney indicated his willingness to testify during the criminal trial of 
his former Chief of Staff, I. Lewis Libby, Jr. See David Johnston, Defense in C.I.A. 
Leak Case Will Call Cheney To Testify, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, at A23. 
Ultimately, he did not have to appear. See Neil A. Lewis & Scott Shane, Libby and 
Cheney Will Not Testify, Says the Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2007, at A1.  
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1.  Walker v. Cheney 
In 2001, President Bush created the National Energy Policy 
Development Group (“NEPDG”) to assemble data and put 
forward policy options regarding national energy policy.543  In so 
doing, he delegated authority to Cheney to lead the task force.544  
After questions arose about meetings of the NEPDG, two strands 
of litigation followed.  First, a pair of House members requested 
that GAO investigate the NEPDG, which resulted in a lawsuit.545
In its investigation of NEPDG, the GAO requested a number 
of documents from the Vice President’s office, many of which the 
Vice President refused to turn over
  
Second, several private parties brought suit demanding similar 
information.  Although neither suit was decided on constitutional 
grounds, neither of the resulting decisions repudiated the 
executive branch’s legal position either; both were concluded in 
favor of Cheney as a practical matter.  In this limited regard, the 
results of Cheney’s conflicts over information do provide support 
for the notion of VPP since they reflect judicial deference to the 
asserted needs of the Vice President for confidentiality. 
546 based on arguments that 
smacked of executive privilege.  After being rebuffed in its 
requests for documents by the Vice President, the GAO filed suit 
in federal court547 to acquire some of the materials in question.  
In making its argument before the court, the GAO argued that 
the “Vice President’s constitutional arguments . . . are an ill-
founded proxy for an assertion of privilege that the Executive has 
declined to make.”548
 
543 See Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53–55 (D.D.C. 2002). 
  GAO claimed further that Cheney’s stance 
involved “the same language and reasoning as assertions of 
544 See id. at 53, 55. 
545 Neither lawmaker thought that the Vice President had the authority to 
exercise executive privilege, believing the power to be the President’s alone. See 
FISHER, supra note 6, at 187.  
546 President Bush himself ultimately made the decision to continue to contest 
the GAO’s efforts to secure the documents in question. See STEPHEN F. HAYES, 
CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND CONTROVERSIAL 
VICE PRESIDENT 324 (2007); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKOVER: THE RETURN OF THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 99–100 
(2007).  
547 David Walker was Comptroller General and the head of GAO. See Walker, 
230 F. Supp. 2d at 53.  
548 Id. at 61.  
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Executive Privilege.”549
exercise of a form of executive privilege by a sitting vice 
president, even though the common standard for years has been 
that presidents alone have the authority to either assert 
executive privilege or direct an administration official to do so.  
Although Cheney did not use the words executive privilege in 
refusing access to information, he used legal language and 
justifications identical to an actual claim of executive 
privilege.
  Professor Rozell agreed with GAO when 
he described the Vice President’s position as an  
550
The administration, countered that an “intent to allow suit 
against a unique constitutional officer should not be lightly 
inferred.”
   
551  It elaborated by contending that the “President and 
Vice President are constitutionally created officials with unique 
statuses, responsibilities, and positions in our constitutional 
structure.”552  In this way, the administration seemed to blend 
the offices and powers of the President and the Vice President 
together, focusing more on the status of the Vice President than 
his actual constitutional authority.  Yet, the administration and 
Cheney stopped short of claiming executive privilege or a vice 
presidential privilege outright.553
 
549 Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege in the Bush Administration, in 
CONSIDERING THE BUSH PRESIDENCY 125, 131 & n.35 (Gary L. Gregg II & Mark J. 
Rozell eds., 2004) [hereinafter Gregg II & Rozell] (quoting Letter from David M. 
Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, to J. Dennis 
Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives (Aug. 17, 2001) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)); see also Eric Weiner, What Is Executive Privilege, Anyway?, NPR, 
June 22, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=11527747 
(“[T]he Bush Administration invoked the spirit, if the not [sic] letter, of executive 
privilege when it argued that Vice President Dick Cheney need not disclose what 
was discussed during his Taskforce on Energy meetings.”).  
 
550 ROZELL II, supra note 7. For similar commentary on the administration’s 
legal posture in this respect, see MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 75 (observing 
that in the GAO litigation, “the White House carefully refrained from invoking a 
claim of executive privilege in the case, its lawyers contended that Cheney was 
covered under the same executive privilege as the president. This assertion was a 
highly questionable, if not revealing, supposition since the Constitution does not vest 
executive authority in the vice president, but rather relegates his office to legislative 
matters.”); see also id. at 84. 
551 Defendant’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Reply to Plaintiff’s 
Opposition to Motion To Dismiss at 13, Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (No. 
1:02cv340JDB) [hereinafter Cheney GAO Brief]. 
552 Id.  
553 See generally id. 
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
dismissed the GAO’s suit for lack of standing and the GAO 
declined to appeal.  Relying heavily on Raines v. Byrd,554 the 
court through Judge John Bates concluded that Congress had not 
fully exercised its own powers in trying to acquire the disputed 
materials.555  The court placed emphasis on the fact that not a 
single committee had asserted its need for the information, let 
alone both houses of Congress.556  The court, therefore, did not 
believe it needed to reach the constitutional or statutory merits 
of the dispute.557  Interestingly, Judge Bates did make an 
allusion to the President and Vice President being somewhat 
interchangeable, seeming to accept in some measure the 
executive branch’s formulation of the two offices.558  Judge Bates 
wrote that “no court has ever before granted [what is sought 
here] . . . an order that the President (or Vice President) must 
produce information to Congress.”559
That language would not prove anomalous as it would be 
echoed later in Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers, involving 
whether White House aides could be compelled to appear before a 
congressional committee.
  The parenthetical reference 
to the Vice President could be read to imply that his and the 
President’s respective powers in this realm are closely related 
and perhaps coextensive.   
560
 
554 521 U.S. 811 (1997).  
  It would appear again to a lesser 
extent in Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Washington v. 
555 See Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 63–65, 68. 
556 See id. at 68. 
557 See id. at 74–75. 
558 Judicial precedent involving the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) has 
also treated the Vice President like the President. See Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D.D.C. 2000) (“Offices within the White House 
whose functions are limited to advising and assisting the President do not come 
within the definition of an ‘agency’ within the meaning of FOIA or the Privacy Act. 
This includes the Office of the President (and by analogy the Office of the Vice 
President) and undoubtedly the President and Vice President themselves.”).     
559 Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 53; see also id. at 74–75 (stating that the 
decision’s outcome “may seem overly protective of the Vice President, and hence of 
the Executive Branch”). 
560 See 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). The court concluded that White House 
staff must respond to the committee subpoena; however, it qualified its holding. See 
id. at 55, 99. Speaking again through Judge Bates, the court cautioned that it “has 
no occasion to address whether the President can be subject to compelled 
congressional process. Similarly there is no need to address here whether the Vice 
President could be subject to compelled congressional process.” Id. at 106.   
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U.S. Department of Justice561 and Citizens for Responsibility & 
Ethics in Washington v. Department of Homeland Security.562
Though not decided on the merits, as a practical matter, the 
Vice President “won” and the GAO and Congress “lost” the 
case.
  
Dicta in each of these opinions treat the President and Vice 
President in similar fashion, thus reaffirming the structural 
reasoning undergirding VPP.  If the President and Vice President 
are on the same constitutional plane, then it would make sense 
for the Vice President to enjoy his own constitutional privilege 
when carrying out his own constitutional powers. 
563
 
561 See 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D.D.C. 2009) (regarding whether Vice 
President Cheney’s interview with the FBI in the Valerie Plame Wilson matter 
constituted a waiver of privilege, the court wrote that “Vice President Cheney’s 
statements [to the FBI] qualified as an inter-agency disclosure, his failure to 
formally invoke any executive privileges did not preclude the White House’s future 
reliance on those privileges.” (emphasis added)).    
  The result of the decision, if not the legal holding, was 
that the Vice President was permitted to withhold the documents 
from the GAO and preserve the President’s and his 
confidentiality.  Moreover, the court tacitly embraced the 
executive branch’s assertions that vice presidential authority is 
somewhat analogous to that of the President in the context of 
withholding information.  Thus, the overall thrust of the 
decision—when coupled with its practical result—lends a fair 
measure of support for the notion of VPP.  Such support, of 
course, should not be overstated because the facts of the case did 
not entail the Vice President exercising his own constitutional 
power, but delegated presidential authority—not unlike earlier 
examples involving Vice Presidents Wallace, Humphrey, 
Rockefeller, and Quayle.  Thus, the case’s bearing on the Vice 
President’s constitutional authority to withhold documents is not 
entirely on point. 
562 See 532 F.3d 860, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“Moreover, a profound difference 
exists between subpoenas and discovery requests in civil or criminal cases against 
the President or Vice President and routine FOIA cases involving records that may 
or may not touch on presidential or vice presidential activities.”). 
563 See, e.g., DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 338, at 14 (concluding that 
Walker v. Cheney “was a decisive win for the vice president. He never revealed his 
list of contacts, and his constitutional power was expanded.”); MONTGOMERY, supra 
note 143, at 86 (concluding that the GAO decision “marked a significant legal 
triumph for the Bush White House”). 
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2. Cheney v. U.S. District Court 
In Cheney v. U.S. District Court, a number of private 
litigants sued for access to many of the same materials as the 
GAO.564
In this case, the federal trial court issued discovery orders  
to the Vice President instructing him to turn over materials 
related to the NEPDG.
  Unlike the GAO litigation, which did not proceed beyond 
the district court level, Cheney was decided by the Supreme 
Court.   
565  The question before the Supreme 
Court was to what extent a federal appeals court may, through a 
“writ of mandamus . . . modify or dissolve the orders 
when . . . enforcement might . . . impinge upon the President’s 
constitutional prerogatives.”566  At another juncture, the Court 
emphasized its concern not to “impinge upon the President’s 
constitutional prerogatives.”567  Notably, there is no mention in 
the opinion of the Vice President’s constitutional powers.  In fact, 
during oral argument, Solicitor General Ted Olson was quick to 
point out that the authority at issue was in fact the President’s 
alone.568
The Supreme Court held in favor of the Bush administration.  
Although not a success regarding the Vice President’s 
constitutional powers per se, the decision was a victory 
nonetheless in that again Cheney, as the President’s proxy, did 
not have to surrender the information in question,  once more 




564 542 U.S. 367 (2004). 
  
565 See id. at 372. 
566 Id. at 372–73 (emphasis added). 
567 Id. at 373 (emphasis added). 
568 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 2, Cheney, 542 U.S. 367 (No. 03-472) 
(“[T]he Vice President is acting as the subordinate and surrogate for the President 
here. This is the President’s authority.” (quoting Solicitor General Olson)); see also 
Cheney Supreme Court Brief, supra note 27, at 44 (“[T]he President is in many 
respects the real party in interest.”); cf. id. at 43 (“[[I]t serves no purpose to require 
the President or Vice President to assert privilege claims before permitting an 
interlocutory appeal.” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, the government did 
emphasize the status of the Vice President. See id. at 38–39 (“The decisions below 
impose intrusive and distracting discovery obligations on the Vice President himself.” 
(emphasis added)).   
569 See, e.g., Shannen W. Coffin, An Examination of Cheney v. U.S. District 
Court—A Win for Executive Authority, FEDERALIST SOCIETY WHITE PAPERS,  
June 2004, http://fedsoc.server326.com/Publications/White%20Papers/cheney.pdf 
(contending that “the decision of the Supreme Court . . . is a major victory for the 
Executive”). 
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It merits mention that Sierra Club, one of the chief litigants 
seeking the NEPDG documents, conceded in its brief before the 
Supreme Court that significant hurdles stood in the way of 
deposing the Vice President himself in a civil suit.  The group 
acknowledged that “the Vice President . . . could not be deposed, 
either as a party or as a third party witness, unless respondents 
made a substantial showing of need to the district court.”570  The 
Court itself also recognized the Vice President’s unique status, 
reasoning that “[w]ere the Vice President not a party in the case, 
the argument that the Court of Appeals [erred] . . . might present 
different considerations.”571  Quoting the Court’s immunity 
decision in Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it reasoned that Cheney’s 
“ ‘constitutional responsibilities and status [were] . . . factors 
counseling judicial deference and restraint.’ ”572
At other junctures, the decision seemed to eliminate any 
distinction between the President and Vice President, not unlike 
the district court’s treatment of the two offices in Walker v. 
Cheney.
  Adoption of the 
“constitutional responsibilities” language by the Court seemed 
once again to hearken back to Nixon I’s embrace of the 
“enumerated powers” formula.   
573
 
570 Brief of Respondent Sierra Club at 39, Cheney, 542 U.S. 364 (No. 03-475).    
  For instance, the Court stated that “separation-of-
571 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381; cf. id. at 385 (“This is not a routine discovery 
dispute. The discovery requests are directed to the Vice President and other senior 
Government officials . . . .”).    
572 Id. at 385 (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982)); Myers, 
supra note 45, at 910.   
573 See Amar, supra note 7 (“The Cheney Court repeatedly and reflexively lumps 
the vice presidency together with the presidency, and talks as if executive privilege 
concepts necessarily play out identically for both offices.”); Myers, supra note 45, at 
911 (“By explicitly linking the President and Vice President and suggesting that the 
involvement of either office in the lawsuit raised similar separation of powers 
questions, the Court . . . demonstrated its willingness to view the two offices in 
similar terms.”); see also Klarevas, supra note 7.  
In public discourse, Vice President Cheney often blended the two offices himself. 
Regarding the outcome of the GAO litigation, Cheney stated that “I think it restored 
some of the legitimate authority of the executive branch, the president and the vice 
president, to be able to conduct their business.” Keith Koffler, Cheney’s Words Show 
He Counts Self Part of Government’s Executive Branch, CONGRESS DAILY, June 29, 
2007 (emphasis added); see SAVAGE, supra note 546, at 100 (“What’s at stake here is 
whether a member of Congress can demand that I give him notes of all my meetings 
and a list of everybody I met with. We don’t think that he has that authority.” 
(quoting Vice President Cheney) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); Shane Harris, Legacy of Strength, or Weakness?, NAT’L J., Jan. 28, 2008, 
at 34, available at http://news.nationaljournal.com/articles/bush/legacy.htm (“The 
president is bound and determined to defend those principles and to pass on this 
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powers considerations should inform a court of appeals’ 
evaluation of a mandamus petition involving the President or the 
Vice President.”574
[t]he discovery requests are directed to the Vice President . . . .  
The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of 
  Elsewhere, the Court commented that  
 
office, his and mine, to future generations in better shape than we found it.” (quoting 
Vice President Cheney) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Bruce 
P. Montgomery, Congressional Oversight: Vice President Richard B. Cheney’s 
Executive Branch Triumph, 120 POL. SCI. Q. 581, 592 (2006) (“[The issue] at stake 
here is the ability of the president and vice president to solicit advice from anybody 
they want in confidence . . . without having to make it available to a member of 
Congress.” (quoting Vice President Cheney) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
What I object to . . . and what the president’s [sic] objected to, and what 
we’ve told the GAO we don’t do, is make it impossible for me or future vice 
presidents to ever have a conversation in confidence with anybody without 
having, ultimately, to tell a member of Congress what we talked about and 
what was said. You just cannot accept that proposition without putting a 
chill over the ability of the president and the vice president to receive 
unvarnished advice.  
DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 338, at 12 (quoting Vice President Cheney) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
The important thing here, Campbell, to understand is what we’re focused 
on are those things that relate to my role as Vice President; that as Vice 
President I’m the constitutional officer provided for in the Constitution. 
And the General Accounting Office has authority over statutory agencies, 
but not over constitutional officers. That’s not the way their statute is set 
up. And that it’s important here to protect the ability of the President and 
the Vice President to get unvarnished advice from any source we want.  
. . . . 
You have an obligation, I believe, in these offices to defend the office 
against the unlawful or unconstitutional or unreasonable encroachment by 
the other branches of government. The way the Constitution is set up 
specifically provides for separation of powers. And to create a precedent 
where future vice presidents, for example, would be in a situation where 
anytime they meet with somebody, they have to call Henry Waxman and 
tell them who they met with, what the subject was that was discussed, 
giving him notes of the meetings that were taken—now, the Congressman 
does not have the constitutional right to insist that the President or the 
Vice President provide him with that information, any more than I can 
demand of the Congressman, look, you’ve got to tell me everybody you 
talked to before you cast that vote. That’s silly. That’s not the way the 
government works. 
Interview by Campbell Brown with Richard B. Cheney, 46th Vice President of the 
United States, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 28, 2002), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/vicepresident/news-speeches/speeches/vp20020128.html. 
President Bush at times did the same. See MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 77 
(“[W]hen the GAO overstepped its bounds to try to get advice given to the vice 
president and me, we resisted.” (emphasis added) (quoting President Bush) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  
574 Cheney, 542 U.S. at 382. 
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the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives.  As we have 
already noted, special considerations control when the 
Executive Branch’s interests in maintaining the autonomy of its 
office and safeguarding the confidentiality of its 
communications are implicated.575
In yet another part of the opinion, the majority noted “that all 
courts should be mindful of the burdens imposed on the 
Executive Branch in any future proceedings.  Special 
considerations applicable to the President and the Vice President 
suggest” the need for judicial awareness of these concerns.
   
576
The Court’s equation of the Vice President with the 
President clearly underscores the structural argument that is a 
central feature of VPP.  If the President lawfully may exercise a 
constitutional privilege, and if the Vice President should be 
treated the same as the President as the Supreme Court 
repeatedly implies—in the context of withholding documents no 
less—then it stands to reason that the Vice President should 
benefit from his own constitutional privilege.  That is certainly 
more logical than the other potential corollary, which is that if 
the President and Vice President are conjoined, then the Vice 
President should be able to exercise a constitutional privilege 
that is automatically part of the President’s authority.
   
577
While not deciding any constitutional questions, Cheney left 
behind notable dicta that recognized the constitutional 
importance of the Vice President and at the same time protected 
his asserted confidentiality interests.  In the context of 
nondisclosure of documents, this judicial acknowledgement of the 
Vice President’s constitutional role supports the existence of 
VPP.  Thus, the undeniable tenor of the decision, if not its exact 
holding, favors the Vice President possessing authority to shield 
materials and communications from outside parties.   
   
 
575 Id. at 385 (emphasis added). 
576 Id. at 391–92. In ruling in favor of the Vice President, the Court justified its 
decision in part by citing case law involving questions of presidential civil immunity. 
See id. at 385–86, 388 (quoting Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997) and Nixon v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982)); Myers, supra note 45, at 910–11 (discussing the 
Court’s expansion of the case law on presidential civil immunity to include the Vice 
President).   
577 This argument will be examined and dismissed below. See infra Part VII.B. 
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3. Executive Order 13,233 Regarding Presidential and Vice 
Presidential Records 
On November 1, 2001, the Bush administration issued 
Executive Order No. 13,233.578  This directive, which addressed 
implementation of the Presidential Records Act,579 referred at 
some length to privileges held by sitting Presidents and former 
Presidents.  Included among these privileges was that of 
executive privilege.  The order stated that it “shall also apply 
with respect to any such records that are subject to any 
constitutionally based privilege that the former Vice President 
may be entitled to invoke . . . references in this order to a former 
President shall be deemed also to be references to the relevant 
former Vice President.”580  It appeared to qualify that 
authorization, however, by declining to permit a Vice President 
or a former Vice President to assert “any constitutional privilege 
of a President or former President except as authorized by that 
President or former President.”581
During a hearing on the executive order before the House 
Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, Financial Management 
and Intergovernmental Relations, Professor Peter Shane 
discussed this aspect of the executive order.  Shane, one of the 
leading authorities on separation of powers, expressed skepticism 
about the rule: 
   
[The order states that] the Vice President shall be treated as the 
President.  And if I may ask rhetorically, why in heaven’s name 
would that be? 
The Vice President’s privileges, such as they are, could only be 
part and parcel of the privilege that protects the Presidency.  I 
don’t read into the Constitution—I know of no authority that 
suggests there’s independent executive privilege to protect the 
Office of the Vice Presidency.  As a Presidential advisor, Vice 
Presidents are undoubtedly protected in their communications 
 
578 Exec. Order No. 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov. 1, 2001), revoked by Exec. 
Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Executive Order]. 
At least one other executive order provided Vice President Cheney with enhanced 
authority in the area of information control: the power to declassify documents. See 
Exec. Order No. 13,292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), revoked by Exec. Order 
No. 13,526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009). For discussion, see Byron York, The 
Little-Noticed Order that Gave Dick Cheney New Power, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Feb. 16, 
2006, http://www.nationalreview.com/york/york200602160841.asp.    
579 See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201–07 (2006). 
580 Executive Order, supra note 578, § 11(a) (emphasis added).   
581 Id. § 11(b); see also SHANE, supra note 323, at 131. 
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in order to protect the Presidency, but I would imagine that 
huge quantities of what Vice Presidents read and deliberate 
upon are no more protected by executive privilege than, say, the 
records of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission . . . . 
. . . .  
Constitutionally, my intuition is—and I use the word “intuition” 
because there’s not a lot of law on this subject, but my intuition 
is that only a President can assert executive privilege.582
Although the subcommittee did not devote significant 
attention to the specific question of whether the Vice President 
enjoyed his own privilege, Shane’s doubt as to the constitutional 
privilege alluded to in the order seemed to be shared by some 
committee members and other witnesses at the hearing.
 
583
The committee subsequently marked up legislation to 
overturn the executive order,
  In 
particular, the view that the President and Vice President should 
be treated the same with respect to executive privilege was 
challenged with some vigor.  This concern was warranted since 
the order appeared to be based on a muddled concept of vice 
presidential executive privilege rather than a constitutional 
privilege belonging entirely to the Vice President.  This 
represents a crucial internal flaw with the order.  It seemed to 
allow for a vice presidential privilege subject to the President’s 
approval.  A true constitutional privilege for the Vice President 
would need to be exercised independently from the President.  In 
fact, if a Vice President has recourse to his own constitutional 
privilege, he would need to prevail over the President in case of a 
conflict or in effect the privilege would not be his own.   
584
 
582 PRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 105. The administration contended that the 
order did not break any new ground as to privileges. See Mike Allen & George 
Lardner Jr., A Veto over Presidential Papers; Order Lets Sitting or Former President 
Block Release, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2001, at A1 (quoting the White House Counsel: 
the directive “simply implemented an orderly process to deal with this information” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  
 including a provision taking aim 
583 See PRA Hearing, supra note 7, at 396 (“President Bush’s Executive order 
even appears to establish a process for extending executive privilege to former Vice 
Presidents . . . . No court has ever recognized such a right for Vice Presidents.” 
(statement of Rep. Waxman)); see also id. at 449 (statement of Morton Rosenberg).    
584 See H.R. 4187, 107th Cong. (2002). H.R. 1255 in the 110th Congress reflected 
a similar attempt to rescind the executive order. See H.R. REP. No. 110-44, at 4–5 
(2007) (“[T]he bill clarifies that the incumbent and former presidents must make 
privilege claims personally. The bill would make clear that the right to claim 
executive privilege is personal to current and former presidents and cannot be 
bequeathed to assistants, relatives, or descendants. And finally, the bill . . . restores 
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specifically at the vice presidential provision.  The bill purported 
to “clarif[y] that authority to claim executive privilege is personal 
to a former or incumbent President and cannot be delegated to 
their representatives . . . .  [It] clarifies that a former or 
incumbent Vice President cannot claim presidential 
privileges . . . .  [T]hese provisions are consistent with current 
theory and practice concerning executive privilege.”585
The bill, however, was never enacted.  Moreover, the drafters 
of the legislation seemed trapped in the same preconception that 
whatever “constitutionally based privilege” the Vice President 
might invoke must be executive privilege.   
   
While the executive order rightly noted the possibility of a 
constitutional privilege for the Vice President, the rationale 
behind it was confused.  Moreover, the privilege was never 
asserted under the directive.  It merely laid down a marker for 
future invocation.586  The directive seemed to build in part on the 
holding of Nixon II, which recognized a privilege for former 
Presidents.  As it did in the two lawsuits involving efforts to 
claim documents from Vice President Cheney, the executive 
order appeared to treat the President and Vice President in a 
similar fashion.587
 
the long-standing understanding that the right to assert executive privilege over 
presidential records is a right held only by presidents.” (emphasis added)). 
  To that end the executive order reaffirmed the 
structural argument made in this Article.  In early 2009, 
however, the issue was rendered moot when the Obama 
585 H.R. REP. No. 107-790, at 10 (2002). The committee’s bill was not 
inconsistent with VPP. It will be recalled that VPP is not a presidential privilege or 
executive privilege but one rooted in the Vice President’s own constitutional powers. 
586 In litigation over the order, a federal court noted without comment that these 
provisions had yet to be exercised. See Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & 
Records Admin., 516 F. Supp. 2d 90, 104 (D.D.C. 2007). In this court challenge to the 
executive order, plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality of a vice presidential 
constitutional privilege as alluded to in the order. See id. at 99 (noting the argument 
that “there is no constitutional basis for a vice presidential executive privilege”). The 
court declined the opportunity to discuss the constitutional question and decided the 
case on statutory grounds. See id. at 107 n.11 (“[T]he Court need not reach the 
question of whether assertion of privilege by representatives of former presidents or 
former vice presidents is a constitutionally-based privilege . . . .”); id. at 110 (“[T]he 
Court shall assume without deciding that a former president . . . and a former vice 
president have some authority to invoke executive privilege.”). It is perhaps worth 
noting that the concept of a vice presidential privilege was not dismissed out of hand 
by the court.    
587 See infra Part VII.B for discussion on this topic.   
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administration repealed the order, presumably reflecting 
skepticism of the vice presidential provision, among others.588
4. Senate Judiciary Committee Subpoena Issued to the Vice 
President 
 
In an attempt to gain information about the Bush 
administration’s warrantless electronic surveillance program, the 
Senate Judiciary Committee issued a subpoena duces tecum to 
the Vice President’s office on June 27, 2007.589
[t]he Office of the Vice President reserves all legal privileges 
applicable to the vice presidency, such as the attorney-client 
privilege and the deliberative process privilege.  
  The Vice 
President’s office responded to the Judiciary Committee on 
August 20, 2007.  In its letter, the Vice President’s counsel wrote,  
. . . . 
In the performance of executive functions in support of the 
President, the Vice President respects the legal privileges 
afforded by the Constitution to the presidency, such as the 
Executive Privilege protecting among other things national 
security secrets and policy deliberations.  Similarly, in the 
performance of legislative functions, the Vice President respects 
the legal privileges afforded by the Constitution to the Senate, 
such as preservation of the confidentiality of a session of the 
Senate with closed doors over which a Vice President may 
preside. 
. . . . 
[The Vice President does not interpret the subpoena to involve 
records created] in the performance of his legislative 
functions.590
Notably, the letter does not formally assert that the Vice 
President has his own constitutional privilege.  It actually seems 
to abjure such a power, observing that the Vice President 
respects both executive privilege as “afforded by the Constitution 
to the presidency” and legislative privileges “afforded by the 
  
 
588 See Exec. Order No. 13,489, 74 Fed. Reg. 4669 (Jan. 21, 2009). The 2001 
order was controversial for a host of reasons unrelated to the vice presidency. See 
generally Rosenberg Statement, supra note 7. 
589 An attempt to have the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs issue a subpoena to Vice President Cheney was undertaken, but 
without success. See Alexander Bolton, For Collins, Forgiveness May Be Tough, THE 
HILL, Nov. 24, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/17169-for-collins-forgiveness-
may-be-tough. 
590 See August 20, 2007 Letter, supra note 13. 
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Constitution to the Senate.”591
The end result was that the White House appeared to ignore 
the subpoenas, and the Senate did not pursue contempt 
proceedings against the Vice President or his staff.
  Thus, a constitutional 
presidential privilege and a Senate privilege are recognized but 
not VPP.  In this vein, the letter only comments that the Vice 
President may benefit from the deliberative process privilege.  
That, of course, is a common-law privilege involving 
communication for the benefit of the President; it is not a 
constitutional privilege tied to the Vice President’s unique 
powers.   
592
5. House Judiciary Committee Subpoena Issued to Vice 
President Cheney’s Chief of Staff 
 
In April 2008, Vice President Cheney’s office and the House 
Judiciary Committee became embroiled in a controversy over 
whether Cheney’s Chief of Staff, David Addington, should appear 
before the panel to testify as to his role in the formulation of the 
Bush administration’s legal policy during the War on Terror.593
[S]eparate from any question of immunity from testimony 
[are] . . . questions of privilege [that] may arise with respect to 
information sought by questions, such as with respect to 
privileges protecting state secrets, attorney-client 
communications, deliberations, and communications among 
Presidents, Vice Presidents, and their advisers . . . .  [A] 
principal function of [the Chief of Staff to the Vice 
  
In a letter dated April 18, 2008, the counsel to the Vice President 
argued against Addington having to appear before the body.  In 
the letter, the Vice President’s office made three assertions that 
have some bearing on VPP.  First, unlike the communication the 
year before to the Senate Judiciary Committee, this letter could 
be read to imply a vice presidential privilege: 
 
591 Id.  
592 See Elana Schor, White House Lets Leahy’s Deadline Pass, THE HILL, Aug. 20, 
2007, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/12845-white-house-lets-leahys-deadline-
pass. 
593 See, e.g., Keith Perine, House Judiciary Asks Former Administration 
Advisors To Testify on Torture, CQ TODAY, May 6, 2008, http://www.cqpolitics.com/ 
wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000002717900. 
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President] . . . is engaging in privileged communications, such as 
the giving of privileged advice.594
It is unclear from the letter whether the privilege alluded to 
involves the Vice President himself enjoying a constitutional 
privilege or merely that his conversations with his Chief of Staff 
are covered by the President’s communications privilege since the 
Vice President provides confidential advice to the President.  If 
the Vice President’s office meant to include only the latter, the 
correspondence needed only to state that “deliberations, and 
communications among Presidents and their advisers” are 
protected.  Inclusion of “Vice Presidents” in that phrase would 
seem redundant since Vice Presidents would almost certainly be 
categorized as presidential advisers
   
595
Second, the Vice President’s counsel asserted the 
independence of the Vice President’s staff from that of the 
President.  She noted that the “Chief of Staff to the Vice 
President is an employee of the Vice President, and not the 
President, and therefore is not in a position to speak on behalf of 
the President.”
 and covered by 
presidential communications privilege.  Inclusion of “Vice 
Presidents” in that passage of the letter could, therefore, be read 
to reflect subtle advocacy of a constitutional vice presidential 
privilege. 
596  This assertion properly reflects the 
constitutional independence of the Vice President.597
 
594 April 18, 2008 Letter, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis added). The Vice 
President’s office also questioned the authority of Congress to investigate the Vice 
President since “Congress lacks the constitutional power to regulate by a law what a 
Vice President communicates in the performance of the Vice President’s official 
duties, or what a Vice President recommends that a President communicate in the 
President’s performance of official duties.” Id. at 1. 
  Moreover, 
taken together with the aforementioned reference to privilege, 
the letter would seem to reinforce that Cheney’s office was 
advocating that the Vice President holds his own privilege.  If “a 
principal function” of the Vice President’s Chief of Staff is to 
engage in privileged communication and if the “Chief of Staff to 
the Vice President is an employee of the Vice President, and not 
the President,” then it would seem to follow that the Chief of 
595 See Schwartz v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 131 F. Supp. 2d 142, 147 (D.D.C. 
2000); Executive Order, supra note 578, § 11(b); LIGHT, supra note 306, at 1 
(contending that “Vice-Presidents have finally joined that small group of White 
House aides who act as senior advisers to the President”).    
596 April 18, 2008 Letter, supra note 13, at 1.   
597 See infra notes 652–97 and accompanying text.   
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Staff’s advice is privileged because that communication is itself 
given to the Chief of Staff’s employer, the Vice President, a 
constitutional officer who is not legally answerable to the 
President.598
Finally, the letter separates the Vice President’s role in the 
Senate from that of the executive branch.  The letter notes that 
an “inquiry by a House Committee concerning the Senate 
functions of the Vice President would not, in any event, be 
appropriate.”
   
599
The House Judiciary Committee responded to the April 18 
letter first with a letter of its own dated April 28
  While not asserting privilege outright with 
respect to the House committee, this reference seems to lay down 
a marker for future invocation of VPP if a House request were 
ever made for Senate-related documents involving the Vice 
President. 
600 and a few 
days later with a subpoena ad testificum.601
 
598 An alternate reading could be that the Chief of Staff’s advice to the Vice 
President is privileged because the Vice President’s advice to the President is 
protected; such presidential conversations are privileged even if they are with the 
constitutionally independent Vice President. This interpretation seems somewhat 
less likely given the emphasis placed on to whom the Chief of Staff is answerable, 
the manner in which the Vice President is mentioned in the letter and the fact the 
Vice President is not removable by the President. 
  In the committee’s 
letter, the chairman challenged some of the assertions made in 
the Vice President’s correspondence but avoided the privilege 
599 April 18, 2008 Letter, supra note 13, at 2. Presumably the Constitution’s 
grant of rulemaking authority to each house would prevent the respective chambers 
from compelling the production of documents from each other. For example, if the 
Senate conducted business in secret session pursuant to Senate rule, it would seem 
that a House investigation could not compel the Senate to produce the materials if 
the upper chamber resisted. Similarly, it would appear unlikely that one body could 
compel materials from the other if those documents fell within the latter chamber’s 
exclusive constitutional responsibilities. For instance, it would appear doubtful that 
the Senate could investigate and compel material from a House impeachment 
inquiry since the House has the exclusive authority to impeach officials. Similarly, it 
is questionable whether a House investigation could compel material from the 
Senate as it involves the Senate’s advice and consent function in considering 
executive branch or judicial nominations. See supra notes 402–03 (noting the House 
Rules Committee members’ concern about a House committee investigating the 
President of the Senate); cf. Hooper, supra note 13 (quoting Rep. Young). But cf. 3 
HINDS’, supra note 13, § 2665, at 1115–16. 
600 See Letter from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, to David S. Addington, Chief of Staff to the Vice President (Apr. 28, 2008) 
[hereinafter April 28, 2008 Letter].    
601 See Letter and Subpoena from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, to David S. Addington, Chief of Staff to the Vice President 
(May 7, 2008). 
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question.  The Committee noted that “many relevant questions 
exist that do not implicate executive privilege.”602
Vice Presidential staff have previously testified before Congress 
and I am aware of no authority—and counsel’s letter cites 
none—for the proposition that such staff could be immune from 
testimony before Congress.  While the issue of the immunity of 
senior advisors to the President is currently under litigation, 
there has been no suggestion that such immunity, even if 
recognized, would reach to the Vice President’s office, an entity 
that, as you well know, is constitutionally quite different from 
the Office of the President.
  The letter 
focused instead on the closely related question of immunity.  
Chairman Conyers noted that: 
603
Similarly, Conyers dismissed as a canard the assertion made 
about the Vice President’s Senate duties.  He stated that 
“concern that ‘inquiry by a House Committee concerning the 
Senate functions of the Vice President would not, in any event, be 
appropriate’ seems especially out of place given the subject 




At the end of the day, in response to the subpoena, the Vice 
President’s office agreed that Addington could appear before the 
committee subject to certain stipulations.  These included that 
“the Committee does not seek information relating to Vice 
Presidential communications or to Vice Presidential 
recommendations to the President,”
  Thus, if the committee read the Vice President’s letter 
as advocating a constitutional privilege, it chose to ignore it.  
Instead, the committee focused on how the Vice President is 
constitutionally distinct from the President with regard to the 
related issue of immunity and whether Cheney’s staff could 
appear before the committee.   
605
 
602 See April 28, 2008 Letter, supra note 600, at 4. 
 that “the Committee does 
603 Id. As noted by Conyers, vice presidential staff members have testified before 
committees of Congress on several occasions. For example, Vice President Bush had 
several aides testify before the Iran-Contra Committee. See supra notes 484–85 and 
accompanying text. Vice President Gore’s former Chief of Staff and former Deputy 
Chief of Staff both testified before a Senate investigative committee. See supra notes 
539–40 and accompanying text. Finally, Gore’s Chief of Staff appeared before a 
Senate panel looking into the Whitewater matter and Vice President Wallace’s BEW 
staff testified at several hearings. See supra notes 389–95 and 539.  
604 April 28, 2008 Letter, supra note 600, at 4 n.11.   
605 Letter from Kathryn L. Wheelbarger, Counsel to the Vice President, to Perry 
Apelbaum, Chief of Staff and Counsel, Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (May 1, 2008).  
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not seek information relating to the Senate functions of the Vice 
Presidency . . . [, and that] applicable legal privileges may be 
invoked in response to questions.”606
The Vice President’s counsel was also careful to note that  
  Again, the separate 
references to “Vice Presidential communications” and “Vice 
Presidential recommendations to the President” seem to reflect 
the Cheney office’s awareness that communications made to the 
Vice President himself as an independent constitutional officer 
might themselves be privileged, not merely communications from 
the Vice President to the President.  The latter’s use of the 
disjunctive “or” to separate “Vice Presidential communications” 
and “Vice Presidential recommendations to the President” seems 
to bear this out. 
[t]he Office of the Vice President remains of the view that the 
courts, to protect the institution of the Vice Presidency under 
the Constitution from encroachment by committees of Congress, 
would recognize that a chief of staff or counsel to the Vice 
President is immune from compulsion to appear before 
committees of Congress to testify concerning official duties 
performed for the Vice President.607
Yet again, Cheney’s counsel asserted concern over the vice 
presidency being undermined by the committee’s actions.  
Clearly, the Vice President’s counsel viewed the vice presidency 
as a separate institution with equities distinct from those of the 
President.  Despite these concerns, Addington appeared before 
the committee on June 26, 2008.
 
608
6. The Valerie Plame Wilson Matter 
   
Valerie Plame Wilson was a Central Intelligence Agency 
officer whose identity was leaked to the press.  The ensuing 
investigation over the circumstances involving the disclosure of 
her identity was conducted by a DOJ special counsel.  During 
this inquiry, Vice President Cheney was questioned under 
oath.609
 
606 Id. at 2. 
  Cheney did not seem to oppose his being questioned by 
607 Id. at 1–2. 
608 See Dan Eggen, Bush Policy Authors Defend Their Actions, WASH. POST, June 
27, 2008, at A2; Dana Milbank, When Anonymity Fails, Be Nasty, Brutish and Short, 
WASH. POST, June 27, 2008, at A3. 
609 See ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 45, at 945 n.25.      
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the FBI.610  His agreeing to this interview was in keeping with 
Nixon I, which held that broad claims of executive privilege must 
defer to the particularized need of the criminal justice process.611
The fallout from this investigation embroiled Vice President 
Cheney in yet another conflict over information with a 
congressional panel, this time with the House Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform.  The Committee sought 
copies of reports of the FBI interviews with President Bush and 
the Vice President that had been compiled during the special 
counsel’s investigation.
  
612  For over a year, the committee and the 
DOJ—including the special counsel’s office—exchanged letters 
over whether the executive branch would comply with the 
Committee’s request.613
 
610 See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 658 
F. Supp. 2d 217, 221–22 (D.D.C. 2009) (noting the “voluntary” nature of the 
interview).   
  The matter was followed by a Committee 
611 See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (“The 
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for 
evidence in a pending criminal trial.”); see also ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 45, 
at 945–60 (discussing presidential cooperation—compelled or otherwise—in other 
criminal contexts).   
612 See Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice (July 16, 2007) [hereinafter Waxman, July 16, 2007 Letter] (on file with 
author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
Rep. Henry Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform (Aug. 16, 
2007) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, Aug. 16, 2007 Letter] (on file with author).   
Chairman Waxman noted that FBI interviews with President Clinton and Vice 
President Gore had been turned over to the Committee. See Letter from Rep. Henry 
A. Waxman, Chairman, the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to 
Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter 
Waxman, Dec. 3, 2007 Letter] (on file with author). 
Following the inauguration of President Barack Obama, private parties secured 
much of this information through FOIA litigation. See Citizens for Responsibility & 
Ethics in Wash., 658 F. Supp. 2d at 217.   
613 See, e.g., Waxman, July 16, 2007 Letter, supra note 612; Fitzgerald, Aug. 16, 
2007 Letter, supra note 612; Waxman, Dec. 3, 2007 Letter, supra note 612; Letter 
from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, the House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform, to Michael Mukasey, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Dec. 18, 2007) (on file 
with author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform (Jan. 18, 2008) (on file with author); Benczkowski Letter, supra note 24; 
Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform, to Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. (June 3, 2008) (on file with author); 
Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform (June 11, 2008) [hereinafter Nelson, June 11, 2008 Letter] (on file with 
author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Office of Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
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subpoena duces tecum and culminated in an assertion of 
executive privilege, a claim made by the President.  For purposes 
of this Article, the exchange of letters includes important 
references by the executive branch to vice presidential authority; 
in the end, however, it was the President and not the Vice 
President who invoked the constitutional privilege. 
Throughout the correspondence, the DOJ combined the 
President and Vice President together as had been done in the 
NEPDG litigation.  In a letter dated January 18, 2008, the 
Department offered reports of the FBI interviews in redacted 
form.614  In explaining its decision to omit portions of the report, 
the Department noted the status of “the President and the  
Vice President, the two constitutional officers of the  
executive branch, [which] raises serious separation of powers  
and heightened confidentiality concerns . . . .  The limited 
redactions concern . . . presidential and vice presidential 
communications . . . .”615  As noted earlier, reference to both the 
President and Vice President together implies an equal 
constitutional status.  Similarly, inclusion of “vice presidential 
communications” is of note since “presidential communications” 
would seem to subsume the former and render it redundant, at 
least to the extent such exchanges involve executive branch 
communication—excepting those made pursuant to the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment.616
 
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform (June 18, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal 
Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, 
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform (June 24, 2008) 
[hereinafter Nelson, June 24, 2008 Letter] (on file with author); Letter from Rep. 
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to 
Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (June 27, 2008) (on file 
with author); Letter from Patrick J. Fitzgerald, Special Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t 
Reform (July 3, 2008) (on file with author); Letter from Rep. Henry A. Waxman, 
Chairman, House Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, to Michael B. Mukasey, 
Att’y Gen. (July 8, 2008) [hereinafter Waxman, July 8, 2008 Letter] (on file with 
author). 
 
614 Benczkowski Letter, supra note 24, at 1. 
615 Id. (emphasis added). The phrase “the President and Vice President, the two 
constitutional officers of the Executive Branch, raises serious separation of powers 
and heightened confidentiality concerns,” appears more than once in the 
correspondence. See Nelson June 11, 2008 Letter, supra note 613, at 1. 
616 See infra Part VII.A.2.    
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
558 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84:423   
In a June 24, 2008 letter, the Department maintained its 
position that it would not provide unredacted FBI reports to the 
Committee but elaborated on its reasoning: 
[With respect to] the President and Vice President[,] . . . the 
confidentiality interests relating to those documents are of a 
greater constitutional magnitude.  The President and the Vice 
President are the two nationally elected constitutional officers 
under our Government.  The President heads the Executive 
Branch and, as the Congress has by law recognized, the Vice 
President often advises and assists the President in the 
President’s performance of his executive duties.  It is settled as 
a matter of constitutional law, reflected in court decisions, and 
congressional and Executive Branch practice, that the 
communications of the President and the Vice President with 
their staffs relating to official Executive Branch activities lie at 
the absolute core of executive privilege. . . .  Congressional 
access to those reports would intrude into . . . areas of 
presidential decision-making.617
On July 8, 2008, the Committee responded to the June 24 
letter from the Department.  The panel relented on pursuing the 




Vice President Cheney’s attorneys have consistently maintained 
that he is not an “entity within the executive branch.”  Whether 
this unusual claim is accurate or not, I am aware of no 
freestanding vice presidential communications privilege, let 
alone one that covers voluntary and unrestricted conversations 
with a special counsel investigating wrongdoing.  There 
certainly was no such understanding when our Committee 
sought the FBI interview report of an interview with Vice 
President Gore.  The Justice Department produced the 
interview to the Committee despite the fact that it contained 
discussion of official White House business.
  The Committee also focused on the implied 
reference in the Department’s letter to the Vice President 
enjoying his own privilege.   
619
 
617 Nelson, June 24, 2008 Letter, supra note 613, at 2 (emphasis added).      
 
618 Waxman, July 8, 2008 Letter, supra note 613, at 1. 
619 Id. at 2 (emphasis added). For coverage of Cheney’s assertion that he was not 
part of the executive branch, see, for example, Dana Milbank, The Cheese Stands 
Alone, WASH. POST, June 26, 2007, at A2 (quoting a letter from Cheney staff 
asserting that, in the context of an executive order, the Vice President should not be 
considered “an entity within the executive branch”). 
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The Committee maintained that it was “seeking information 
which the President and Vice President previously disclosed to 
the FBI without asserting privilege of any kind—executive or 
otherwise.”620
not aware of any precedent in which executive privilege has 
been asserted over communications between a vice president 
and his staff about vice presidential decisionmaking.  Courts 
have carved out a presidential communications privilege, but 
they have limited it quite narrowly to communications had 
directly with the President or certain advisers directly on his 
behalf about presidential decisionmaking. . . .  If the Vice 
President is indeed outside the executive branch, as he seems to 
contend, it is hard to understand what basis there could be for 
asserting executive branch confidentiality interests in his 
communications.
  Moreover, the committee asserted that it was 
621
The panel, therefore, aimed squarely at whether the Vice 
President possessed his own privilege, seizing on the apparent 
inconsistency of the Office of the Vice President’s previous 
statement that he was outside the executive branch and the 
implications of the DOJ’s letter, which seemed to state that the 
Vice President holds his own executive privilege.
 
622  In so doing, 
the Committee raised a legitimate criticism of the DOJ’s legal 
position.  But the answer to the panel’s question should not have 
been that the Vice President does not benefit from his own 
constitutional privilege.623
Once the matter was brought to a head, the President 
responded by invoking executive privilege.  In a letter to the 
Committee, the DOJ indicated it was 
  A fuller exploration of the legal 
questions would have concluded that the Vice President may 
claim his own constitutional privilege to the degree the activity 
falls within his own areas of constitutional authority.  On the 
other hand, his communications involving issues of presidential 
decisionmaking would be covered by the President’s executive 
privilege, more specifically by presidential communications 
privilege should the President assert it.   
disappointed that the Committee has not been satisfied by our 
substantial accommodations of the Committee’s needs and has 
 
620 Id. at 7. 
621 Id. at 7–8.  
622 See Milbank, supra note 619. 
623 See infra Part VII.A. 
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scheduled a meeting to consider citing the Attorney General for 
contempt of Congress if the Department does not produce the 
Vice President’s interview report . . . .  Accordingly, the 
Attorney General has requested that the President assert 
executive privilege with respect to these documents, and the 
President has done so.624
What stands out is that Bush—not Cheney—asserted the 
privilege over records involving the Vice President.   
   
7. The 9/11 Commission 
The example of the National Commission on Terrorist 
Attacks upon the United States (the “9/11 Commission” or 
“Commission”) and its interaction with Vice President Cheney 
provides a somewhat ambiguous precedent.  The 9/11 
Commission was a body established by statute625 and was 
granted subpoena power.  By its own terms it was “established in 
the legislative branch” of the government.626  Of course, such a 
legislative assertion is not dispositive; that no members of 
Congress served on the Commission could lead one to conclude 
that the body was more akin to an independent agency or an 
executive branch body in which members are prohibited from 
serving.627
 
624 Letter from Keith B. Nelson, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, to Rep. Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Comm. on Oversight and 
Gov’t Reform 1 (July 16, 2008); see also Letter from Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the President 1 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter Mukasey 
Recommendation Letter] (“I am writing to request that you assert executive privilege 
with respect to Department of Justice documents subpoenaed by the Committee on 
Government Reform of the House of Representatives . . . . The documents include 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) reports of the Special Counsel’s interviews 
with the Vice President . . . [and] notes taken by the Deputy National Security 
Advisor during conversations with the Vice President and senior White House 
officials . . . . Many of the subpoenaed materials reflect frank and candid 
deliberations among senior presidential advisers, including the Vice 
President . . . .”); id. at 2 (“The only reports the Department has not expressed a 
willingness to make available for review are those for the interviews of you and the 
Vice President, because of heightened separation of powers concerns.”); id. (“[I]t is 
my considered legal judgment that it would be legally permissible for you to assert 
executive privilege with respect to the subpoenaed documents . . . .” (emphasis 
added)). For similar action taken by President Clinton to protect communications 
involving Vice President Gore, see supra note 525. 
  Nonetheless, it could be persuasively argued that 
625 See Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, 
116 Stat. 2383 (2002). 
626 Id. § 601.   
627 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
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since the Commission was created by statute and Senate and 
House leaders placed all but one Commission member on the 
panel, the entity was more like a congressional committee than 
an independent outside body.628
One of the major questions confronting the Commission was 
the extent to which it could question the President and Vice 
President.  The two men ultimately agreed to appear jointly for 
an interview before the body.  In this regard, the panel got what 
it wanted: to question the President and Vice President.  Their 
questioning, however, was subject to a number of significant 
limitations: it was neither conducted under oath,
 
629 nor was it 
recorded.630
In light of past practice,
 
631 there is little reason to think that 
the 9/11 Commission could have legally compelled the President 
and Vice President to testify.632  After all, neither was 
subpoenaed; they both appeared voluntarily.  Further, that the 
President and Vice President appeared together would seem to 
reflect the heightened status they both share as constitutional 
officers.  Notably, the Vice President was not treated with lesser 
deference than the President.  In addition, few would seriously 
argue that because the President appeared before the 9/11 
Commission that a congressional committee could compel his 
attendance at a hearing.633
 
628 See RELYEA & TATELMAN, supra note 11, at 28 n.139. 
  Using the same precedent to try to 
establish the principle that the Vice President must appear at a 
congressional hearing is equally dubious.  This is especially so in 
light of Walker, Cheney, and related decisions, which essentially 
equate the constitutional stature of the Vice President with that 
of the President.  Finally, even though the Vice President 
appeared before the 9/11 Commission under restricted 
circumstances, as will be demonstrated in the next Section, 
members of Congress still seemed to recognize the futility of 
629 See David Gregory et al., 9/11 Commission Finishes Bush, Cheney Session; 
Bush Chastises Ashcroft in Private Statements at the White House, Apr. 29, 2004, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4862296. 
630 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Philip Shenon, Bush-Cheney 9/11 Interview 
Won’t Be Formally Recorded, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at A18.       
631 See supra note 339. 
632 See generally Part VI. 
633 If in fact the Commission was part of the legislative branch, it seems doubtful 
it could exercise authority that a congressional committee with its own subpoena 
power could not.  
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trying to force Cheney to appear before an actual congressional 
committee. 
8. Congressional Committees and Vice President Cheney 
An element of both executive privilege and judicial privilege 
is the qualified right of constitutional officers to resist being 
compelled to appear before congressional committees to discuss 
their official duties.  During the Cheney vice presidency, many 
influential members of Congress with leadership roles on key 
congressional oversight panels openly doubted whether the Vice 
President himself could be forced to appear before them.634  These 
members were hardly apologists for Cheney.  For example, 
Senator Carl Levin, Chairman of the Homeland Security and 
Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigation, 
stated “[w]e can’t get [Vice President Cheney] in front of us.”635  
Waxman, then Chairman of the House Government Reform 
Committee, concluded that trying to compel the Vice President to 
answer questions as to his official duties would be 
“problematic.”636
Other prominent members of Congress who share Levin’s 
and Waxman’s views of aggressive congressional oversight, 
expressed implicit agreement with their position.  Regarding a 
probe by a Senate panel into pre-Iraq War intelligence, Senator 
John McCain stated: 
  
In general, I think everyone should be interviewed that was 
involved . . . .  The president of the United States and the vice 
president of the United States have a special status, and you’ve 
got to be concerned about the executive-congressional 
relationship.  I think certainly Cabinet secretaries who are 
confirmable by the Senate should be interviewed.637
 
634 See Nather, supra note 306, at 1740–41 (“[T]here are limits on what Congress 
can do. It can’t subpoena him, lawmakers say, because that would instantly set off a 
constitutional struggle over separation of powers.”). For a brief argument to the 
contrary, see Jonathan Strong, Letter to the Editor, Even if Cheney View Is Valid, 
Congress Can Subpoena Him, THE HILL, Sept. 21, 2007, at 16.       
   
635 Nather, supra note 306, at 1741.    
636 See id.  
637 Alexander Bolton, Dems Win McCain’s Backing, THE HILL, Nov. 22, 2005, at 
7 (quoting Sen. McCain) (internal quotation marks omitted). As noted earlier, a 
House impeachment investigation would likely be able to secure privileged 
documents from the Vice President if not compel his attendance. Cf. FISHER, supra 
note 6, at 49–50; supra note 262.  
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Thus, it would appear that there is a grudging 
acknowledgement that a congressional committee would be 
unable to legally compel a Vice President to appear before it.  
While Vice President Colfax made an appearance before a panel, 
he did so voluntarily.  Vice President Humphrey refused to 
testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a public 
hearing, forcing the committee to agree to a closed-door meeting 
on neutral turf.  Vice President Quayle refused several 
invitations to appear before committees to discuss the Council on 
Competitiveness.  In 1997, members of a special Senate 
investigative panel made rumblings about compelling Vice 
President Gore to appear before it, but nothing came of the effort.  
Recent opinion—from lawmakers with a strong record of 
assertiveness in the area of congressional oversight—only 
reinforces the view that the Vice President may not be forced to 
testify before a congressional committee, underscoring the 
legitimacy of VPP.638
In short, events during the Cheney vice presidency provide 
support for the notion of VPP.  In two court decisions there are 
dicta, particularly in the Supreme Court decision of Cheney v. 
U.S. District Court, that indicate that because of his 
“responsibilities and status[ ]” as a constitutional officer, the Vice 
President has a healthy leeway when he attempts to withhold 




638 Part of congressional deference in this regard could be the recognition that 
the Vice President is a presidential adviser and arguably beyond the compulsory 
power of Congress. This reasoning is somewhat strained since numerous 
presidential advisers who are not the Vice President have appeared before Congress 
unwillingly. See generally RELYEA & TATELMAN, supra note 11, at 16–17. That has 
not been the case, however, with the Vice President, who is after all a constitutional 
officer. 
  
In the view of the Supreme Court, the Vice President’s authority 
639 In other contexts, courts have been similarly disinclined to force the Vice 
President’s office to divulge documents. See, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Energy, 310 F. Supp. 2d 271, 298 n.8 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 
412 F.3d 125 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(ruling that a task force chaired by the Vice President was not subject to FOIA); 
Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy Policy Dev. Group, 219 F. Supp. 2d 20, 55 
(D.D.C. 2002) (concluding that the Vice President was not subject to FOIA), vacated, 
542 U.S. 367 (2004). FOIA suits brought during the Cheney vice presidency were 
successful, however, with respect to securing his visitor logs; those records being 
kept by the secret service and not the Vice President’s office. See Citizens for 
Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 527 F. Supp. 2d 76, 
93 (D.D.C. 2007); Wash. Post v. Dep’t of Homeland Security, 459 F. Supp. 2d 61 
(D.D.C. 2006). 
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appears to be linked with and comparable to that of the 
President.  Moreover, Committee on Judiciary v. Miers left 
behind a similar dictum, this time in a case explicitly involving 
constitutional privilege.640
During Cheney’s tenure, an executive order involving 
presidential records also seemed to offer the potential for a 
constitutional privilege for the Vice President and former Vice 
Presidents.  This directive stirred a fair amount of controversy 
and such a privilege was never asserted.  While the order was not 
overturned by either the judiciary or by Congress, the Obama 
administration quickly rescinded it upon assuming office.  
  Two other court decisions hinted 
much the same.  In the absence of any case law squarely on 
point, these dicta provide useful guideposts.  Since the courts 
have indicated that the President and Vice President are of 
similar constitutional stature, and since the President holds his 
own constitutional privilege, it is all the more likely that the Vice 
President does as well.   
In its second-term struggles with congressional committees, 
the Vice President’s office put forward positions that hinted at a 
constitutional vice presidential privilege.  During these 
exchanges, one House committee explicitly called into question 
whether the Vice President holds such authority.  Regarding the 
matter in question, ultimately it was the President, not the Vice 
President, who invoked a constitutional privilege to protect the 
disputed materials.  Moreover, Cheney did permit his Chief of 
Staff to comply with a House committee subpoena and testify at 
an open hearing subject to a host of conditions.  On the Senate 
side of the ledger, Cheney—under the aegis of the White House 
Counsel—appeared to ignore a Senate Judiciary Committee 
subpoena for documents.   
Despite his unprecedented power and the unprecedented 
legal challenges facing him and his staff over access to 
information, Cheney never formally invoked a constitutional 
privilege.  By litigating closely related issues, he did, however, go 
further than either Humphrey or Agnew, both of whom made 
public references to the Vice President possessing his own 
privilege.  Taken in sum, the Cheney vice presidency provides 
more support for VPP than any other, even if the example of his 
vice presidency is not wholly dispositive. 
 
640 558 F. Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008). 
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M. Conclusion 
History reflects that Vice Presidents have increasingly 
become the target of investigations, many of which have led to 
conflicts over access to information.  Several of these disputes, 
particularly those in the nineteenth century, entailed actions 
taken by Vice Presidents prior to their terms of office: Tompkins, 
Calhoun, Colfax, Agnew, and Rockefeller—the latter regarding 
his gubernatorial activities.  Others involved a sitting Vice 
President that did not involve his official duties—Gore.  Within 
the grouping of investigations involving pre-vice-presidential or 
nonofficial duties, Agnew stands out in that he indicated he did 
not believe prosecutors had a right to his vice presidential 
records.  The Rockefeller vice presidency is also noteworthy.  In 
Rockefeller’s case, efforts were made to force him to testify at a 
criminal trial and before New York State investigative 
commissions.  Those pursuing these efforts against Rockefeller 
were mindful of the Vice President raising his own constitutional 
privilege, reflecting that such an assertion was hardly 
outlandish.  Other Vice Presidents have been investigated for 
their official acts.  These include Wallace, Humphrey, Ford, 
Rockefeller—in his role as Commission chairman—Bush, Quayle, 
and Cheney.  Of these vice presidential episodes, Humphrey and 
Cheney both implied that the Vice President may enjoy a 
constitutional privilege.  While these near assertions of a vice 
presidential privilege reflect an appreciation of the growing 
stature of the Vice President in American political life, there 
appears never to have been a Vice President who has formally 
invoked such a doctrine.  That said, as the Vice President 
continues to play a significant role in national governance, an 
assertion of privilege is increasingly likely.   
That Vice Presidents have never invoked a privilege, despite 
their having had opportunities to have done so, certainly would 
seem to go a long way toward disproving the existence of VPP.  
As the Supreme Court noted in another separation of powers 
context, such “prolonged reticence would be amazing if such 
[action] were not understood to be constitutionally proscribed.”641
 
641 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 212 (1995). 
  
That said, none of the examples discussed above involved the 
Vice President’s role as presiding officer of the Senate and only 
one involved his preparation for succession to the presidency—
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Ford.  Furthermore, no Vice President has ever appeared before a 
congressional committee against his will.  Calhoun asked to be 
investigated by the House but never appeared in person before 
the relevant committee.  Colfax raised the issue of his being 
subpoenaed by a congressional panel but appeared voluntarily.  
Moreover, Colfax’s biographer asserts that the committee in 
question concluded it lacked authority to force his attendance.  
Humphrey declined to appear in an open session of the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and Senator Fulbright, the 
committee chairman, had to make major concessions before 
Humphrey agreed to appear behind closed doors.  Vice President 
Bush’s aides testified before a congressional committee but not 
Bush himself.  Vice President Quayle declined to appear in front 
of several congressional panels.  Similarly, efforts to bring Gore 
before a comparable Senate investigative panel were never 
vigorously pursued.   
Cheney’s disputes over information spilled over into the 
courts where, as a practical matter, his position was vindicated 
and his confidentiality interests preserved even though the 
matters at hand involved presidentially delegated authority.  An 
executive order and conflicts with several congressional 
committees also highlighted questions as to the Vice President’s 
authority to withhold information.  Even seasoned members of 
Congress wound up publicly conceding that they could not compel 
Cheney to appear before their committees.642
 
  At the end of the 
day, while an outright assertion of VPP would be without 
precedent, such an invocation would not be without pedigree. 
 
642 See supra Part VI.L.8. 
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ARGUMENTATION:  DOES A CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE EXIST 
FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT? 
 
VII. POTENTIAL ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF VICE PRESIDENTIAL 
PRIVILEGE (VPP) 
The previous discussion of past practice and case law offers a 
fair measure of support for the notion of VPP.  Nonetheless, there 
remain much more compelling theoretical arguments in its favor.  
One could imagine some of the positions discussed below being 
asserted by a future Vice President were he to invoke such a 
privilege.643
A. The Vice President as a Constitutional Officer Enjoys an 
Implied Privilege 
   
As a constitutional officer, a strong argument can be made 
that the Vice President may lawfully claim his own privilege.  
The logic should be familiar:  Since the President enjoys his own 
privilege under Article II,644 since members of Congress have a 
legislative privilege under Article I,645 and since members of the 
federal judiciary possess a privilege under Article III,646 the Vice 
President should also be entitled to his own constitutional 
privilege because he, like his colleagues, needs to receive candid 
advice from his aides to encourage effective decisionmaking.  
Otherwise, the Vice President would be the only one of the 
approximately 1,400 constitutional officers not to benefit from 
such a privilege when carrying out his duties. His deliberations 
would be uniquely lacking in confidentiality, his decisionmaking 
uniquely vulnerable to compromise.  This singular omission 
would appear particularly striking given the exalted status the 
Vice President has come to enjoy in American government.647
 
643 The focus of this Article has been on whether the Vice President enjoys a 
constitutionally based privilege to withhold certain material from the public, the 
Congress, and the courts. As such, it has focused on whether he enjoys an analogue 
to the constitutionally based presidential communications privilege and not whether 
he enjoys a vice presidential equivalent of the common law deliberative process 
privilege.   
   
644 See supra Part II.  
645 See supra Part III. 
646 See supra Part IV. 
647 See, e.g., JODY BAUMGARTNER, THE AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY 
RECONSIDERED ix (2006); Albert, supra note 315.   
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To the extent the Vice President is carrying out his own 
constitutional responsibilities, his deliberations would be cloaked 
in privilege, and he could prevent certain conversations and 
documents from facing outside scrutiny.  The scope would no 
doubt be narrow since the Vice President has no meaningful648 
constitutional duties other than presiding over the Senate, 
breaking tie votes,649 preparing for and helping to make 
determinations about presidential inability, and preparing for 
succession.650  His bifurcated privilege, involving both legislative 
and executive branch activities, would thus reflect that the “Vice-
Presiden[t’s] . . . prestige [is] derived from two entirely different 
sources.”651
1. President of the Senate 
   
a. The Vice President Has His Own Generalized Legislative 
Privilege as a Constitutional Officer Presiding over the Senate 
In exercising his constitutional duties in the Senate, the Vice 
President is, as a strictly legal matter, independent from the 
President.652
 
648 As noted earlier, the Vice President’s role in counting electors has come to be 
essentially a ministerial duty. See supra text accompanying note 320. 
  Article I, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that 
649 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
650 See id. amend. XXV, §§ 3–4. 
651 Cf. 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 229; LIGHT, supra note 306, at 7 (“In theory, 
the Vice-President’s position as the only constitutional officer with both legislative 
and executive roots could be a source of power.”). 
652 See, e.g., Memorandum from Antonin Scalia, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Kenneth A. Lazarus, Assoc. Counsel to the 
President, Regarding the Applicability of 3 C.F.R. Part 100 to the President and Vice 
President 3 (Dec. 16, 1974) (“With regard to the Vice President there is even a 
constitutional question whether the President can direct him to abide by prescribed 
standards of conduct. The Vice Presidential Office is an independent constitutional 
office, and the Vice President is independently elected. Just as the President cannot 
remove the Vice President, it would seem he may not dictate his standards of 
conduct.”); LOUIS CLINTON HATCH & EARL L. SHOUP, A HISTORY OF THE VICE-
PRESIDENCY OF THE UNITED STATES 11 (Earl L. Shoup ed., Greenwood Press 1970) 
(1934)) (“there is attached to the Vice-Presidency another office by nature wholly 
independent, that of President of the Senate”); cf. CURRIE, supra note 140, at 240 n.9 
(“The nation has chosen Jefferson [to be Vice President], and commanded him to a 
certain station. The President, therefore, has no right to command him to another or 
to take him off from that.” (quoting President John Adams)); TASK FORCE, supra 
note 318, at 64 (“The vice president . . . is constitutionally independent. . . . [T]he 
president cannot command the vice president to do or not do anything, nor can the 
president fire the vice president.”); HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 328 (quoting Vice 
President James Sherman’s refusal to assist President Taft in his legislative efforts: 
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the “Vice President of the United States shall be President of the 
Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.”653  
This is a grant of power to the Vice President.654
 
“You will have to act on your own account. I am to be Vice President and acting as a 
messenger boy is not part of the duties as Vice President.”); JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM 
FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 220 (1965) (contending 
that the “Vice President, not being technically in the Executive branch of 
government, was not subject to presidential orders” (quoting President 
Eisenhower)); LIGHT, supra note 306, at 119 (“the President cannot compel activity” 
out of the Vice President); SIDNEY M. MILKIS & MICHAEL NELSON, THE AMERICAN 
PRESIDENCY: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 1776–1993, at 420 (1994) (“[T]he vice 
president is a constitutionally independent official whom the president cannot 
command or remove, at least not in the usual sense . . . .”); Thomas E. Cronin, 
Rethinking the Vice-Presidency, in RETHINKING THE PRESIDENCY 324, 324 (Thomas 
E. Cronin ed., 1982) (“[T]echnically a vice-president is neither a part of the executive 
branch nor subject to the direction of the president.”); ALLAN P. SINDLER, UNCHOSEN 
PRESIDENTS: THE VICE PRESIDENT AND OTHER FRUSTRATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
SUCCESSION 29 (1976) (“The formal position of the vice-president, who technically is 
neither a part of the executive branch nor subject to the direction of the president, 
underscores the anomaly of that office.”); Onslow to Patrick Henry, in REPORTS AND 
PUBLIC LETTERS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN 322, 336 (Richard K. Cralle ed., 1855) 
(quoting Vice President Calhoun discussing the possibility of “the Vice-President [as 
presiding officer] choos[ing] to pursue a course independent of the will of the 
Executive”); Tench Coxe, An American Citizen I, INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER (Phila.), 
Sept. 26, 1787, in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: FEDERALIST, 
ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER 
RATIFICATION 20, 23 (1993) (“[O]ur vice-president, who is chosen by the people 
through the electors and the senate, is not at all dependent on the president, but may 
exercise equal powers on some occasions.”). As a practical matter, of course, the 
modern Vice President is politically reliant on the President for the duties he is 
assigned. Until President Roosevelt broke the tradition in 1940, vice presidential 
candidates were generally selected by party conventions and not by presidential 
candidates. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 178–79. As presidential candidates 
have come to select vice presidential candidates largely by themselves, Vice 
Presidents have become more beholden politically to the President. See id. at 179. In 
large part because of this reason, in the modern era there have been fewer public 
breaks between Presidents and Vice Presidents.   
  That the Vice 
President’s role as President of the Senate appears in Article I 
would seem to reflect that in this capacity, he acts as a 
653 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3.   
654 See J. Michael Medina, The American Vice-Presidency: Toward a More 
Utilized Institution, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 77, 94 (1990) (“The one constitutional 
power accorded the Vice-President was and is the tie-breaking vote.”); cf. Danforth v. 
Cason, 507 S.W.2d 405, 411–13 (Mo. 1974) (“The position of the lieutenant governor 
[of Missouri] is in many ways similar to that of the vice president of the United 
States. . . . [T]he designation of the lieutenant governor as president of the 
senate . . . is a . . . grant of authority . . . .”). 
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participant in the legislative branch and not the executive 
branch655
Vice presidential independence manifested itself early on.  In 
1794, Vice President Adams refused a request by President 
Washington to negotiate a treaty with Great Britain regarding 
commercial affairs.  Adams declined because he asserted that 
under the Constitution he was duty bound to serve as President 
of the Senate.
 and that in this regard he is his own man.   
656  Jefferson, as Vice President elect, rebuffed a 
similar overture by President elect Adams in 1797, this time over 
a potential diplomatic mission to France.657  Jefferson argued 
that the proposed mission was beyond the scope of his 
constitutional responsibilities.658
These rebuffs of the President occurred in part because 
under the original text of the Constitution there was little 
indication that the Vice President should comply with the 
President’s wishes even as a political matter.
   
659  Prior to the 
adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, the Vice President was 
simply the runner-up to the President in electoral votes.  This led 
to Adams serving as President with his opponent in the 1796 
presidential race, Jefferson, holding office as Vice President.  
Jefferson, therefore, was in no way beholden to Adams for his 
position, either legally or politically.  By having electors vote 
separately for President and Vice President,660
 
655 See supra note 323; cf. Brown v. Owen, 206 P.3d 310 (Wash. 2009) (“While 
serving as the presiding officer of the senate, the lieutenant governor is an officer of 
the legislative branch.”). The question could be raised: when the President exercises 
his veto power under Article I, why would he not be considered part of the legislative 
branch as well? Cf. Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1193–94 (5th Cir. 
1981) (concluding that a mayor exercising veto power is entitled to legislative 
immunity). The major difference is that the Vice President is explicitly placed within 
the legislative branch as President of the Senate. While reviewing bills for approval, 
the President is exercising legislative power under Article I but is not part of the 
legislative branch. This is like the Senate’s role in considering treaties and 
appointments. The Senate is exercising executive power under Article II, but the 
upper chamber is not part of the executive branch while doing so. The Vice 
President, while presiding over the Senate or breaking ties, is both exercising 
legislative power and is in the legislative branch while taking such action. This 
distinction is reflected by the Vice President’s ability to participate in debate and 
vote on measures that are not presented to the President. See infra note 673. 
 thus permitting 
656 See WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 24.       
657 See id.   
658 See, e.g., DONALD YOUNG, AMERICAN ROULETTE: THE HISTORY AND DILEMMA 
OF THE VICE PRESIDENCY 12 (1966).   
659 See, e.g., Amar, supra note 7.       
660 See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. 
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party tickets to get elected instead of two potentially opposing 
candidates, the Twelfth Amendment essentially acknowledged 
the existence of political parties.661
This independence is illustrated by the President’s inability 
to remove the Vice President from office.
  The amendment, however, 
changed nothing as far as the Vice President’s legal 
independence from the President.   
662  This is unlike 
Cabinet-level officials, who serve at the pleasure of the chief 
executive.  If they defy the President, they face the specter of 
removal from office.663  The authority to remove officials is, of 
course, pivotal in the President’s responsibility over the executive 
branch.  It is self evident that the basis for the independence of 
independent agencies is that limitations can be placed on 
presidential removal of the heads of these entities.664
Underscoring the Vice President’s status as an independent 
constitutional actor is that, until well into the twentieth century, 





661 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 6–7.    
 rather than the executive branch.  As has been 
outlined by the Senate Historical Office, the vice presidency 
“[d]uring the nineteenth century . . . remained essentially a 
662 See, e.g., Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Amar, supra 
note 7 (“[T]he Constitution’s text does not give the president the power to remove a 
vice president . . . .”); Clinton Rossiter, The Reform of the Vice–Presidency, 63 POL. 
SCI. Q. 383, 401 (1948) (“For four years, at least, the Vice–President is as 
irremovable as the Chief Justice . . . .”). He may be removed only through the 
impeachment process, which takes place outside of the executive branch.   
663 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); see also Rossiter, supra 
note 663 (contrasting a Cabinet office with the vice presidency, which is “in no way 
subject to . . . presidential supervision and dominance which the power of removal 
logically engenders”). 
664 See, e.g., Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 739 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
(“In upholding the congressional limitations on the President’s power of removal [in 
Humphrey’s Executor], the Court stressed the independence of the [Federal Trade] 
Commission from the President.”); see also EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: 
OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1957, at 89–95 (4th rev. ed. 1957). 
665 See, e.g., RELYEA, supra note 307, at 1 (following adoption of the Constitution 
“the Vice President soon came to be regarded as a legislative branch official”); 
FEERICK, supra note 18, at 32 (“Vice Presidents in the nineteenth century rarely 
were given any executive responsibilities.”); Manu Raju, Quiet End to Cheney’s 
Senate Era, THE HILL, Nov. 19, 2008, http://thehill.com/homenews/news/17119-
quiet-end-to-cheneys-senate-era (quoting Senate historian Don Ritchie who noted 
that in the nineteenth century “99 percent” of a Vice President’s work involved his 
presiding over the Senate); WAUGH, supra note 296, at 151 (writing in 1956 that “the 
Vice President is only a potential executive officer”).   
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legislative position.”666  As Vice President, Adams wrote in 1790 
that his position was “totally detached from the executive 
authority and confined to the legislative.”667  With respect to the 
foreign policy charted by the Washington administration, Adams 
asserted he had “no constitutional vote.”668  The second Vice 
President concurred.  Jefferson wrote that while Vice President 
he viewed the “office as constitutionally confined to legislative 
functions, and that [he] could not take any part whatever in 
executive consultations, even were it proposed.”669  This 
interpretation of the Vice President as a participant in the 
legislative branch almost certainly contributed to the officeholder 
being largely excluded from regular attendance at Cabinet 
proceedings until the third decade of the twentieth century.670
 
666 HATFIELD, supra note 318, at xix.     
  
Indeed, even midway through the twentieth century Vice 
667 Id. at 7.   
668 Id. at 10.   
669 Charles O. Paullin, The Vice-President and the Cabinet, 29 AM. HIST. REV. 
496, 497 (1924) (citation omitted).   
670 Not until Coolidge did Vice Presidents attend Cabinet sessions as a matter of 
course, see, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 352, and even afterward his successor 
balked at doing so. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 136. In 1791, 
Washington undertook a tour of the southern states. He instructed his cabinet that 
while he was away they should consult with Adams if any major developments 
occurred. In this respect, Adams may have been the only Vice President to attend 
such meetings before Marshall in the late 1910s. See H. B. Learned, Some Aspects of 
the Vice-Presidency, 7 POL. SCI. REV. 162, 174–75 (1913) (“I can discover no evidence 
that reveals a single instance of the vice-president in attendance at cabinet 
sessions . . . . It is possible that instances of admitting the vice-president on 
occasions to a gathering of the cabinet may have occurred, and may some day appear 
in stray records. But it is certain that from 1789 to 1912 no custom in the matter has 
been established.”); see also AUGUSTUS B. WOODWARD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 9 (1825) (“Perhaps [the Vice President’s] constitutional function of 
being prolocutor of the Senate was deemed incompatible with his being a member of 
the Cabinet. His attendance would frequently be inconvenient, and his possessing a 
voice in the deliberations of the Senate might render it indelicate. That any 
dissatisfaction arose from this course being pursued, either at the time of its 
adoption, or subsequently, has never been manifested.”); Memorandum from 
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel on the 
Constitutionality of the Vice President’s Service as Chairman of the Nat’l 
Aeronautics & Space Council to the Vice President 1–2 (Apr. 18, 1961), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/041861.pdf. As late as 1916, one lawmaker 
thought a constitutional amendment necessary for the Vice President to participate 
in such gatherings. See Lucius Wilmerding, The Vice Presidency, 68 POL. SCI. Q. 17, 
33 (1953).   
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President Alben Barkley viewed himself as a legislative 
official.671
History confirms that, when the Vice President is acting in 
his legislative branch capacity, the President does not have the 
legal authority to instruct him how to do his job.  For instance, 
Presidents cannot order Vice Presidents to cast their vote a 
certain way.
 
672  After all, in this capacity, Vice Presidents are 
acting as part of the legislative branch, not the executive 
branch.673  For example, Vice President Aaron Burr’s deciding 
vote kept the Jefferson-led Republicans from rescinding the 
Judiciary Act of 1801.674  Vice President George Clinton broke a 
tie that stymied reauthorization of the U.S. National Bank, a 
position distinctly at odds with the views of President James 
Madison.675  Vice President Calhoun voted against legislation 
President John Quincy Adams supported to build a canal 
between the Illinois River and Lake Michigan.676  Calhoun also 
voted against a tariff bill the Adams administration favored.677
 
671 See, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 423, 427. 
  
672 See, e.g., Cronin, supra note 652, at 329 (contending that “participation by 
the Vice-President in Senate voting [may be], either in support of his own views or 
the President’s” (quoting James F. Byrnes, former Supreme Court Justice and 
Senator) (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
673 This is further reflected in that the Vice President’s role in breaking tie votes 
appears to extend to consideration of constitutional amendments. See HATFIELD, 
supra note 318, at 391; WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 40–41; cf. Coleman v. Miller, 
307 U.S. 433, 446–47 (1939). This is unlike the role of the President, who plays no 
formal role in the adoption of constitutional amendments. See Hollingsworth v. 
Virginia, 3 U.S. 378, 382 (1798); see also Henry Barrett Learned, Casting Votes of the 
Vice-Presidents, 1789–1915, 20 AM. HIST. REV. 571, 575–76 (1915); cf. 47 CONG. REC. 
1949–59 (1911). Similarly, the Vice President can vote on matters involving internal 
Senate organization that are also not presented to the President for his 
consideration. See Learned, supra, at 572 (discussing Vice President Calhoun’s and 
Vice President Fillmore’s votes to confirm Senate officers); id. at 572–73 (noting Vice 
President Wheeler’s vote related to whether an individual could be seated as a 
Senator); infra notes 872–73 and accompanying text (noting Vice President Arthur’s 
and Vice President Cheney’s votes to decide which party would be in the Senate 
majority).   
674 See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 37–38; YOUNG, supra note 658, at 14. It 
should be remembered that, with the exception of Burr’s episode regarding the 
Judiciary Act, all of the examples discussed in this segment entail actions following 
the Twelfth Amendment, which tied the Vice President’s political fortunes more 
closely to those of the President.   
675 See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 57; IRVING G. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF THE 
VICE PRESIDENCY 34 (1956). 
676 See MERRILL D. PETERSON, THE GREAT TRIUMVIRATE: WEBSTER, CLAY, AND 
CALHOUN 157 (1987).   
677 See id. at 153–54 (labeling Calhoun’s action as “an anti-administration vote”).    
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As Andrew Jackson’s Vice President, Calhoun678 voted against 
one of the President’s most highly prized nominees, Martin Van 
Buren, to be minister to Great Britain.679  Vice President Millard 
Fillmore informed President Zachary Taylor that he would be 
supportive of the Compromise of 1850 if he had to break a tie; 
this was counter to the President’s stance.680
Vice Presidents can also use their legislative perch as 
presiding officer to undercut presidential priorities in ways other 
than through tie breaking votes.  Jefferson worked to frustrate 
the Adams administration in a number of areas.
  President Taylor 
died before Fillmore could take such action.   
681  As John 
Quincy Adams’s Vice President, Calhoun worked to defeat U.S. 
participation in the Panama Congress.682  He also purposely 
placed anti-administration Senators on a key committee.683  
Chester Arthur publicly opposed President James Garfield’s 
nominee for Secretary of the Treasury.684  In 1891, Levi Morton 
proved unhelpful to President Benjamin Harrison during 
consideration of civil rights legislation.685  While debating 
whether to rescind the Sherman Silver Purchase Act in 1893, 
Adlai Stevenson likewise did no favors for President Grover 
Cleveland.686  Charles Fairbanks worked to scuttle President 
Theodore Roosevelt’s Square Deal legislative agenda in the 
Senate.687  James Sherman was brazenly insubordinate to 
President William Howard Taft about a request the President 
made of him.688
 
678 Calhoun is one of only two men to have served as Vice President for two 
different Presidents. The other is George Clinton, who served under both Presidents 
Jefferson and Madison.   
  Charles Dawes undercut President Calvin 
679 See, e.g., WAUGH, supra note 296, at 66. 
680 See HATCH & SHOUP, supra note 652, at 35.   
681 See, e.g., SWANSTROM, supra note 144, at 256–57.    
682 See PETERSON, supra note 676, at 138–39.  
683 See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 89; see also PETERSON, supra note 676, at 
136. In addition, Calhoun stymied President Jackson’s nomination of Henry Baldwin 
to be Secretary of the Treasury. See ABRAHAM, supra note 273, at 79. The Vice 
President tried to do the same with respect to his appointment to serve on the 
Supreme Court but ultimately fell short. See id.   
684 See, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 254. 
685 See id. at 273. 
686 See id. at 281–82. 
687 See DORMAN, supra note 312, at 96; HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 320.   
688 See e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 325.   
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Coolidge’s Senate strategy on a pivotal farm bill689 and on 
banking legislation.690  John Nance Garner did much the same 
during the late 1930s with respect to New Deal policies 
advocated by President Franklin Roosevelt.691
Even today—though the office is “a predominantly executive 
post”
   
692—Vice Presidents at times still stake out public positions 
independent from the President based on their legislative role.  
For instance, Vice President Cheney broke with the Bush 
administration on litigation involving the Second Amendment.693  
Taking an approach different from that of the Bush Justice 
Department, Cheney signed an amicus curiae brief submitted to 
the Supreme Court by members of Congress.694  He did so solely 
in his capacity as “President of the United States Senate.”695  
Similarly, Cheney staked out his own position on changing 
Senate rules to end the filibustering of judicial nominees, the so-
called “nuclear option.”  While President Bush had indicated he 
would not get involved in internal Senate matters, Cheney stated 
publicly that in his capacity as President of the Senate he would 
interpret Senate rules to prohibit such filibustering.696
 
689 See id. at 359, 366; Irving G. Williams, Senators, Rules, and Vice-Presidents, 
in 5 THOUGHT PATTERNS 21, 26 (Arpad F. Kovacs ed., 1957).   
  When 
Bush’s Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, was asked whether Cheney’s 
views reflected the Bush administration’s policy in this regard, 
690 See James R. Garner, Office of the Vice President of the United States 185–
86 (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa) (June 1934) (on file with the 
St. John’s Law Review).   
691 See JAMES T. PATTERSON, CONGRESSIONAL CONSERVATISM AND THE NEW 
DEAL 135–37, 167–68, 231–32, 292, 295, 331 (1967). 
692 HATFIELD, supra note 318, at xxi. 
693 See Robert Barnes, Cheney Joins Congress in Opposing D.C. Gun Ban, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 9, 2008, at A1 (stating that Cheney’s position “is at odds with the one put 
forward by the administration”).   
694 See id.  
695 See Brief for Amici Curiae, 55 Members of United States Senate, the 
President of the United States Senate and 250 Members of United States House of 
Representatives in Support of Respondent, at App. 1a, District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07–290). Underscoring his legislative role, 
Cheney not only presided over the Senate from time to time but also frequently 
attended Senate Republican lunch meetings. See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 
338, at 192.   
696 See David D. Kirkpatrick, Cheney Enters Filibuster Fight, Backing Change in 
Senate Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2005, at A1. 
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he responded that Cheney was speaking in his capacity “as the 
president of the Senate” and not on behalf of the President.697
These examples all reflect the constitutional independence 
enjoyed by the Vice President while serving in the Senate.  Since 
the Vice President is not answerable to the President as he 
presides over the upper chamber—while carrying out his duties 
in the chair the Vice President is by definition not acting as part 
of the executive branch—he could not turn to the President to 
exercise executive privilege on his behalf.
   
698  In his capacity as 
Senate President, and to conform with the structural imperatives 
of the Constitution providing each constitutional officer a 
privilege when executing his or her enumerated duties, the Vice 
President would need to invoke an Article I privilege: either the 
generalized legislative privilege699 or the Speech or Debate 
privilege.700
The question then is, what are the Vice President’s 
legislative duties, the preparation and execution of which would 
be shielded by the generalized legislative privilege or the Speech 
or Debate privilege?  In addition to voting, Vice Presidents carry 
out a few other modest legislative responsibilities depending on 
the state of Senate rules and practice.  On occasion they have 
spoken from the Chair.  Riddick’s Senate Procedure indicates 
that while the “Vice President should not participate in 
debate[,] . . . on different occasions he has made long statements 
   
 
697 Transcript of Meet the Press, May 1, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com 
/id/7698687/print/1/displaymode/1098/. In another assertion of vice presidential 
independence, Cheney openly broke with President Bush on the issue of gay rights. 
See, e.g., Cheney at Odds with Bush on Gay Marriage, Aug. 25, 2004, available at 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5817720/. In August 2004, the Vice President stated 
that he did not agree with President Bush’s view about the need for a constitutional 
amendment prohibiting same-sex marriage. See id. “[M]y own preference,” Cheney 
indicated, “is as I’ve stated, but the president makes policy for the administration.  
He’s made it clear that he does, in fact, support a constitutional amendment on this 
issue.” See id. For more on vice presidential independence, see Garner, supra note 
689, at 181 (the Vice President is “not unnaturally thrown into a sort of antagonism 
with the Administration—an antagonism sure to be stimulated by the 
coterie . . . disappointed in efforts to secure favor with the President” (quoting 2 
JAMES BLAINE, TWENTY YEARS OF CONGRESS 57 (1886)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
698 The Vice President, of course, cannot claim executive privilege on his own. 
See supra Part II. 
699 See supra Part III.B. 
700 See supra Part III.A. 
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from the chair.”701  To do so today, the Vice President needs the 
unanimous consent of the Senate.702  In the 1790s, Vice President 
Adams, however, was known to participate in debate with some 
frequency.703  At the end of his term, Vice President Burr gave 
one of the most memorable addresses in the history of the 
Senate.704
As presiding officer, the Vice President must also ensure 
that regular order and decorum are observed both on the floor 
and in the Senate gallery, may make parliamentary rulings not 
involving constitutional matters, and may recognize individual 
members so they can address the Senate.
 
705  In addition, from 
time to time Vice Presidents have exercised other powers under 
Senate rules.  Calhoun, for example, took full advantage of 
Senate rules at the time to make committee assignments.706  
Finally, from the outset, Vice Presidents have lobbied 
lawmakers.707
Thus, it seems clear that the Vice President qua presiding 
officer is very much his own man from a constitutional 
standpoint, and this is because in such a capacity the Vice 
   
 
701 RIDDICK’S SENATE PROCEDURE: PRECEDENTS AND PRACTICES, S. DOC. NO. 
101-28, at 1391 (1992) [hereinafter RIDDICK’S]. 
702 See id. at 1391–92. 
703 See, e.g., DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS 401–02, 407 (2001). 
704 See ROBERT C. BYRD, THE SENATE, 1789–1989, ADDRESSES ON THE HISTORY 
OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 48 (Mary Sharon Hall ed., 1988). 
705 See RIDDICK’S, supra note 701, at 1025. The power to recognize speakers 
carries with it some authority as it did when Vice President Rockefeller, in 
attempting to defeat a filibuster, refused to recognize opponents of his effort. See, 
e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 510–11. Before the rise of modern Senate party 
leadership and the expansion of the office’s executive branch role, the Vice President 
appears to have had even more authority in this vein. As Coolidge reflected on his 
role as presiding officer: “the President of the Senate can and does exercise a good 
deal of influence over its deliberations. The Constitution gives him the power to 
preside, which is the power to recognize whom he will. That often means that he 
decides what business is to be taken up and who is to have the floor for debate at 
any specific time.” See CALVIN COOLIDGE, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF CALVIN 
COOLIDGE 162 (3d ed. 1984) (1929). 
706 See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 87–89; Gerald Gamm & Steven S. Smith, 
Last Among Equals: The Senate’s Presiding Officer, in ESTEEMED COLLEAGUES: 
CIVILITY AND DELIBERATION IN THE U.S. SENATE 105, 112–13 (Burdett A. Loomis 
ed., 2000) (noting that the presiding officer enjoyed the power to make committee 
assignments from 1823 to 1825, 1829 to 1832, and 1837 to 1844).   
707 See HATCH & SHOUP, supra note 652, 101–02; see also HATFIELD, supra note 
318, at 389 (discussing how Vice President Garner would reach out to members on 
the floor). For a discussion of vice presidential lobbying, see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 
295, at 177–84. 
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President is acting as a part of the legislative branch.  In 
carrying out his own independent legislative functions—which, 
as discussed above, involve casting tie breaking votes, ruling on 
parliamentary procedure, recognizing Senators to speak, and 
occasionally speaking himself—the Vice President is in no way 
interfering with the President’s Article II authority to administer 
the executive branch.  Nor would the Vice President be exercising 
a legislative privilege in a manner inconsistent with Senate 
practice if he acted on his own since that privilege may be 
asserted by individual members of the body.708
The Vice President’s consultations with aides on 
parliamentary procedure and tactics would therefore have the 
benefit of privilege.  The same could be said to the extent he is 
consulting with subordinates on any remarks he may make from 
the chair or how to vote when the Senate is deadlocked.  As is the 
case with lawmakers, discussions of this kind are sensitive, 
requiring candid exchanges between the Vice President and his 
staff.  Perhaps only slightly less compelling for purposes of 
privilege would be any conversations and documents exchanged 
between the Vice President and his aides on legislative strategy, 
such as how to lobby Senators.  These materials could be 
privileged since they involve the Vice President in his legislative 
role.
   
709
Therefore, as a matter of constitutional structure and 
symmetry, to the extent the Vice President is carrying out his 
own independent constitutional duty to preside over the Senate 
and break ties, he would seem likely to enjoy the generalized 
legislative privilege based on structure and past practice.  Of 
course, given the limited amount of time the modern Vice 
  In this setting, the Vice President—at least in the 
modern era—would tend to be fulfilling the President’s 
legislative agenda, but that is not constitutionally prescribed.  As 
has been discussed earlier, Vice Presidents have actively worked 
against presidential legislative agendas in the past, and as a 
constitutional matter, are independent in this sphere.   
 
708 See supra note 180 and accompanying text. 
709 Since the Vice President plays no constitutional role with respect to the 
House, it is less certain if his internal communications regarding legislative strategy 
involving the House of Representatives would be privileged. In such an instance, he 
may be acting more as an agent of the President than a constitutional officer of the 
Senate. Interestingly, Cheney maintained an office on the House side of the Capitol 
as well as the traditional one on the Senate side.   
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President spends presiding over the Senate,710
b. The Vice President and the Speech or Debate Clause 
 such a privilege 
would no doubt shield only a minor portion of the Vice 
President’s conversations and only a small amount of the 
material prepared for his review.  But that does not mean the 
privilege would not exist.   
Much as the Vice President qua presiding officer of the 
Senate would seem to have recourse to the generalized legislative 
privilege during the execution of his Senate responsibilities, so 
too would it appear that the Vice President may enjoy similar 
protection of his internal deliberations under the Speech or 
Debate Clause of the Constitution.711
To the extent the Vice President is fulfilling his duties under 
Article I to preside over the Senate and break ties, he would be 
considered part of the legislative branch
   
712
 
710 One has to go back to Barkley to find a Vice President devoting a significant 
portion of his work day to his Senate duties. On average, the Kentuckian sat in the 
chair about half of the time. See MARTIN B. GOLD, SENATE PROCEDURE AND 
PRACTICE 13 (2d ed. 2004). Nixon estimated that he spent only five to ten percent of 
his time presiding over the Senate. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 142. 
Agnew devoted about the same amount of time to his legislative duties. See id. Vice 
President Humphrey estimated that he dedicated approximately one third of his 
schedule to Senate activities. See Paul T. David, The Vice Presidency: Its 
Institutional Evolution and Contemporary Status, 29 J. POL. 721, 744 n.105 (1967). 
Walter Mondale spent only eighteen hours in the chair during his initial twelve 
months as Vice President. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 142.   
 and fall within the 
ambit of the Speech or Debate Clause.  Accordingly, he could 
exercise a privilege akin to that outlined in Rayburn.  OLC has in 
fact alluded to the Vice President benefitting from protection 
under the Speech or Debate Clause.  OLC has written that 
“[w]ith respect to [the Vice President’s] responsibility as tie 
breaker [in the Senate] his immunity from criminal prosecution 
should be analogized to that of Members of Congress under 
711 Cf. Myers, supra note 45, at 936–40 (conceding that the Speech or Debate 
Clause could provide the Vice President with some degree of civil immunity); Akhil 
Reed Amar, Constitutional Redundancies and Clarifying Clauses, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 
1, 17 n.40 (1998).    
712 See, e.g., Reis Letter, supra note 323, at 3 (“[The Vice President] is . . . made 
an officer of the Senate and given a right to vote in certain circumstances. It would 
reasonably follow that he is ‘in the legislative branch.’ . . . . [In fact], it seems 
difficult to conceive that an officer whose only constitutional function, when the 
President is capable of exercising the Executive power, is to preside over the Senate 
and to vote . . . is not ‘in the legislative branch.”); cf. supra note 323 and 
accompanying text.   
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Article I, section 6, clause 1 of the Constitution.”713  Such a 
privilege, of course, would not extend beyond the confines of 
legislative activity.714
While largely convincing, such an argument is admittedly 
not airtight.  There are three concerns with the Vice President 
being shielded by the Speech or Debate Clause that are less 
apparent than with his invoking the generalized legislative 
privilege, which is based on structure and past practice and not, 
strictly speaking, constitutional text.  First, Article I, Section 6 
applies to “Senators and Representatives.”
   
715  It is by no means 
assured that the Vice President would be considered a “Senator” 
for purposes of this clause.716  He is not elected from and does not 
represent a state and serves on no committee.  He cannot speak 
on the floor without the Senate’s permission.  Most significantly 
perhaps, he cannot introduce legislation or amendments and 
cannot vote in most circumstances.  Finally, OLC has concluded 
that he is not a lawmaker, observing that he is subject to 
impeachment, as are other executive branch officials.717
 
713 Dixon Memo, supra note 434, at 36; cf. Amar, supra note 711 (“[T]he Vice 
President must obviously be immune from a libel suit for things he says in the 
Senate, even though he is not, strictly speaking, a Senator covered by the words of 
the Article I speech clause . . . .”).   
  As such, 
714 The Speech or Debate Clause is only interpreted to include duties that relate 
to legislative functions. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 126–36 
(1979) (concluding that Speech or Debate Clause protection does not extend to press 
releases and newsletters); see also Myers, supra note 45, at 938 n.315. 
715 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. An argument could be made that if the Incompability 
Clause does not apply to the Vice President because he is not a member of Congress, 
cf. supra note 323, then why should he be treated as a member for legislative 
privilege purposes? There are three reasons. First, the courts have long construed 
the Speech or Debate Clause broadly, see infra notes 718–19 and accompanying text, 
while they have let stand the political branches’ narrow interpretation of the 
Incompatibility Clause. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 
208 (1974). Second, it reflects explicit text, which restricts only “Members” of 
Congress from serving in the executive branch and which expressly provides that 
the Vice President is President of the Senate. Finally, even were the Speech or 
Debate Clause to be viewed as not providing support for VPP, the generalized 
legislative privilege would still do so.   
716 But cf. WILLIAMS, supra note 308, at 31 (“[T]he Vice President is, insofar as 
he is able, a ‘Senator’ for his party.”); Garvey, supra note 323, at 582–83 (“It would 
be logically inconsistent not to consider an individual with the authority to vote in a 
legislative body a ‘member’ of that body . . . . Confined to a strictly textual analysis, 
the Constitution clearly perceives the Vice President as a legislative officer.”). 
717 See, e.g., Katzenbach Memo, supra note 318, at 10–11 (“Despite his position 
as President of the Senate, he is certainly not one of its members. Nor can he be 
convincingly described as a third member of the Legislative Branch alongside the 
two Houses of Congress. His office was created by Article II of the Constitution 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 581 
the Vice President may not be expelled from the chamber like a 
Senator.   
However, the Court has not interpreted those covered by the 
Speech or Debate Clause narrowly.  The Supreme Court in 
Gravel v. United States reasoned that “[i]t is true that the Clause 
itself mentions only ‘Senators and Representatives,’ but prior 
cases have plainly not taken a literalistic approach in applying 
the privilege.”718  As a general matter, the courts have 
interpreted the Speech or Debate Clause to include congressional 
staff.  Staff members obviously are not constitutional officers.  
They are not elected, they do not vote, they do not speak on the 
floor, they do not preside over the body—as does the Vice 
President—yet the Supreme Court in Gravel concluded they are 
shielded by privilege as their members’ alter ego.719
Moreover, from a textual standpoint, the use of the term “of” 
in the President of the Senate Clause makes clear that the Vice 
President is considered part of the Senate, even if he is not a 
  Since staff 
members are afforded protection under the Speech or Debate 
Clause—even if their privilege is derivative from the members 
they serve—it would seem the Vice President as the 
constitutional President of the Senate would enjoy no less a 
privilege.   
 
dealing with the Executive Branch, and section 4 of that Article makes him, just as 
the President, subject to impeachment by the Legislative Branch.”). 
718 408 U.S. 606, 617 (1972); see also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 823 
(1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“It is hardly an overstatement to say that [when 
applying the Speech or Debate Clause to congressional aides] we thus avoided a 
‘literalistic approach’ . . . and instead looked to the structure of the Constitution and 
the evolution of the function of the Legislative Branch.”); Gravel, 408 U.S. at 617 
(“The Clause . . . speaks only of ‘Speech or Debate,’ but the Court’s consistent 
approach has been that to confine the protection of the Speech or Debate Clause to 
words spoken in debate would be an unacceptably narrow view.”); id. at 624 (“Prior 
cases have read the Speech or Debate Clause ‘broadly to effectuate its 
purposes’ . . . .” (quoting United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966)); United 
States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 509 (1972) (concluding that past precedent ensured 
that “the Clause is to be read broadly to include anything ‘generally done in a 
session of the House by one of its members in relation to the business before it’ ” 
(quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881)); United States v. Johnson, 383 
U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (“Kilbourn and Tenney indicate that the legislative privilege 
will be read broadly to effectuate its purposes . . . .”).   
719 See 408 U.S. at 618 (“[T]he Speech or Debate Clause applies not only to a 
Member, but also to his aides insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a 
protected legislative act if performed by the Member himself.”). 
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Senator himself.720  Thus, while the Vice President is not a 
Senator, constitutional text and case law would seem to favor the 
Vice President having a measure of protection under the Speech 
or Debate Clause.  The Vice President has also been treated as 
part of the legislative branch in a number of statutory 
schemes.721
 
720 In this context, the term “of” is typically interpreted to relate to an object that 
is part of a larger entity. See, e.g., MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 
860 (11th ed. 2007) (defining “of” as “a function word to indicate the component 
material, parts, or elements or the contents . . . used as a function word to indicate 
belonging or a possessive relationship” (emphasis added)); RANDOM HOUSE 
WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1342 (2d ed. 1987) (“to indicate material, 
component parts, substance, or contents . . . possession, connection, or association”).   
  It would be consistent with past legislative 
treatment of the Vice President for him to be shielded by the 
Speech or Debate Clause.  
Use of the term “of” in other areas of the Constitution clearly reflects the view that 
the Vice President should be considered part of the Senate and therefore part of the 
legislative branch. Cf. Amar, supra note 15, at 791–92 (discussing use of the 
Constitution as a dictionary). He is “Vice President of the United States [and] shall 
be President of the Senate.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5. There is little doubt that 
the first “of” in the clause denotes that the Vice President must be part of, and not 
separate from, the United States. This is underscored by the constitutional 
requirement that the President, and thus the Vice President, must have been born 
in the United States and therefore be “of” the United States. See id. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 
(“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the 
time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of 
President.”); id. amend. XII (“no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of 
President shall be eligible to that of Vice President”).  
Moreover, following Article I’s provision that the “Vice President of the United 
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be 
equally divided,” the Constitution states that the “Senate shall chuse their other 
Officers.” See id. § 3, cls. 4–5. The use of the term “other” is instructive. It clearly 
demonstrates that the Vice President as the President of the Senate is himself a 
Senate officer. It is difficult to argue that the Vice President is a Senate officer but is 
not part of the Senate. After all, this constitutional language mimics that governing 
the House. That language provides that the “House of Representatives shall chuse 
their Speaker and other Officers.” Id. § 2, cl. 5.   
On the other hand, it could be argued Article I provides that the “Senate of the 
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State,” Id. art. I, § 3, 
cl. 1, and that such a formulation leaves no room for the Vice President. However, 
the context of that provision almost assuredly implies actual membership in the 
body and not the issue of broader affiliation with the chamber. Senate staff members 
who number in the thousands are certainly “of” the Senate even if they are not 
senators. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616–18.  
721 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006) (“For purposes of this title, ‘Member of 
Congress’ means the Vice President, a member of the Senate or the House of 
Representatives.”); An Act Making Appropriations for the Legislative Branch for the 
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 2010, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 111-68, 
tit. I, 123 Stat. 2023, 2023–24 (2009) (providing funds for vice presidential expense 
allowances and staff salaries); see also Cheney GAO Brief, supra note 551, at 16–17.   
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Further, the Supreme Court in its jurisprudence involving 
immunity from civil liability for official actions has concluded 
that non-lawmakers still enjoy legislative immunity when they 
are carrying out legislative functions.  As noted above, immunity 
from civil liability is closely linked to questions of constitutional 
privilege as to both rationale and effect.722  Both are key pillars in 
the broad constitutional emphasis placed on encouraging 
effective constitutional decisionmaking.  The two concepts are 
also tied in that both involve exceptions to “ordinary legal 
processes.”723  Moreover, the Supreme Court itself utilized 
reasoning from its civil immunity cases when deciding Cheney v. 
U.S. District Court, which of course involved matters related 
closely to privilege.724
In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,
 
725 the 
U.S. Supreme Court followed reasoning that provides additional 
support for the Vice President possessing a Speech or Debate 
privilege.  In that case, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that, when 
carrying out legislative activities, the Virginia Supreme Court 
should be granted legislative immunity.726  The Vice President 
could make a convincing parallel argument that, if the 
judiciary—as a separate branch of state government—is entitled 
to legislative immunity when acting legislatively, the Vice 
President at the federal level should have the same treatment 
when he is acting in a legislative capacity.727  The Vice 
President’s case would actually be on much firmer ground than 
the state court’s in Consumers Union since, unlike the court, the 
Vice President in fact is part of the legislative branch, at least 
some of the time.728
The Supreme Court has also concluded in other contexts that 
certain actions are legislative by their very nature and are 
   
 
722 See supra Part I.B. 
723 See Amar, supra note 7, at 192; see also supra Part I.  
724 542 U.S. 367, 385–86, 388 (2004). The Court cited both Clinton v. Jones and 
Nixon v. Fitzgerald in arriving at its conclusion. See id.; see also Myers, supra note 
45, at 910–12 & 912 n.104.   
725 446 U.S. 719 (1980).   
726 See id. at 731.   
727 The author would like to thank a Senate staff colleague for directing him to 
this case. See also Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 
U.S. 391, 406 (1979) (concluding that “to the extent [a regional commission 
is] . . . acting in a capacity comparable to that of members of a state legislature, they 
are entitled to absolute immunity”).  
728 See discussion supra note 323.  
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therefore entitled to the absolute immunity that accompanies 
such action.  The Court in Bogan v. Scott-Harris,729 which 
centered around the question of immunity for local officials 
involved in legislative actions, concluded that “acts of 
voting . . . [are] quintessentially legislative.”730  The Court was 
unconcerned about which branch of government the local official 
belonged to:  “Petitioner[’s] . . . signing into law an 
ordinance . . . [is] formally legislative, even though he [is] . . . an 
executive official.  We have recognized that officials outside the 
legislative branch are entitled to legislative immunity when they 
perform legislative functions.”731  The Court concluded that 
“[w]hether an act is legislative turns on the nature of the act.”732  
Since officials altogether outside of the legislative branch are 
entitled to legislative immunity when they perform legislative 
acts,733 it would seem all but certain that the Vice President 
would enjoy legislative immunity in his capacity as President of 
the Senate734 because he is performing legislative acts within the 
legislative branch.  Since the Vice President would seem to have 
legislative immunity when acting in a lawmaking capacity, it 
would stand to reason that he would also have legislative 
privilege since the two concepts are so closely intertwined.735
 
729 523 U.S. 44 (1998).  
   
730 Id. at 55. 
731 Id. (emphasis added).  
732 Id. at 54.  
733 See also Bryan v. City of Madison, 213 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2000) 
(“Legislative immunity protects officials fulfilling legislative functions even if they 
are not ‘legislators.’ ”); Hernandez v. City of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1194 (5th Cir. 
1981).  
734 See Myers, supra note 45, at 937–38 (“[T]he lack of an explicit textual basis 
for the Vice President’s legislative immunity claim would not necessarily be fatal, 
as . . . neither judicial nor executive immunity has a ‘specific textual basis.’ . . . 
Bogan v. Scott-Harris . . . extended . . . legislative immunity to a city mayor for 
participating in the budget process . . . . The willingness of the Court to blur the 
distinction between executive and legislative roles in Bogan, coupled with the Vice 
President’s constitutional function as President of the Senate, suggests that a grant 
of limited legislative immunity might not be as farfetched as originally presumed.”). 
The law in at least one state confirms this position. See Jubelirer v. Singel, 638 A.2d 
352, 357 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (“[T]he Pennsylvania Supreme Court [has] 
indicated that the Lieutenant Governor, acting in his capacity as President of the 
Senate, would also be immunized from suit under the Speech and [sic] Debate 
Clause.” (internal citation omitted)).  
735 See supra Part I; cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 
522 n.19 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“I see no distinction in Congress’ seeking 
to compel the appearance and testimony of a former President and in, alternatively, 
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As a further structural matter, it would seem anomalous for 
the presiding officer of the House—the Speaker—to enjoy Speech 
or Debate protection but not the presiding officer of the Senate.736
The second concern is that, since the Speech or Debate 
Clause was designed largely to defend the legislative branch from 
overweening executive power,
  
It would appear all the more incongruous for the President of the 
Senate’s replacement—the President pro tempore—to benefit 
from a privilege but not the President of the Senate himself.  
After all, they perform the exact same function.  For these 
reasons, the view that the Vice President should not hold a 
Speech or Debate privilege because he is not a Senator is 
unpersuasive.   
737 the protective rationale might 
not apply in the case of the Vice President who is a part of the 
executive branch the majority of the time.738
 
seeking to compel the production of Presidential papers over the former President’s 
objection.”). 
  This criticism is not 
without merit.  Yet, under the Constitution, the Vice President is 
legally independent from the President; this is especially 
manifest regarding his Senate role.  It could be argued, therefore, 
that the integrity of the Vice President’s actions as presiding 
officer of the Senate would require protection from undue 
executive branch influence.  The argument would be that not 
only is the independence of the vice presidential office preserved, 
but also the independence of the Senate’s proceedings as a whole.  
To the extent the executive branch could, through its 
prosecutorial or coercive authority, arrest, detain, and otherwise 
harass lawmakers in an effort to get them to vote or act a certain 
way, the same hypothetical—however unlikely—could also be 
applied to the Vice President.  In theory, the executive branch 
could similarly harass the Vice President into voting a certain 
way or carrying out his parliamentary duties in a particular 
fashion, thus undercutting the constitutional independence the 
clause was meant to preserve for the Senate and the legislative 
736 There is no constitutional requirement that the Speaker be a House member. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. In theory, a non-House member—perhaps even the Vice 
President—could serve as Speaker.   
737 See United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966) (“[T]he privilege has 
been recognized as an important protection of the independence and integrity of the 
legislature.”).   
738 The author would like to thank Louis Fisher for raising this point.   
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process as a whole.  As a consequence, this second criticism also 
appears to fall short.   
Third, it might prove difficult for the Vice President to claim 
the Speech or Debate Clause as protection from having to 
produce materials to the Senate.  This is because congressional 
committees may thoroughly investigate their own membership 
and the Clause holds no protection in this respect.  The ethics 
committees in both houses have the authority to subpoena 
documents from their members.  For example, Senator Bob 
Packwood’s diaries were subpoenaed by the Senate Ethics 
Committee, and such action was upheld by the Supreme Court.739  
Thus, the Vice President would have a difficult time relying on 
the Speech or Debate Clause to thwart a Senate committee 
demand for documents related to his Senate activities.740
After weighing the arguments pro and con, the Vice 
President would seem to enjoy some measure of protection under 
the Speech or Debate Clause as well as under the generalized 
legislative privilege, although the latter argument is more 
persuasive.  Such an assertion, however, would only shield the 
Vice President to the extent he was carrying out his duties to 
preside over the Senate and break ties—tasks that, as a practical 
matter, take up very little of a modern Vice President’s time.  
The vast majority of documents and communications the modern 
Vice President has a hand in involve executive branch activity 
delegated to him by the President or by statute and would not 
seem to be covered.  Thus, the opening for VPP to be exercised in 
this realm would be narrow.   
  That 
said, the clause could still very likely protect the Vice President 
from having to submit legislative materials to a non-Senate 
investigation or pursuant to a civil suit.  In this respect, he could 
assert Speech or Debate privilege in court against the executive 
branch or against outside parties in civil litigation.  Therefore, 
this concern is less than meets the eye.   
 
739 See Packwood v. Senate Select Comm. on Ethics, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994).  
740 The Vice President could validly claim VPP to block materials sought by the 
Senate related to his duties under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.   
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2. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
Another component of VPP involves the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment.741  In this context, the Vice President possesses a 
privilege while: (1) preparing to fill in for the President with 
respect to presidential inability and when making an inability 
determination if the President’s health is in question;742 or 
(2) preparing to assume office on a permanent basis due to 
presidential death, resignation, removal, or vacancy.743
 
741 Cf. Amar, supra note 7, at 207 (emphasis added) (“All these changes brought 
by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might have important consequences for the issue of 
executive privilege. By formalizing succession, by making the vice president part of 
(and indeed a leader of) the cabinet for purposes of determining presidential 
disability, and by making clear that the president gets to choose persons to fill vice 
presidential vacancies . . . the amendment strongly suggests that, today at least, the 
vice president is a full member of the president’s executive team. This 
amendment . . . might provide a possible basis today for a somewhat broad claim of 
executive privilege on the part of the vice president.” (emphasis added)); Goldstein, 
supra note 2, at 167 (“[T]he [Twenty-Fifth] Amendment assigns the office certain 
constitutional powers, duties, and privileges.” (emphasis added)); Myers, supra note 
45, at 934 n.290 (arguing that the Vice President’s authority under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment might cloak him with absolute civil immunity for his official actions in 
this context). 
   
If the Vice President enjoyed the constitutional authority to decide questions of 
inability prior to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as many maintained, see, e.g., 
Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69, 87–88, 94 (1961); RICHARD H. HANSEN, 
THE YEAR WE HAD NO PRESIDENT 85 (1962); SILVA, supra note 297, at 102, then 
presumably he would have enjoyed a constitutional privilege as well. There are 
several examples of vice presidential communications about succession and inability 
that might have been privileged if the Vice President indeed had this constitutional 
authority before adoption of the amendment. These instances reflect Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment-type discussions. While Vice President Arthur never met with 
President Garfield following the shooting of the latter, see FEERICK, supra note 18, at 
8, the Vice President did exchange letters with Secretary of State Blaine concerning 
the President’s health. See FEERICK, supra note 652, at 122. The Garfield Cabinet 
also appears to have presented Arthur with a way forward regarding Garfield’s 
inability, but it was never acted upon. See also id. at 137–38. A staffer of Vice 
President Marshall urged him to take steps to prepare himself to be President 
following Wilson’s stroke in 1919, but Marshall took no action. See DORMAN, supra 
note 312, at 109. After President Eisenhower’s heart attack in September 1955, Vice 
President Nixon met with senior executive branch officials, such as the Secretary of 
State, Secretary of the Treasury, the Acting Attorney General, and White House 
aides about how the executive branch would run during the President’s incapacity. 
See FEERICK, supra note 18, at 17–18. Similar high-level discussions took place 
following Eisenhower’s stroke two years later. See id. at 21–22.  
742 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. 
743 In addition, a Vice President elect is likely to enjoy a modest privilege under 
the Twentieth Amendment. This is based on the premise that there would seem to 
be an executive privilege for incoming Presidents, cf. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. 
(Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (recognizing executive privilege for former 
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The Twenty-Fifth Amendment maps out the procedure for 
determining presidential inability.  It provides that  
[w]henever the Vice President and a majority of either the 
principal officers of the executive departments or of such other 
body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice 
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of 
the office as Acting President. 
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, 
he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the 
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of 
the executive department or of such other body as Congress may 
by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro 
tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives their written declaration that the President is 
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. 
Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within 
 
Presidents), particularly following the vote of the electoral college. This would reflect 
the same reasoning undergirding any other constitutional privilege: the premium 
the Constitution places on encouraging effective decisionmaking.   
Between election day and the inauguration, the President elect undertakes serious 
deliberations as to policy options and personnel appointments, which require a high 
degree of candid internal discussion. In this vein, it would also appear that there 
would need to be a vice presidential transition privilege. Any deliberations held by 
the Vice President elect about succession and presidential inability would need to be 
protected for the same reason as VPP. A unique aspect of the vice presidential 
transition privilege would seem to come into play during this period since the Vice 
President elect would presumably have some deliberations involving the Twentieth 
Amendment and how he might need to assume the presidency: (1) were tragedy to 
befall the President elect prior to inauguration; (2) were the President elect to fail to 
qualify as President; or (3) were the President elect not to secure sufficient electoral 
votes. See U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.  
If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the 
President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become 
President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed 
for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to 
qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a 
President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the 
case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have 
qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in 
which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act 
accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified. 
Id. The author would like to thank Joel Goldstein for raising this question.   
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forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session.  If the 
Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter 
written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within 
twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, 
determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President 
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the 
Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting 
President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers 
and duties of his office.744
Thus, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment expressly lays out an 
important role for the Vice President regarding whether a 
presidential inability exists, a role that should be considered 
among the Vice President’s enumerated powers under the 
Constitution.
 
745  The Supreme Court has in fact noted in this 
context that “the Twenty-fifth Amendment . . . empowers the Vice 
President.”746  Or as Dean John Feerick, the leading authority on 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, has written, the “Amendment 
provides a broad grant of power and discretion to be used 
appropriately by the President, Vice President, and Cabinet.”747
In this respect, it is important to recall what the Supreme 
Court stated in Nixon I:  “Certain powers and privileges flow 
   
 
744 Id. amend. XXV, § 4. 
745 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 206 (“The text of the Amendment gives 
the vice president certain powers and duties—it makes him a potential decision-
maker regarding presidential inability . . . .”). 
746 Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 (1991) (emphasis added).   
747 FEERICK, supra note 18, at xxiv (emphasis added); see also BIRCH BAYH, ONE 
HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION 188 (1968) (“[A]ll 
that Congress can do [under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment] is to affirm a decision 
that has already been made in the executive branch, because the majority of the 
Cabinet have already supported the Vice President.” (quoting Attorney General 
Katzenbach) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Paul B. Stephan III, History, 
Background and Outstanding Problems, in 1 PAPERS ON PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY 
AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 34, at 63, 78 (“Section Four at 
least now settles th[e] question [as to who has the authority to initiate action 
regarding a determination of inability]: The vice president does have the power.” 
(quoting Paul Stephan)); TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 38 (characterizing the 
inability provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as providing a “grant of power” 
to the Vice President even if Vice Presidents are chary to use it); Amar, supra note 7, 
at 207 (the Twenty-Fifth Amendment ensures that “the vice president [is] part of 
(and indeed a leader of) the cabinet for purposes of determining presidential 
disability”); Medina, supra note 654, at 95 n.97 (“One might also describe the Vice-
President’s originating initiative under the [T]wenty-[F]ifth [A]mendment to declare 
the President unable to fulfill his responsibilities as a constitutional power.”); cf. 
Goldstein, supra note 2, at 192 (“The Amendment . . . mak[es] the vice president an 
indispensable decision-maker.”).   
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from the nature of enumerated powers.”748  In carrying out the 
inability provision, the Vice President and the Cabinet or a 
separate body must “transmit . . . [a] written declaration” to 
Congress as to the President’s inability.  Before deciding whether 
to make such a declaration, the mechanism for determining 
presidential inability anticipates that the Vice President must 
consult with others—most likely Cabinet officers, White House 
staff, vice presidential staff, the First Lady, and medical 
authorities.749  As Feerick points out, “the Amendment gives the 
Vice President and Cabinet (or such other body established by 
law) the primary role in the process and implicitly requires them 
to secure such information, medical and otherwise, as may be 
necessary to make an informed decision.”750
 
748 United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974).   
  He adds that 
“[t]hose closest to the President should be expected to cooperate 
with any Twenty-Fifth Amendment inquiry made by the Cabinet 
749 See FEERICK, supra note 18, at 89–90 (“First, the President has to transmit 
his own conviction that he is well. Then the Vice President has to say, ‘No, I do not 
agree with you, you are not well.’ Then the Vice President has to have a talk with a 
majority of the members of the Cabinet.” (quoting Martin Taylor, who testified 
during consideration of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment)); see also S. REP. No. 84-66, 
at 13 (1965) (“Section 4 . . . embraces the most difficult problem of inability—the 
factual determination of whether or not inability exists. . . . [T]he Vice President, if 
satisfied that the President is disabled shall, with the written approval of a majority 
of the heads of the executive departments, assume the discharge of the powers and 
duties of the Office as Acting President. . . . The combination of the judgment of the 
Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet members . . . would enable prompt 
action by the persons closest to the President. . . . It is assumed that such decision 
would be made only after adequate consultation with medical experts who were 
intricately familiar with the President’s physical and mental condition.”); H. REP. 
No. 89-203, at 13 (1965); REPORT, supra note 34, at 21 (recommending that, under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, “[c]onstitutional decision-makers will generally 
require medical advice from appropriate medical experts . . . regarding the 
President’s condition in making decisions . . . as to whether the President is able to 
discharge the powers and duties of his office. The legislative history surrounding the 
adoption of the Twenty-fifth Amendment makes clear that its framers intended that 
constitutional decision-makers would solicit appropriate medical advice.”); Bayh, 
supra note 34 (quoting former Senator Bayh, the sponsor of the amendment, in the 
context of what would be done if a president were suddenly incapacitated: “In the 
real world . . . nothing [would be done] . . . until the vice president has a chance to 
consult with a lot of folks as to whether something needs to be done.”); Caplin, supra 
note 34 (hypothesizing about a first lady attesting to the President’s health in front 
of the Vice President and Cabinet during an inability inquiry under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment); supra note 34; cf. Amar, supra note 7, at 207 (“In some ways, the 
vice president is treated in this process [under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment] as the 
head of the cabinet for assessing whether the president is disabled.”).  
750 FEERICK, supra note 18, at xxiv. 
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and Vice President.”751  Keeping in mind the functional 
considerations laid out by the Supreme Court in Nixon I—which 
emphasize the need for candid exchanges among constitutional 
officers and their aides when carrying out constitutionally 
enumerated duties—it is difficult to imagine intra-governmental 
communication much more sensitive or requiring much more 
candor than questions as to the President’s ability to discharge 
his responsibilities.752
It is generally acknowledged that the Vice President’s most 
vital constitutional function is to be ready to step into the shoes 
of the President if the latter is unable to fulfill his duties, if he is 
deceased, if he is removed, or if the office is left vacant.  One 
could well imagine an instance where a sitting President was 
gravely ill and questions arose as to his ability to carry out his 
duties.  Discussions about legal, logistical, public relations, or 
medical issues involved with the Vice President assuming power 
during an inability scenario—even if the inability were only 
temporary or even if the Vice President never had to actually 
assume power—would involve the Vice President fulfilling his 
express constitutional duty and would, as a functional matter, 
require great candor and secrecy.
  Such information leaking out could have 
far-reaching ramifications for the nation.   
753
 
751 Id. at xxv. 
  In this context, advice and 
752 See, e.g., ROSE MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND 
DECISION MAKING 209 (2008) (“[I]t is absolutely necessary for the vice president and 
Cabinet to obtain accurate and unbiased medical advice to determine whether the 
president is able to perform his or her duties [pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment].” (quoting former President Carter) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); see also HERBERT L. ABRAMS, “THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT”: 
CONFUSION, DISABILITY, AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE 
ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN 180 (1992) (quoting then 
presidential aide Edwin Meese about certain actions taken immediately following 
the assassination attempt on President Reagan: “The concern was that the press not 
get wind of any actions that would raise questions as to whether the president was 
capable of acting.”); cf. REPORT, supra note 34, at 13 (recommending that any 
“contingency plan pertaining to presidential inability and continuity of government 
will contain highly sensitive information and should be classified”). Any alternate 
body created by Congress under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment to replace the 
Cabinet would similarly need to be taken into confidence by the Vice President. Cf. 
MCDERMOTT, supra, at 217–18.   
753 With respect to how the formal declaration of inability might be drawn up 
under the amendment, Attorney General Herbert Brownell opined:  
Undoubtedly the Justice Department would prepare the [inability 
declaration] papers, and the action would be taken at a joint meeting of the 
Vice President and the Cabinet members. It might not even be a matter of 
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communications sought and given within the Vice President’s 
office could legitimately be claimed by the Vice President as 
covered by VPP.754
As a practical matter, if the Vice President were to assume 
power permanently under such a scenario, he could assert 
executive privilege as President and would not need to assert 
VPP.
   
755  If he merely served as acting President, however, he 
might need to assert VPP upon his return to the vice presidency 
if the President did not feel compelled to protect the Vice 
President’s deliberations while acting as President or 
immediately beforehand.756  The possibility of strained relations 
between the President and Vice President under a contested 
inability situation is likely to be fairly high.757
 
public knowledge as to who signed first [the inability declaration]. That 
particular point would fade into insignificance in getting the group action. 
  It is therefore all 
the more important for the Vice President to be able to protect 
his own deliberations in this vein to ensure maximum candor 
from his advisers and those within the executive branch.  He may 
FEERICK, supra note 18, at 203 (emphasis added).   
754 Under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, it could be argued that the Vice 
President would be unable to keep information from Congress in the context of an 
inability scenario since Congress is integral to the process of making a binding 
determination. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 4. Of course, the President may 
claim executive privilege over deliberations involving domestic policy even though 
Congress has primary constitutional authority in that realm. Nonetheless, if one 
accepts the premise as true, then the question could arise is there really much of a 
vice presidential privilege left? The answer is yes. First, VPP would certainly apply 
in any private civil suit that could be brought against the Vice President or others 
requesting materials about the inability determination process. Second, the initial 
determination of inability is made by the Vice President and the Cabinet and not 
Congress. The facts relied on by the Vice President and the Cabinet in this vein 
would surely need to be made available to the Congress as the legislature carries out 
its constitutional role of approving or disapproving the executive branch’s initial 
judgment. Opinions expressed and the internal procedure followed in the making of 
this preliminary determination, however, would seem a much less likely candidate 
for full disclosure to Congress than the facts upon which such a decision was based. 
Third, the Vice President could still block materials that were requested by Congress 
as they concern his preparations for succession, as opposed to inability. Congress 
plays no direct role in the succession process, although the body indirectly can do so 
through confirmation of a new Vice President. The author would like to thank Joel 
Goldstein for posing this probing question.   
755 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 198 (“As a matter of constitutional law, a 
vice president acting as president under Section 3 or 4 has the same powers and 
duties as the chief executive does under whom he serves.”).   
756 The question of whether a former acting President should have the benefit of 
executive privilege as a former President is beyond the scope of this Article.   
757 See infra note 795.   
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in some circumstances even need to protect this information from 
the President.  In reality, Cabinet officials, as opposed to the Vice 
President and his staff, would likely feel more obligated to 
provide such materials to the returning President.  
Responsibility for deliberations, of course, is granted in large 
part to the Vice President by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, not 
by the President, so he would not be “defying” the President in a 
legal sense by refusing to release documents to him.  Nor would 
he be undermining the President’s Article II authority.  If the two 
came into conflict over whether to release Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment documents, the Vice President would be well within 
his rights to refuse the President’s “instructions” to make the 
material public or to give the documents to the President himself.   
If not technically serving as acting President during a time 
of formally recognized presidential inability or not taking direct 
steps toward that end under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, the 
Vice President would likely be unable to enjoy privilege under 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.758
In addition to matters involving inability under the Twenty-
Fifth Amendment, VPP could cover certain matters involving 
presidential succession.  The Twenty-Fifth Amendment provides 
that “[i]n case of the removal of the President from office or of his 
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become 
President.”
  In the context of informally 
filling in for the President, a Vice President could claim to be 
carrying out his constitutional duties under the implied authority 
of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, although he could not do so 
legitimately.  The amendment would not be triggered and any 
actions contrary to the President’s wishes in this setting would 
seem to run afoul of the President’s authority under Article II.   
759
 
758 See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 752, at 72.   
  Although a preparatory role for the Vice President 
regarding succession is not expressly laid out in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment—as is the language involving presidential 
inability—matters of presidential succession clearly reflect a 
major constitutional role for the Vice President.  As former Vice 
President Cheney noted, the Vice President’s “basic role . . . is to 
worry about presidential succession.  And [the Vice President’s] 
759 U.S. CONST. amend. XXV, § 1. 
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job, above all other things, is to be prepared to take over if 
something happens to the president.”760
In this respect, preparations for immediate succession would 
seem to be cloaked by VPP.  The functional need for high 
governmental officials to have the benefit of candor in their 
deliberations with their aides as spelled out in Nixon I would 
seem to be as present here as they would be regarding a 
determination of presidential inability.  Sensitive matters 
involving protocol, timing, legal mechanics, communications, and 
political outreach would all need to be discussed confidentially by 
vice presidential staff.  Individuals close to Vice President Ford, 
for example, began quietly undertaking transition plans in 
advance of Nixon stepping down.
   
761  Official efforts in this vein 
would seem to be privileged since the Vice President would be 
carrying out his constitutional responsibility to prepare for the 
presidency; but, at the same time, he would need to take action 
without information getting out that would make the Vice 
President look disloyal or presumptuous.  The heightened 
sensitivity of these preparations reflects one of the fundamental 
dilemmas of succession and inability—that is, the unwillingness 
of Vice Presidents to take prudent steps in this direction out of 
fear of being viewed as overly ambitious.762
 
760 Paul Kengor, Cheney and Vice Presidential Power, in Gregg II & Rozell, 
supra note 549, at 168; see S. REP. No. 89-66, at 11 (1965) (“To stand by ready for the 
powers and duties of the Presidential office to devolve upon him at the time of death 
or inability of the President, is the principal constitutional function of the Vice 
President.”); S. REP. No. 89-203, at 11 (1965); Dixon Memo, supra note 434, at 36 
(“The principal responsibility of the Vice President is to be ready to serve as 
President or Acting President should the occasion arise, thereby avoiding any 
interruption in the continuity of the office of the President. This duty ‘to stand and 
wait’ is of the highest constitutional and institutional importance. Judicial 
proceedings which could interfere with readiness to serve therefore require careful 
scrutiny.”); TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 33 (noting that preparing for the 
presidency is the Vice President’s “main constitutional role”); MARIE D. NATOLI, 
AMERICAN PRINCE, AMERICAN PAUPER: THE CONTEMPORARY VICE PRESIDENCY IN 
PERSPECTIVE 7 (1985) (“Most observers would suggest that the most crucial function 
of the office of Vice-President is to succeed to the Presidency.”); see also 
Memorandum from Vice President-elect Walter F. Mondale to President-elect Jimmy 
Carter regarding the Role of the Vice President in the Carter Administration, Dec. 9, 
1976, at 11 (on file with author) (The “most important constitutional obligation of 
the office [of Vice President] . . . is, being prepared to take over the Presidency 
should that be required.”). 
  This reticence was a 
concern that animated the framers of the Twenty-Fifth 
761 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 211. 
762 See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 18, at 9, 14, 20. 
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Amendment.763
Moreover, routine documents prepared for the Vice 
President’s review about potential succession or presidential 
inability issues—even if a transition were not imminent—would 
also seem to fall within the privilege.  In this case, memoranda 
about the mechanics of potential succession or related 
communications or political strategy papers would be extremely 
sensitive even if they were merely nonemergency contingency 
documents.
  Acknowledgement of VPP would help somewhat 
to allay these fears. 
764
Nonetheless, in the context of presidential succession, there 
are several drawbacks to relying upon the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment for purposes of VPP.  For one, it is unsupported by 
practice.  Vice President Ford was essentially in this position 
during the last days of the Nixon administration.
  They would seem to fall within the Vice 
President’s constitutional duties and would not appear to 
infringe on the President’s Article II authority.  Such materials 
would therefore likely be privileged.   
765  He had 
meetings with White House Chief of Staff, Alexander Haig, in 
which delicate matters of succession were discussed.  Far from 
declaring these conversations privileged, President Ford testified 
in open session about them before a House subcommittee.766
Furthermore, there is the practical difficulty of line drawing.  
The Vice President could claim that all or most of his daily 
activities are carried out with an eye toward succession.  The 
Vice President could assert, for example, that even routine 
deliberations at the NSC are constitutionally privileged despite 
the fact he is both fulfilling a statutory duty and assisting the 
President.  This is because, he could argue, being familiar with 
national security matters is vital to the Vice President’s potential 
temporary or permanent succession to the Presidency.  For the 
same reason, the Vice President could maintain that 
communication regarding any of the functions he is delegated by 
the President or by statute would also be subject to privilege.   
  
Precedent, although limited, does not support this theory.   
 
763 See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler). 
764 Under Presidents George H.W. Bush and Clinton, Twenty-Fifth Amendment 
contingency plans were in fact drawn up. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 205.   
765 See supra Part VI.G.   
766 See supra notes 449–54 and accompanying text.   
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Because of the potential for overly expansive privilege 
claims, if an assertion of VPP stems from the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, a rule of construction wedding VPP’s invocation to 
immediate or specific succession or presidential inability issues 
would seem to be in order.  This makes sense since it closely 
follows the text of the Amendment.   
At the same time, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment gives no 
indication that the Vice President must be intimately involved in 
presidential decisionmaking.  While it important as a policy 
matter for him to be “plugged in” to what is going on in the 
executive branch in case something happens to the President, it 
is certainly not a constitutional requirement.  Past practice 
before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment demonstrates that Vice 
Presidents often had at best episodic interaction with their 
Presidents.767  Many Vice Presidents assumed the presidency 
with little knowledge of what their predecessor had been doing.  
Vice President Truman’s ignorance about the construction of the 
atomic bomb is well known.768  Even following the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, few would argue that the President is required to 
include the Vice President among his confidantes.  For example, 
Nixon ensured that Agnew was not aware of major policy 
decisions.769  At one point Nixon was queried about whether he 
had informed the Vice President in advance of his diplomatic 
efforts to reach out to communist China.770  To this Nixon was 
“incredulous.”771  “Agnew?  Agnew?” he replied.  “Oh, of course 
not.”772
 
767 See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 647, at 22 (noting that Vice President 
Breckinridge did not meet alone with President Buchanan until three years had 
elapsed into their term).   
  Thus, claiming that the Vice President’s presidentially or 
statutorily delegated responsibilities are shielded by a 
constitutional privilege held by the Vice President is dubious 
768 See, e.g., id. at 30; Goldstein, supra note 297, at 792; see also THOMAS H. 
NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., VICE PRESIDENTIAL VACANCIES: CONGRESSIONAL 
PROCEDURES IN THE FORD AND ROCKEFELLER NOMINATIONS 5 (1998) (“Vice 
President Thomas Marshall remained completely unprepared for potential 
succession to the presidency throughout the period [of Wilson’s illness]” (citations 
omitted)).   
769 See e.g., John Robert Greene, “I’ll Continue To Speak Out”: Spiro T. Agnew as 
Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY 124, 127 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997).   
770 See Friedman, supra note 323, at 1710 n.31.   
771 Id.   
772 Id.   
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since there is no constitutional requirement for a Vice President 
to be “in the loop” with regard to executive branch policymaking; 
such decisions are the President’s alone.   
Such a rule of construction is also necessary to prevent the 
Vice President through exercise of VPP from undercutting the 
President’s role as head of the executive branch under Article II.  
The Framers rejected a plural executive.  Permitting the Vice 
President to invoke a privilege without the approval or even 
against the wishes of the President on matters within the 
President’s constitutional authority would undermine the 
President’s power under Article II.773  As such it would run 
counter to the overwhelming tide of legal authority indicating 
that only the President may invoke executive privilege.774  This 
narrow rule limiting VPP to immediate or specific inability or 
succession issues assures that the Vice President would be 
claiming privilege only over documents and communications 
within his own constitutional sphere, not the President’s.  
Finally, a narrow rule of construction is consistent with the 
traditional legal standard that burdens placed on fact finding in 
legal proceedings should be discouraged.775
The Vice President’s responsibilities under the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment, much like those in the Senate, provide a path for 
the Vice President to claim his own privilege.
   
776
 
773 See infra Part VIII.B.   
  This would be a 
privilege he could lawfully invoke even if opposed by the 
President.   
774 See supra Part II.C–D.   
775 See infra Part VIII.G.   
776 The question could arise: if the Vice President enjoys a privilege under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment when preparing for presidential succession, then would 
the Speaker as the third in line to the presidency also be entitled to such 
confidentiality if the President or Vice President were out of commission? See 
Turley, supra note 7, at 677 n.159. The answer would appear to be yes. In a situation 
in which the President dies and is succeeded by the Vice President, then prior to the 
confirmation of a new Vice President the Speaker would be the next in line to the 
presidency. To the extent the Speaker during this time makes preparations to 
potentially assume the presidency, he or she would seem to enjoy a privilege. As a 
practical matter, the Speaker’s internal deliberations on these matters with his or 
her aides would likely be covered by legislative privilege. The same would be true for 
the President pro tempore. It would not seem as likely for Cabinet secretaries in the 
line of succession since VPP, like all constitutional privileges, is predicated on its 
being invoked by a constitutional officer and Cabinet secretaries are mere creatures 
of statute. Cf. id.; see also infra note 890. 
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B. The Vice President as the President’s Vicar 
It could be argued that the Vice President is the President’s 
vicar in that his acts are inherently the President’s.  In a passage 
in Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote: 
By the Constitution of the United States, the president is 
invested with certain political powers. . . .  To aid him in the 
performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint certain 
officers, who act by his authority, and in conformity with his 
orders.  In such cases, their acts are his acts . . . .777
The implication from Marbury is that the President’s actions 
encompass the actions of the executive branch, at least with 
respect to Cabinet secretaries.  They are one and the same.  
Presumably, as the only other constitutional officer who serves in 
the executive branch—at least most of the time—the Vice 
President would be taking steps on the President’s behalf in 
fulfilling delegated executive branch duties and his actions would 
enjoy the same vicarious treatment as that of a Cabinet 
secretary.  The language in Cheney v. U.S. District Court 
combined the President and Vice President in such a manner on 
several occasions.
 
778  The district court in Walker v. Cheney took 
much the same approach, mixing the two offices.779  The same 
court in Committee on the Judiciary v. Miers followed suit,780 as 
did the courts on two other recent occasions.781  While these 
expressions are mere dicta, they remain the only judicial 
pronouncements on the subject.  With so little judicial reasoning 
to turn to, one naturally feels drawn toward these 
pronouncements.782
 
777 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165–66 (1803) (emphasis added).   
  Further, as the Bush administration argued 
in a somewhat different context in Walker, the President and 
778 See 542 U.S. 367, 391–92 (2004) (stating that “[s]pecial considerations [are] 
applicable to the President and the Vice President”); supra Part VI.L.2; see also 
Amar, supra note 7; Klarevas, supra note 7; Meyers, supra note 45, at 911.  
779 See 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 53 (D.D.C. 2002) (“The parties agree that no court 
has ever before granted . . . an order that the President (or Vice President) must 
produce information to Congress . . . .”); id. at 74–75; supra Part VI.L.1.   
780 558 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2008).   
781 See Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 532 F.3d 860, 866 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in 
Wash. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 658 F. Supp. 2d 217, 238 (D.D.C. 2009). 
782 See, e.g., United States v. Dorcely, 454 F.3d 366, 375 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 
(“ ‘[C]arefully considered language of the Supreme Court, even if technically dictum, 
generally must be treated as authoritative.’ ” (quoting Sierra Club v. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, 322 F.3d 718, 724 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).   
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 599 
Vice President are treated the same in certain statutory regimes 
and by the courts.783
But, as Professor Vikram Amar asks, “does this merging of 
the two offices make sense for executive privilege purposes?”
  Such judicial and legislative opinion may, 
therefore, lend support to the “vicarious” position.   
784  
The answer is no.785  First, as will be recalled, the Vice President 
does not have to do what the President commands.  He may not 
be removed by the President as a legal matter during his term of 
office as he himself is a constitutional officer.  This is unlike 
Cabinet members, who can be removed by the President at any 
time.  In fact, Vice Presidents have not infrequently fulfilled 
their constitutional duties in ways that run counter to the 
President’s policy positions,786 undercutting the concept that the 
President and Vice President are one and the same for 
constitutional purposes.  As noted earlier, on several occasions 
the Vice President has voted against the President in the 
Senate.787  Moreover, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment inability 
provision actually anticipates the President and Vice President 
may end up on opposite sides of such a matter.788
Second, under the Constitution, the Vice President has 




783 See Cheney GAO Brief, supra note 551, at 16–17. 
  The 
784 Amar, supra note 7. 
785 See supra Parts II, VII.A. It could conceivably be argued that much as the 
Speech or Debate Clause treats a legislative aide as an alter ego of a member of 
Congress so too the Vice President is the President’s alter ego and should be entitled 
to the same privileges. See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618 (1972). Of 
course, Gravel does not stand for the proposition that an aide may claim protection 
under the Speech or Debate Clause if the member for whom he or she works opposes 
such a claim. The same holds true for the President and Vice President. If the power 
being exercised has been delegated by the President, then he has the ultimate 
authority to determine whether the privilege may be exercised. See supra notes 546, 
568. Moreover, the Vice President is not typically viewed as the President’s 
doppelganger. See, e.g., COHEN & MITCHELL, supra note 482, at 269 (“The Vice 
President of the United States is not the President’s partner or alter ego.”). He has 
his own unique constitutional responsibilities.   
786 See supra Part VII.A.1.a. 
787 See supra notes 672–80 and accompanying text. 
788 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 190 (“Transfer under Section 4 [of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment] comes without presidential sanction. Section 4 
authorizes involuntary transfer of power to the vice president under a range of 
circumstances.”); see also Friedman, supra note 323, at 1727 n.101.   
789 See TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 73 (“The vice presidency is not fully 
comparable to the presidency . . . . [Unlike the Vice President,] [s]ome of the 
president’s most important roles, for example, are grounded in the Constitution, a 
document that limits more than it empowers the vice president.”).   
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Vice President presides over the Senate, breaks tie votes, and 
must be prepared for succession and presidential inability.  But 
on the other hand, the President heads up the executive branch, 
is Commander in Chief, is Chief Diplomat, nominates judges and 
executive branch officials, approves or vetoes legislation among 
other things.  Because of these markedly different roles it is 
unclear that the Vice President should be automatically treated 
as interchangeable with the President.   
Third, past executive branch policies demonstrate that the 
President alone should invoke executive privilege.790  This is 
entirely logical since it would make no sense for the President—
as head of the executive branch under Article II—to be legally 
forced to “invoke” executive privilege because his Vice President 
chose on his own to exercise such a power.  In this way, the Vice 
President’s decision to invoke privilege would force the 
President’s hand because of their supposedly vicarious 
relationship.  Such a construction would turn Article II 
completely on its head, permitting the Vice President, without 
serving as acting President, to make executive branch decisions 
without presidential approval or even contrary to the President’s 
wishes, essentially creating a plural executive.  This not only 
runs counter to the rule that only the President may invoke 
executive privilege but also does violence to Article II and the 
clear intentions of the Framers.791
Presumably, the courts in Walker, Cheney, Miers, and 
elsewhere merged the President and Vice President together 
because the Vice President was acting as the President’s 
authorized delegate.  It will be recalled that during oral 
argument in Cheney, the DOJ expressly acknowledged that the 
Vice President was acting on behalf of the President.
  Moreover, it clashes with the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which went into painstaking detail 
about when the Vice President could actually exercise 
presidential authority.   
792
 
790 See supra Part II.C. 
  
Nonetheless, the courts’ language left behind not a little 
confusion.   
791 As a practical matter, it seems unlikely a Vice President would assert VPP 
unless the President were unwilling to assert executive privilege—thus again 
exposing the nonvicarious nature of VPP.   
792 See supra note 568 and accompanying text.   
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While the vicarious argument holds some initial promise for 
Vice Presidents based on judicial dicta, closer examination 
reveals several fatal flaws.  The courts’ language, while rightly 
acknowledging the Vice President’s stature as a constitutional 
officer, would seem to find a better home when limited to his 
narrow constitutional functions as opposed to authority delegated 
to him by the President.   
C. Fulfilling Duties Delegated by Statute or by the President 
The contention could be made that, to the extent the Vice 
President is carrying out one of his statutory duties, such as 
serving as a member of the NSC, he might have recourse to VPP.  
The argument would be that service on the NSC involves 
communications involving weighty military and diplomatic 
matters, the type of issues about which courts have often 
conceded the President may withhold information.793  A similar 
position could be advanced that the Vice President could claim a 
privilege for a project that the President assigned him under the 
latter’s own constitutional authority794
Again, this hypothetical would not go to the independent 
powers of the Vice President.  Instead, it merely illustrates the 
executive privilege enjoyed by military and diplomatic advisers to 
the President, which ultimately radiates from the President 
himself under Article II.  When it comes to questions involving 
constitutional privilege regarding the Vice President exercising 
authority delegated to him by the President, all roads lead back 
to the delegator.  The constitutional power in question is the 
President’s and by definition so is the privilege; the Vice 
President would not independently have such authority.  The 
true test is when the President and Vice President oppose each 
other over whether to disclose a document.  In such a scenario 
the legal variable is isolated.  Unless the materials in question 
have a tight nexus to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment or involve 
the Vice President’s legislative duties in the Senate, the 
—for example, if the 
President sent the Vice President abroad as a diplomatic envoy.  
In this capacity, the Vice President would be acting as an adviser 
to the President.   
 
793 See, e.g., United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 706, 707, 710, 715 
(1974).   
794 Cf. supra Part VI.E. 
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President’s decision in this regard must control.  Otherwise, a 
plural executive could emerge. 
D. Potential Applications 
The previous two arguments in favor of a form of vice 
presidential privilege assume an autonomous Vice President 
wielding quasi-presidential power within the executive branch.  
In practice, the Vice President, however, has never been a co-
President.  His duties are almost exclusively delegated to him at 
the discretion of the President or Congress.   
A few scenarios can be readily imagined where VPP could 
come into play.  One context in which VPP could manifest itself 
would be where a President wished to distance himself from the 
Vice President for political purposes and the Vice President 
would feel compelled to invoke the privilege to protect himself.  
This may be particularly likely during a second term when the 
threat of being removed from the ticket is no longer a political 
concern to the Vice President.  For this reason, a Vice President 
may be less worried about breaking with the President.  A 
comparable situation almost played itself out with Vice President 
Agnew in 1973.  Nixon and Agnew had just been reelected, the 
two men had divergent political interests at the time, and neither 
was much concerned about upsetting relations with the other.  
During the DOJ investigation of the Vice President, it will be 
remembered, the White House Counsel’s office offered to secure 
vice presidential documents for federal investigators.   
As noted above, another scenario could involve a disgruntled 
President returning to power following an inability 
determination by the Vice President.795
Yet another scenario might involve the results of an election 
in which no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, 
throwing the presidential race into the House of Representatives 
and the vice presidential race into the Senate.  The outcome 
  The returning President 
could very well harbor ill-feelings toward the Vice President and 
try to embarrass him politically by either revealing or 
withholding materials from the public.   
 
795 See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 191 (“The prospects for an acrimonious 
encounter with the president would, of course, be greatest when the proposed 
transfer encounters the president’s opposition. But even when a transfer responds to 
a clear presidential disability . . . the chief executive might later complain that no 
pressing events mandated the transfer.”). 
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could result in a situation where the country has a President 
from one party and a Vice President from another, not unlike the 
Adams-Jefferson pairing.796
E. Conclusion 
  This could lead to a distrustful 
combination that might pit the President and the Vice President 
against one another in a contest over documents.  One could well 
imagine the tension that might emerge from an attempted 
inability determination.   
The arguments in favor of a narrow VPP are convincing to 
the extent the Vice President is carrying out his constitutionally 
prescribed duties.  Such a position is in concert with Nixon I’s 
rationale that “[c]ertain powers and privileges flow from the 
nature of enumerated powers.”797  When presiding over the 
Senate, the Vice President would seem to possess a narrow 
privilege relating to his legislative duties, which would stem from 
the generalized legislative privilege or the Speech or Debate 
Clause.  He is also obligated to refuse to release information 
provided in any secret session of the Senate until released by the 
chamber.  To the extent he takes action pursuant to immediate 
or specific succession or presidential inability matters, the Vice 
President’s authority in this regard is expressly tied to the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  These authorities constitute the Vice 
President’s enumerated powers, and, despite their modesty and 
that they straddle Articles I and II,798
Other arguments based on a merging of the presidency and 
vice presidency seem much less defensible.  While judicial dicta 
have left the implication that the two offices are inseparable, 
 they should enjoy the same 
degree of confidentiality as the those of the President, federal 
lawmakers, or federal judges.  This would be fully in accord with 
the premium the Constitution places on encouraging effective 
decisionmaking by constitutional officers. 
 
796 The author would like to thank Joel Goldstein for raising this possibility.   
797 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974). It will be remembered that the Supreme Court has 
reiterated the rationale from Nixon I on numerous occasions. See supra Part II.B.2.   
798 The only other parallel situation under the Constitution would seem to be 
when the Chief Justice serves as presiding officer during an impeachment trial of 
the President before the Senate. In this capacity, the Chief Justice would likely 
enjoy a legislative privilege akin to that enjoyed by the Vice President when he acts 
as presiding officer. The Chief Justice also benefits from judicial privilege when 
carrying out his judicial duties. In this regard, the Chief Justice—like the Vice 
President—would enjoy privileges from two different branches.   
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they are in fact distinct.  The President alone is in charge of the 
executive branch.  On the other hand, the Vice President has 
unique responsibilities that involve both legislative and executive 
branch duties.  To permit the Vice President to proceed beyond 
the powers granted him by Article I and the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment and to assert his own executive privilege 
independent from the President would create a plural executive, 
an approach the Framers clearly rejected.  The courts’ dicta 
would, therefore, seem to rest more comfortably in the context of 
reinforcing the Vice President’s constitutional powers and not his 
delegated duties, an approach that dovetails with VPP. 
VIII.POTENTIAL COUNTERARGUMENTS AGAINST VPP  
Even the prospect of a narrow VPP is likely to draw a 
number of counterarguments.  They include that: (1) there is no 
express textual basis for VPP; (2) the Vice President should have 
no constitutional privilege because all executive power inheres in 
the President; (3) there is little judicial or historical precedent 
supporting VPP; (4) the President enjoys no implied powers so 
neither should the Vice President; (5) the Vice President’s 
constitutional powers are too modest to require a privilege; 
(6) the Vice President does not occupy his own branch of 
government, therefore he does not have his own distinct 
privilege; (7) acknowledging that the Vice President has a 
privilege would be counter to the rule against creating new 
privileges; and (8) VPP is anti-Originalist.  While these positions 
cannot be dismissed out of hand, in the end they are 
unpersuasive.   
A. There Is No Explicit Textual Grant Providing Support for 
VPP 
It could be contended that VPP does not exist because it 
cannot be traced to any express textual grant.  The argument 
could be advanced that, since executive privilege arguably 
derives authority from Article II’s Vesting Clause, legislative 
privilege arguably from the Speech or Debate Clause, and 
judicial privilege arguably from Article III’s Vesting Clause, the 
Vice President—by contrast—cannot point to any single 
constitutional clause to support his privilege.  Because the Vice 
President cannot rely on any express textual grant, he, unlike all 
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other constitutional officers, must lack a similar constitutional 
privilege.   
This position is far less convincing than it may initially 
seem.  After all, it is far from certain that executive and judicial 
privileges draw their support from the Vesting Clauses of 
Articles II and III.799  Indeed, in the case of executive privilege, 
while lower courts and academic authorities have often tied the 
privilege to Article II’s Vesting Clause,800 the Supreme Court has 
never done so.  In both Nixon I and Nixon II, the Court relied 
instead on broader structural features of the Constitution, 
rejecting an explicit textual tie.801  The Court looked instead to 
the doctrine of separation of powers and concluded that 
constitutional privileges were implicitly linked to enumerated 
powers.802
An argument based on Article III’s Vesting Clause faces the 
same hurdle.  In the case law that has discussed judicial 
privilege, Article III’s Vesting Clause has not been invoked.
 
803  As 
with executive privilege, the courts that have discussed the 
doctrine justified judicial privilege by looking to broader 
structural considerations in the Constitution.804
 
799 See supra Parts II.A, IV.A. 
  The courts’ 
reasoning in this regard has been by analogy since it is 
understood that both lawmakers and Presidents enjoy such 
authority.  That approach—reasoning based on constitutional 
structure and symmetry—is of course exactly what undergirds 
800 See supra note 84.   
801 See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974) (stating that 
“[n]owhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit 
reference to a [presidential] privilege of confidentiality”); Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs. 
(Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 448 (1977) (citing two cases involving members of Congress 
to support reasoning regarding executive privilege); Pub. Citizen v. Dep’t of Justice, 
491 U.S. 440, 484 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[C]ontrol [of] the disposition of 
Presidential materials [is] . . . vital to the President’s ability to perform his assigned 
functions [but], is not given to exclusive Presidential control by any explicit 
provision in the Constitution itself.”).   
802 See, e.g., In re Certain Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating 
Comm. of the Judicial Council of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488, 1519 (11th 
Cir. 1986) (“The Court [in Nixon I] discerned the constitutional foundation for the 
executive privilege—notwithstanding the lack of any express provision—in the 
constitutional scheme of separation of powers and in the very nature of a President’s 
duties . . . . [T]he same must be true of the judiciary.”).   
803 See supra Part IV.A–B. 
804 See, e.g., In re Certain Complaints, 783 F.2d at 1519.   
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the argument in favor of VPP and is an approach that has been 
embraced in other separation-of-powers contexts.805
Even with regard to the Speech or Debate Clause itself, the 
text says nothing about protecting papers or confidential 
discussions with aides.  At best, the text provides a somewhat 
less ambiguous nexus with privilege than the Vesting Clauses of 
Articles II and III.  To the extent the Clause does lend support 
for privilege, it is because the Clause has been interpreted in an 
expansive fashion by the courts, not because the text of the 
provision commands it.  As Chief Justice Burger wrote in dissent 
in Nixon II, “the Court has refused to confine that Clause 
literally ‘to words spoken in debate.’ . . .  Congressional 
papers . . . have [also] been held protected by the Clause . . . .”
   
806  
He reasoned further that “[d]espite the Constitution’s silence as 
to the papers of the Legislative Branch, this Court ha[s] had no 
difficulty holding those papers to be protected from control by 
other branches.”807
Further, the generalized legislative privilege has been used 
to justify the confidentiality of individual lawmakers’ 
deliberations.  In this context, the courts have turned to 
structural considerations to support this privilege, rather than 
text.   
  And, of course, VPP itself is in part tied to 
the broad judicial construction given the Speech or Debate 
Clause.   
The unanimous Court in Nixon I rejected the argument that 
the lack of an explicit textual privilege for the President meant 
that none existed.  This reasoning merits full quotation since it 
has a direct bearing on the existence of VPP.  The Court stated: 
The Special Prosecutor argues that there is no provision in the 
Constitution for a Presidential privilege as to the President’s 
communications corresponding to the privilege of Members of 
Congress under the Speech or Debate Clause. But the silence of 
the Constitution on this score is not dispositive.   
The rule of constitutional interpretation announced in 
McCulloch v. Maryland . . . that that which was reasonably 
appropriate and relevant to the exercise of a granted power was 
 
805 See supra note 15.   
806 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon II), 433 U.S. 425, 511 (1977) (Burger, 
C.J., dissenting).   
807 Id. at 515 n.9.   
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to be considered as accompanying the grant, has been so 
universally applied that it suffices merely to state it.808
Thus, while VPP lacks express textual support, so does 
executive privilege, legislative privilege, and judicial privilege.  
All constitutional officers rely on constitutional structure for 
their privileges, the same basis that a Vice President would.   
 
B. The Vice President Enjoys No Constitutional Privilege 
Because All Executive Power Is Delegated to the President 
At first blush, one of the major dilemmas surrounding 
invocation of VPP would be that it appears to entail an implicit 
assertion that the executive branch is plural.809  As noted above, 
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that “[t]he 
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United 
States of America.”  As one authority on the vice presidency 
concluded, the Vice President “is constitutionally prohibited from 
sharing the ‘executive Power.’ ”810
 
808 United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 705 n.16 (1974) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 537 (1917)).   
 
809 See, e.g., David F. Forte, Vice President, in THE HERITAGE GUIDE TO THE 
CONSTITUTION 183, 183 (Edwin Meese III et al. eds., 2005) (stating that from the 
constitutional text “it is clear that the Vice President was not vested with any part of 
the constitutionally mandated executive power. There would be no plural 
executive.”).   
810 YOUNG, supra note 658, at 8; see also, e.g., TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 64 
(“The constitutional independence of the vice presidency, joined to the constitutional 
indivisibility of executive power, limits the range of responsibilities that the vice 
president can perform well in the executive branch.”); G. Homer Durham, The Vice-
Presidency, 1 W. POL. Q. 311, 312 (1948) (“In vesting the executive power in Article 
II, the Constitution bestows no grant on the Vice-President.”); see also Katzenbach 
Memo, supra note 318 (“Legislation [which] might attempt to place power in the Vice 
President to be wielded independently of the President . . . would run afoul of Article 
II, section 1”); id. at 9 (“To the extent that legislation might attempt to place power 
in the Vice President to be wielded independently of the President, it no doubt would 
run afoul of Article II, section 1 of the Constitution, which provides flatly that ‘the 
executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States.’ Furthermore, 
since the Vice President is an elective officer in no way answerable or subordinate to 
the President, the practical difficulties which might arise from such legislation are 
as patent as the Constitutional problem.”); SILVA, supra note 297, at 170 (“[T]he 
Constitution vests executive power in the President and thus by implication forbids 
its exercise by anyone who is not actually a President.”); Reynolds, supra note 323, 
at 1542 n.14 (“I am aware of no argument to the effect that the Vesting Clause of 
Article II imbues the Vice President with any executive power, and of course such an 
argument would be plainly contrary to text. Nonetheless, in modern times the 
presence of some sort of ‘spillover’ executive authority in the Vice President seems 
sometimes to be assumed.”); Wilmerding, supra note 670, at 34 (“The whole idea of 
vesting in the office of the vice president any substantial part of the executive power 
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Over the years, the DOJ has maintained that the executive 
branch and the President are essentially one,811 as reflected in 
the President’s ability to remove high-ranking executive branch 
officials.  It is beyond cavil that the Framers of the Constitution 
explicitly rejected notions of a plural executive.  During the 
Constitutional Convention, for example, the New Jersey Plan 
provided for a multi-headed executive branch.812  This approach 
was rejected by the Convention813
 
is inconsistent with that clause of the Constitution which vests the executive power 
of the United States in a single person, the president, and with that other clause 
which makes the president responsible by requiring him to take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed. How is the president to be held responsible for the entire 
execution of the laws, if some of the laws are to be executed by an officer not subject 
to his direction or control?”); cf. Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(“[D]espite the Vice President’s rank, we do not believe his status as Chairman [of 
the interagency group] lent the Task Force any authority independent of the 
President.”); GEORGE BUSH, LOOKING FORWARD 227 (Victor Gold ed., 1987) (“It’s 
fundamental that the country can only have one President at a time. On the day a 
disgruntled, self-serving Vice President declares civil war on the White House by 
publicly challenging a President, our system of government will be in serious 
trouble.”); Cronin, supra note 652, at 335 (“You can’t have two leaders of the 
Executive Branch at one time . . . .” (quoting Vice President Humphrey) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 and is reflected further by an 
earlier version of Article II, Section 1 which read that “the 
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single 
Following his tenure as Vice President, Henry Wallace addressed Harvard Law 
School and stated that “[t]here should be no legislation nor any constitutional 
amendment giving the office of the Vice President more power. It is vital that the 
power of the Chief Executive should not be diminished in any way by law. So far as 
the law is concerned, one man should run the executive branch of the Government, 
not two.” See YOUNG, supra note 658, at 321 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
811 See, e.g., Authority of Agency Officials To Prohibit Employees from Providing 
Information to Congress, Op. O.L.C. (May 21, 2004), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/olc/crsmemoresponsese.htm; Authority of the Special Counsel 
of the Merit Systems Protection Board To Litigate & Submit Legislation to 
Congress, 8 OP. O.L.C. 30, 31 (1984) (concluding that “Congress may not grant [a 
special counsel] the authority to submit legislative proposals directly to Congress 
without prior review and clearance by the President, or other appropriate authority, 
without raising serious separation of powers concerns”); Constitutionality of Statute 
Requiring Executive Agency To Report Directly to Congress, 6 OP. O.L.C. 632, 633 
(1982) (stating that a legislative “requirement that subordinate officials within the 
Executive Branch submit reports directly to Congress, without any prior review by 
their superiors, would greatly impair the right of the President to exercise his 
constitutionally based right to control the Executive Branch”). 
812 See, e.g., CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 368 (2d ed. 
1987) (quoting the New Jersey Plan, which would have “authorized [Congress] to 
elect a federal Executive to consist of [blank] persons”). 
813 See Rossiter, supra note 662 (observing that “a plural executive . . . [was] long 
ago rejected by the framers of the Constitution”).   
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person.”814  In The Federalist No. 70, Alexander Hamilton 
defended the Constitution with its new executive.  He noted that 
its unitary nature was a primary feature.  He stated that the 
first ingredient that constitutes “energy in the executive” is 
unity.815
[t]he Vice President is an independent officer.  He is in nowise 
responsible to the President or subordinate to him. . . .  But to 
allow him authority for executive action—particularly should 
his acts not be subject to Presidential review and veto—would 
be a dangerous and doubtless unconstitutional intrusion into 
the domain of the chief executive.
  As this rejection of a plural executive relates to the vice 
presidency, one commentator noted decades ago,  
816
To the extent that the executive power—whatever the scope 
of this authority—is placed in the President, it would seem to 
follow that power over executive privilege would inhere in the 
President also.  If the executive power resides in the President 





814 2 FARRAND, supra note 323, at 171; see also Edward S. Corwin, The Steel 
Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953) (“The 
records of the Constitutional Convention make it clear that the purposes of this 
clause were simply to settle the question whether the executive branch should be 
plural or single and to give the executive a title.”).   
 then how would the Vice President be able to invoke 
VPP?   
815 THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, supra note 136, at 355 (Alexander Hamilton); see 
also id. at 356 (“Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise 
the proceedings of one man [as in the case of the President].”).   
816 WAUGH, supra note 296, at 194. A hint at the practical problems involved 
with a plural executive is reflected in an incident during the vice presidency of 
Charles Curtis. Although generally a nondescript Vice President, in 1932, when 
confronted by hundreds of protestors on the Capitol Grounds, Curtis reportedly 
called out the Marines, two companies of which arrived at the Capitol. See 
HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 381. Although Curtis later denied having ordered the 
Marines to the grounds, see Fleta Campbell Springer, Glassford and the Siege of 
Washington, HARPER’S MONTHLY, Nov. 1932, at 641, Admiral Henry F. Butler, the 
leader of the Marine units, stated that he had “sent the Marines at the request of 
the Vice-President.” Id. at 650. This action led to considerable embarrassment to all 
involved. See HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 381.  
Interestingly, Abraham Lincoln’s first Vice President, Hannibal Hamlin, partook in 
military activity of a different sort during the Civil War. As Vice President, Hamlin 
volunteered for and drilled with a Maine Coast Guard unit for two months. See H. 
DRAPER HUNT, HANNIBAL HAMLIN OF MAINE: LINCOLN’S FIRST VICE-PRESIDENT 
210–12 (1969); MARK SCROGGINS, HANNIBAL: THE LIFE OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN’S 
FIRST VICE PRESIDENT 210–12 (1994).   
817 See supra Part II.C–D.   
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Even though the Vesting Clause precludes the Vice 
President from enjoying executive power, that does not mean 
that VPP cannot exist.  It will be recalled that VPP is not 
executive privilege or even a subset of executive privilege, it is a 
privilege incidental to the Vice President’s unique constitutional 
powers.  The Vice President exercises Article I authority as 
President of the Senate.  In this capacity, he is exercising 
legislative power, not executive power.  Moreover, the Vice 
President can take preparatory action in anticipation of 
succession, preparatory action in anticipation of presidential 
inability and steps to help determine presidential inability that 
derive authority from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, not the 
Vesting Clause or any part of Article II.818  As with any 
potentially competing constitutional clauses, Article II and the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment must be read together.819
 
818 See, e.g., Adam R.F. Gustafson, Note, Presidential Inability and Subjective 
Meaning, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 459, 476 (2009) (“The power Section 4 grants to 
the Vice President and the Cabinet . . . is an exception to the Constitution’s 
otherwise nearly exclusive grant of executive power to the President.”). 
  To interpret 
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment so as not to read the Vice 
President out of the inability or succession processes altogether—
which would be in clear contravention of the amendment’s 
purposes—it must be viewed to permit the Vice President to 
carry out such functions independently from the President.  
Otherwise, the President could lawfully order the Vice President 
not to make an inability determination against him simply by 
virtue of his heading the executive branch.  This would render 
Section 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment a nullity.  A 
circumscribed privilege involving the Vice President’s limited 
powers would not hamper the President’s recognized authority as 
the head of the executive branch and would be consistent with 
the purposes of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.   
819 See Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904) (“If there be any 
conflict between these two [constitutional] provisions, the one found in the 
Amendments must control, under the well understood rule that the last expression 
of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one.”).   
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C. There Is Little Judicial or Historical Precedent Supporting 
VPP 
It could also be argued that the position favoring VPP relies 
on “arid logic” alone.820  In this way, VPP has never been 
expressly litigated821 because it has never been expressly 
invoked.  Two hundred and twenty years of experience without 
exercise of such authority, at least with respect to the Vice 
President’s duties of presiding over the Senate, is no small 
reason to doubt its existence.822
While the courts are the ultimate interpreters of the 
Constitution, they are not the sole interpreters.  Congress and 
the executive branch also render constitutional exegesis.  This 
interpretation, known in some circles as “coordinate 
construction,”
  Thus, there is no judicial 
precedent directly on point, only tantalizing bits of dicta.  While 
there is in fact little judicial or historical precedent to support 
VPP, at the same time, there is no judicial precedent to counter 
such an invocation and only one such historical instance.   
823 is of particular interest when the branches 
interpret their respective powers.824
 
820 This expression is borrowed from Frank Easterbrook. See Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 905, 922 (1990).   
  Longstanding coordinate 
821 See supra Part VI.L.1–2. On this basis it could be argued that VPP does not 
exist because there is no case law supporting the proposition. Cf. SHANE, supra note 
323, at 131 (“Prior to the Bush [2002 executive] order . . . there is not a sentence in 
any statute or judicial opinion suggesting that there is any independent vice 
presidential privilege to protect vice presidential records.”). But, of course, that is 
the case with any legal matter that has never been litigated. By definition, there is 
no judicial decision on point. The opposite proposition is of course equally true: there 
is no case law that explicitly rejects VPP. And, as has been discussed above, there is 
in fact much analogous case law to support VPP, particularly since 2002. See Cheney 
v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004); Comm. on the Judiciary v. Miers, 558 F. 
Supp. 2d 53 (D.D.C. 2008); Walker v. Cheney, 230 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2002). 
Finally, such an argument overlooks the compelling structural and historical 
arguments in favor of VPP.   
822 Of course, legislative privilege has not been definitively resolved to this day. 
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the merits of issue. See United States v. 
Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Neither has judicial 
privilege. Admittedly, unlike VPP, lower court opinions and dicta have made explicit 
reference to the existence of these other two privileges.   
823 See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS 
POLITICAL PROCESS 231–32 (1988).   
824 See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974) (“In the 
performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must 
initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpretation of its powers by any 
branch is due great respect from the others.”); see also Immigration & 
Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983) (“When any Branch [of 
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construction or constitutional custom is given great deference by 
the courts, particularly the closer the practice is to the origins of 
the Constitution.825
In questions of law such as VPP, which have no express 
textual link and which have never been decided judicially on the 
merits, one must rely even more heavily on custom.
   
826  History, 
however, is bereft of any formal assertions of privilege by Vice 
Presidents despite there having been opportunities for them to 
have done so.  Vice Presidents Humphrey, Agnew, and Cheney 
all made references to the possible existence of such a privilege, 
and the matter was discussed during the Rockefeller vice 
presidency.  Vice President Quayle successfully resisted efforts to 
appear before several congressional hearings although he did not 
explicitly justify his position on VPP grounds.  It would seem late 
in the day for such a novel assertion to be made.827
 
the federal government] acts, it is presumptively exercising the power the 
constitution has delegated to it.”).   
 
825 See supra note 137; see also J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 
U.S. 394, 412 (1928) (“This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a 
contemporaneous legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our 
government and framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public 
affairs long acquiesced in fixes the construction to be given its provisions.”); Burrow-
Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57 (1884) (“The construction placed 
upon the constitution . . . by the men who were contemporary with its 
formation . . . is of itself entitled to very great weight . . . .”); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 621 (1842) (concluding that “contemporaneous expositions of” 
the Constitution by the Framers bolster long acquiescence in construction); Stuart v. 
Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 299, 309 (1803) (“[I]t is sufficient to observe, that practice 
and acquiescence under it for a period of several years, commencing with the 
organization of the judicial system, affords an irresistible answer, and has indeed 
fixed the construction. It is a contemporary interpretation of the most forcible 
nature. This practical exposition is too strong and obstinate to be shaken or 
controlled.”).   
826 Cf. Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds: Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 233 
(1971) (testimony of William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, Dep’t of Justice) (with respect to the lawfulness of presidential 
impoundment, stating that “I think you pretty well have to go to the history and the 
congressional and executive precedents, there just being no very helpful cases”); 
EDWARD S. CORWIN, ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 263 (Robert G. McCloskey ed., 
1957) (“[W]hen two departments both operate upon the same subject matter . . . . 
[T]he question is what does the pertinent historical record show with regard to 
presidential action in the field of congressional power?”).   
827 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 230 (1995) (“[P]rolonged 
reticence would be amazing if such [action] . . . were not understood to be 
constitutionally proscribed.”).   
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While the absence of explicit political precedent for VPP 
would appear somewhat damning, that is not to say the doctrine 
could never be judicially recognized.  First, the courts have not 
treated venerable political precedent as outcome determinative.  
For example, in Immigration & Naturalization Services v. 
Chadha,828 the Supreme Court ruled the legislative veto 
unconstitutional despite its existence in scores of statutes over 
more than a half century.  In Powell v. McCormack,829
Second, the absence of explicit precedent involving VPP is 
less than meets the eye.  VPP involves very narrow 
circumstances, the type of which would occur only rarely.  There 
is no precedent involving a court or a committee trying to compel 
a Vice President to appear to discuss his official duties.  There 
seems never to have been a situation in which a Vice President’s 
legislative materials were demanded by an outside body.  There 
is only one occasion in which the Vice President’s Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment actions regarding succession have been examined 
directly—Ford’s appearance before a House subcommittee.  And 
there has been no inability determination made in U.S. history, 
let alone an opportunity for assertion of privilege thereto.  Thus, 
the parameters for such a precedent are so narrow that its 
absence is far less relevant than it otherwise might be.
 the 
Supreme Court struck down the House’s decision to exclude a 
lawmaker despite longstanding political precedent to the 
contrary.  Thus, past practice is not always dispositive.   
830  As the 
D.C. Circuit noted in In re Sealed Case regarding claims of 
privilege, the “lack of such precedent is hardly surprising, 
however, in view of the novelty of the [current] demand for 
testimony: . . .  [W]e do not regard the absence of precedent as 
weighing heavily against recognition of the privilege.”831
And, of course, such an invocation, while never expressly 
made, would not be wholly lacking in pedigree.  As alluded to 
above, references to a possible vice presidential privilege have 
occurred during four vice presidencies: Humphrey, Agnew, 
   
 
828 See 462 U.S. 919 (1983).   
829 395 U.S. 486 (1969).   
830 For more on the application of political precedent in the context of separation 
of powers, see Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom In Resolving Separation of 
Powers Disputes, 64 B.U. L. REV. 109 (1984).   
831 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998); cf. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 
n.5 (1986) (“The Impeachment Clause of the Constitution can hardly be thought to 
be undermined because of nonuse.”). 
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Rockefeller, and Cheney.  Vice Presidents have also declined to 
testify at congressional hearings.  These Vice Presidents could be 
seen as having reserved the right for a successor to invoke such a 
privilege.  It will be remembered that, despite agreeing to provide 
personal records to federal investigators, Agnew announced that 
I do not acknowledge that you or the grand jury have any right 
to records of the Vice President.  Nor do I acknowledge the 
propriety of any grand jury investigation of possible wrongdoing 
on the part of the Vice President so long as he occupies that 
office.  These are difficult constitutional questions which need 
not at this moment be confronted.832
Finally, the applicability of political precedent, or lack 
thereof, ought to reflect the constitutional and historical 
development of the vice presidential office itself.  The Twenty-
Fifth Amendment has only been in force for just over four 
decades, not two-hundred twenty years like the original text of 
the Constitution.
   
833  In this regard, a major pillar of VPP is 
actually comparatively youthful in constitutional terms.  In 
addition, the references to a potential constitutional privilege 
being invoked by a Vice President all occurred during the past 
forty-five years and illustrate the heightened status of the office 
that has taken place in the past several decades.  The increased 
activity of, and attention focused on, the Vice President only 
heighten the likelihood of a VPP scenario presenting itself.  Some 
commentators readily expect that Vice Presidents will invoke 
their own privilege in the future.834
 
832 Agnew Reply, supra note 428.   
  Because of these 
833 Vice Presidents perhaps could or should have played a role in determining 
presidential inability before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. That was never borne 
out in practice, however. See HANSEN, supra note 741, at 123–24 (“In the three 
major instances of temporary inability, Vice Presidents Arthur, Marshall, and Nixon 
made no attempt to determine disability, although at least Nixon had reason to 
believe the legal right was his.”). This failure was one reason why Section 4 of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was added.   
834 See WARSHAW, supra note 1, at 242 (“[F]uture vice presidents will most likely 
seek the same protections for their conversations, asserting that they too have 
executive privilege. . . . The assertion of executive privilege for the vice 
president . . . may be one of the changes in the office that remains in future 
administrations.”); see also MONTGOMERY, supra note 143, at 112–13 (concluding 
that the Cheney v. U.S. District Court “opinion was notable for . . . laying the 
groundwork for future vice presidents to assert a distinct vice presidential immunity 
from legal proceedings under the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine”); 
Klarevas, supra note 7, at 865 (“[T]he opinion implies that the vice president should 
enjoy the right to invoke presidential privileges and immunities (at least in civil 
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considerations, the scope for evaluating the lack of explicit 
political precedent ought to be narrowed accordingly.   
For these reasons, this potential counterargument is much 
less than it first appears. 
D. The President Has No Implied Powers, Therefore, Neither 
Should the Vice President 
A fourth counterargument against VPP could also be made.  
It would proceed as follows: if the President does not enjoy 
implied powers,835 then a fortiori the Vice President should not 
have such authority either.  This argument would be based on 
the principle that the Constitution established a federal 
government of limited powers836 and that this principle was 
underscored by the Tenth Amendment.837
 
suits). . . . Should vice presidents seize on this language in the future, it is likely that 
they will argue that they are shielded from a variety of legal proceedings because of 
the unique rights and responsibilities conferred to them by the Constitution. The 
fact that the Supreme Court did not expressly distinguish the vice president from 
the president in its ruling bodes well for vice presidents.”); cf. Myers, supra note 45, 
at 909 (“Cheney . . . essentially extended the protection of executive privilege to the 
Vice President.”).   
  It could be bolstered 
by past debate involving whether the Vice President possesses 
implied powers.  During the Calhoun vice presidency, a question 
arose over whether the Vice President qua President of the 
835 See, e.g., Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 225 (1821) (“[T]he genius and spirit 
of our institutions are hostile to the exercise of implied powers.”); see also 2 ELLIOT, 
supra note 28, at 540 (quoting Pennsylvania Chief Justice Thomas McKean at the 
state ratifying convention: “executive officers have no manner of authority, any of 
them, beyond what is by positive grant . . . delegated to them”); 3 DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 
464 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (“[Its powers] are enumerated. Is it not, then, fairly 
deducible that it has no power but what is expressly given to it?—for if its powers 
were to be general, an enumeration would be needless.” (statement of Edmund 
Randolph at the Virginia Ratification Convention about the nature of the federal 
government));  cf. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 483 (1789) (quoting Representative 
Thomas Hartley, who stated the President’s “powers, taken together, are not very 
numerous”).   
836 See United States v. Lopez, 518 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (“We start with first 
principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated powers.”); 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 236 (James Madison) (Garry Wills ed., 1982) (“The 
powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few 
and defined. . . . [They] will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, 
peace, negociation, and foreign commerce . . . .”).   
837 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by 
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”).   
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Senate had the implied constitutional authority to call Senators 
to order.  Calhoun argued that the Vice President “has no 
inherent power whatever.”838
There is a fundamental flaw with this position, however.  
Each of the three branches undeniably does exercise implied 
powers, that is to say, powers not expressly delineated in the 
Constitution.
   
839  It has been long recognized that Congress has 
the implied authority to conduct investigations,840 subpoena 
information,841 and hold individuals in contempt.842  The Senate 
has the authority to condition its approval of treaties.843
 
838 Onslow, supra note 652, at 327. Several members of the Senate disagreed 
with Calhoun, however. See 4 CONG. DEB. 278–341 (1828). In an abundance of 
caution, the Senate ultimately decided to clarify matters and expressly granted the 
Vice President this authority subject to overrule by the Senate as a whole. See id. at 
340–41; HATCH & SHOUP, supra note 652, at 418.   
  The 
839 See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406–07 (1819).  
[In the Constitution,] there is no phrase in the instrument which, like the 
Articles of Confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers and which 
requires that everything granted shall be expressly and minutely 
described. Even the 10th Amendment, which was framed for the purpose of 
quieting the excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word 
“expressly,” and declares only that the powers “not delegated to the United 
States, nor prohibited to the States, are reserved to the States or to the 
people,” thus leaving the question whether the particular power which may 
become the subject of contest has been delegated to the one Government, or 
prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole 
instrument. 
Id. 
840 See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).   
841 See, e.g., Eastland v. U.S. Serviceman’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 505 (1975) (“The 
issuance of a subpoena pursuant to an authorized investigation is . . . an 
indispensable ingredient of lawmaking . . . .”).   
842 See, e.g., Marshall v. Gordon, 243 U.S. 521, 542 (1917). The Court stated that 
Congress’s implied power to issue contempt citations  
rests only upon the right of self-preservation; that is, the right to prevent 
acts which, in and of themselves, inherently obstruct or prevent the 
discharge of legislative duty or the refusal to do that which there is 
inherent legislative power to compel in order that legislative function may 
be performed. 
Id. 
843 See, e.g., Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. 32, 35 (1869) (“In this country, a treaty is 
something more than a contract, for the Federal Constitution declares it to be the 
law of the land. If so, before it can become a law, the Senate, in whom rests the 
authority to ratify it, must agree to it. But the Senate are not required to adopt or 
reject it as a whole, but may modify or amend it, as was done with the treaty under 
consideration.”); Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S. 176, 182 (1901) 
(Brown, J., concurring) (“The Senate has no right to ratify the treaty and introduce 
new terms into it, which shall be obligatory upon the other power, although it may 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 617 
President has the authority to establish diplomatic relations with 
foreign governments,844 settle international claims,845 and enter 
into certain executive agreements without the approval of both 
houses of Congress or the Senate.846  The judiciary can strike 
down laws it deems unconstitutional,847 hold individuals in 
contempt,848 and issue stays.849
More importantly for this inquiry, each of the three branches 
not only exercises some measure of implied power but also the 
specific implied power to control the confidentiality of its internal 
deliberations subject to judicial review.
 
850
[T]he valid need for protection of communications between high 
Government officials and those who advise and assist them in 
the performance of their manifold duties; the importance of this 
confidentiality is too plain to require further discussion. . . .  
Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of 
enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of 
Presidential communications has similar constitutional 
underpinnings.
  As will be 
remembered, the Court in Nixon I stated,  
851
Chief Justice Burger was even more explicit in dissent three 
years earlier: 
   
No statute gives this Court express power to establish and 
enforce the utmost security measures for the secrecy of our 
deliberations and records. Yet I have little doubt as to the 
inherent power of the Court to protect the confidentiality of its 
 
refuse its ratification, or make such ratification conditional upon the adoption of 
amendments to the treaty.”).   
844 See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 43 (2d ed. 1996).   
845 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981); United States v. 
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). 
846 See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 654; Pink, 315 U.S. at 203; Belmont, 
301 U.S. at 324. 
847 See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).   
848 Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. 505, 510 (1874) (“The power to punish for 
contempts is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of 
order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders, and 
writs of the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice. The 
moment the courts of the United States were called into existence and invested with 
jurisdiction over any subject, they became possessed of this power.”).   
849 See Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (“[T]he power to stay 
proceedings is incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the 
disposition of the causes on its docket . . . .”).   
850 See supra Parts II–IV.   
851 418 U.S. 683, 705–06 (1974).   
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internal operations by whatever judicial measures may be 
required.852
Why would the Vice President, when exercising his own—
admittedly narrow—enumerated powers, not benefit from the 
same privilege as all other constitutional officers?  Why would his 
decisionmaking be deemed less important and less in need of 
confidential discussion?  Indeed, the only way to read the 
Constitution in a consistent fashion is to recognize the Vice 
President’s authority in this context. 
   
Therefore, an argument against VPP based on the supposed 
lack of implied powers in the federal government is not 
compelling.   
E. Since the Vice President Does Not Occupy His Own Branch of 
Government, He Does Not Have His Own Distinct Privilege 
A fifth counterargument could be made that confidential 
deliberations are required to ensure candor within discreet 
branches of government.  The Vice President is not a member 
solely of any one of the three branches, therefore, it could be 
contended he does not enjoy the protection of any of the three 
constitutional privileges: executive, legislative, or judicial.  Put 
another way, the Vice President is already a constitutional 
anomaly; his lack of a constitutional privilege would merely 
reflect his unique status.853
First, the Vice President has unique duties that are 
delegated to him by the Constitution, and they should not be 
  By extension, any vice presidential 
privilege, such as it exists, must be exercised subject to the 
approval of the head of the executive or legislative branch, 
depending on what functions the Vice President is carrying out at 
the time.  Although this counterargument also has initial appeal, 
a closer examination reveals its flaws.   
 
852 N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting).   
853 This argument could be supported by other constitutional anomalies 
involving the Vice President. For example, while the Constitution provides an oath 
of office for the President, there is no vice presidential equivalent in the charter. See 
Medina, supra note 654, at 80. While the Chief Justice, as opposed to the Vice 
President, presides over the President’s impeachment trial, no special provision 
exists regarding which officer would preside over a vice presidential impeachment 
trial. See, e.g., id. While Congress may not reduce the President’s salary, see U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5, there is no prohibition against its doing so to the Vice 
President. See also supra note 789 and accompanying text.  
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confused with duties delegated to him by either Congress or the 
President.  His constitutional duties are not subject to the 
ultimate means of executive branch or legislative branch control: 
removal.  Congress or the Senate by itself cannot prevent the 
Vice President from chairing the upper chamber unless he is 
impeached by the House and removed through Senate conviction, 
and even then a new Vice President would eventually take his 
place.854  The Senate can, and has, changed its rules to limit the 
discretion the Vice President has as President of the Senate but 
again it cannot keep him from presiding altogether.  Similarly, 
the President cannot lawfully prevent the Vice President from 
playing a role in making a determination as to presidential 
inability or prevent him from succeeding to the presidency.855  
Nor can the President remove him from office.  Thus, in carrying 
out his constitutional duties, the Vice President is not 
subordinated to the head of either the executive or legislative 
branch; neither should his privilege.856
Second, constitutional officers, not the branches writ large, 
hold constitutional privileges.  As the Supreme Court in Nixon I 
stated and has been reaffirmed repeatedly,
   
857 constitutional 
privileges stem from “the valid need for protection of 
communication between high Government officials and those who 
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold 
duties.”858
 
854 See, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, Someone Should Have Told Spiro Agnew, 
14 CONST. COMMENT. 245, 245 (1997).   
  Notably, the Court has also recognized that “high 
855 As a practical matter, since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Vice Presidents 
have been excluded from making at least initial, informal determinations of 
presidential inability. For example, Vice President Bush did not make an initial 
determination as to President Reagan’s fitness following his surgeries; this was 
carried out by White House staff. See FEERICK, supra note 18, at xiii–xiv. As a 
constitutional matter, however, any formal determination as to the President’s 
ability to perform his duties must include the Vice President.   
856 It will be recalled that lawmakers’ invocation of privilege is not subject to 
approval of the parent chamber. See supra note 180. 
857 See supra notes 63–72 and accompanying text.   
858 United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 705 (1974) (emphasis added). 
The question could be raised whether “high Government officials” are in fact 
“constitutional officers.” It is difficult, however, to see how they could be anything 
but one and the same. The Court in Nixon I stated that “[c]ertain powers and 
privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers . . . . The valid need for 
protection of communications between high Government officials and those who 
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties . . . is too plain to 
require further discussion.” Id. Nixon I and its progeny therefore reason that 
constitutional privileges protect the enumerated powers of “high Government 
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Government officials,” not branches, enjoy these privileges.859  
While executive privilege may only be claimed by the President 
as head of the executive branch, the same is not true of 
legislative and judicial privileges.  These privileges reflect the 
dispersed power delegated by Articles I and III.  These privileges, 
therefore, may be asserted by individual lawmakers and judges.  
That is to say a federal judge may invoke judicial privilege 
without first seeking the approval of the Chief Justice of the 
United States; although, if the matter were litigated, the 
Supreme Court could wind up reviewing the assertion.860  A 
House member may do the same without seeking the approval of 
the Speaker.861  Not only is the privilege to be exercised by high 
officials, but it is identified with enumerated powers under the 
Constitution.862
Thus, simply because the Vice President straddles two 
branches does not mean he lacks a constitutional privilege.  Were 
such a rule to govern it could lead to absurd results.  For 
instance, under this scenario, the Chief Justice would not be 
permitted to claim a judicial privilege because he straddles the 
judicial and legislative branches through his role as presiding 
officer during impeachment trials of the President.  Yet all other 
federal judges would maintain such authority.
  The Vice President’s enumerated powers just 
happen to include powers involving both the legislative and 
executive branches.  
863
 
officials.” At the same time, case law and past practice clearly indicate that only 
constitutional officers may invoke constitutional privileges. This is further reflected 
in the case law regarding executive privilege, which concludes that the doctrine can 
only be invoked by a current or former President. See supra Part II.C–D. Similarly, 
legislative privilege can only be asserted by current or former members of Congress 
or staff at the member’s direction. See supra Part III. The same is likely true for 
judges and law clerks. See supra Part IV. Since only constitutional officers can make 
the decision to invoke constitutional privileges, the only way to reconcile the 
rationale in Nixon I with the case law and past practice that restrict who can assert 
constitutional privileges is to conclude that “constitutional officers” are in fact “high 
Government officials.”   
 
859 See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511 (1978) (“Judges have absolute 
immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because 
of the special nature of their responsibilities.” (emphasis added)).   
860 See supra Part IV. 
861 See supra note 180.   
862 See Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 705–06 (“Certain powers and privileges flow from the 
nature of enumerated powers; the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential 
communications has similar constitutional underpinnings.” (emphasis added)).   
863 In a similar context, the President still enjoys executive privilege over 
communication related to whether to veto legislation even though his responsibility 
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As has been often observed, the branches of the federal 
government are not hermetically sealed off from one another.864
F. The Vice President’s Powers Are Too Modest To Require a 
Privilege 
  
By design, constitutional duties transcend specific branches and 
articles.  Accordingly, constitutional privileges flow from 
“enumerated powers,” not from concerns over which branch or 
article the constitutional officer happens to occupy.   
The counterargument could be advanced that the Vice 
President’s powers are too unimportant to require a 
constitutional privilege.865  It could be contended that since he 
only presides over the Senate and casts tie breaking votes—
which as a practical matter he does infrequently and which 
involve only modest authority—and since succession and 
presidential inability matters take up little time, there is no need 
for the Vice President to have a privilege.  To build on Vice 
President Rockefeller’s complaint, the “Vice-President has no 
responsibility and no power.”866
 
in this regard stems from Article I, not Article II. This is no different from members 
of the Senate who enjoy a legislative privilege when sitting in executive session 
considering treaties and nominations. See also supra note 655.   
  Such an argument against VPP 
would be a variant of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex, 
864 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 
635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under our 
Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any 
of its branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context. 
While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also 
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable 
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, 
autonomy but reciprocity.” (emphasis added)); Springer v. Gov’t of the Phil. Islands, 
277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The great ordinances of the 
Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and white.”).   
865 The office of Vice President has been denigrated from the beginning. Vice 
President Adams famously lamented, “[m]y country has in its wisdom contrived for 
me the most insignificant office that ever the invention of man contrived or in his 
imagination conceived.” 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 230. In declining nomination 
to be Vice President, Daniel Webster stated, “I do not propose to be buried until I am 
dead.” MILKIS & NELSON, supra note 652, at 428. Woodrow Wilson observed that 
“the chief embarrassment in discussing this [vice presidential] office is that in 
explaining how little there is to be said about it one has evidently said all there is to 
say.” See id. at 431. Their comments and others like them generally predate the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment and the beginning of the modern vice presidency. See, e.g., 
Goldstein, supra note 298, at 508.   
866 Cronin, supra note 652, at 326 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the law does not concern itself with trifles.  For two reasons such 
a counterargument is misplaced.   
First, it is difficult to argue that issues of presidential 
inability and succession are unimportant.  To the contrary, there 
are few more weighty governmental matters than ensuring the 
executive branch is led by an individual who is not laboring 
under an inability.  Ensuring an orderly succession is equally 
important.  Both of these concerns are especially vital in an age 
involving nuclear weaponry, terrorists with global reach and a 
host of other potential issues requiring instantaneous 
presidential attention.  The importance of presidential inability 
and succession is reflected by the fact that a constitutional 
amendment was adopted expressly to resolve such matters.867  
Moreover, three times Congress has taken action by statute to 
attempt to improve the presidential succession process.868
Second, while the Vice President’s role in the Senate is 
usually a modest one, at times it can be of supreme importance.  
During the first Congress, Vice President Adams’s tiebreaking 
vote ensured that the President’s authority to remove executive 
officers from their posts without Senate approval was 
recognized,
  
Simply because the Vice President may spend disproportionately 
little of his time on matters of presidential succession and 
inability does not mean that these are not vital governmental 
functions; it means only that the nation has had the good fortune 
to have been spared excessive experience with such matters since 
the adoption of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.   
869 a constitutional interpretation later upheld in 
Myers v. United States.  This congressional interpretation of the 
Constitution is credited with ensuring that Presidents have 
sufficient authority to control the executive branch.870  Another 
vote cast by Adams may have averted war with Great Britain.871
 
867 See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at 205 (“[O]bviously, the new 
constitutional vision of the vice presidency that is embodied in the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment gives the office an enhanced constitutional status. The Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment articulates an appreciation of the office as an essential institution, 
integral to the executive branch and crucial to solving problems of presidential 
succession and inability.”).   
  
868 The Succession Acts were passed in 1792, 1886, and 1947.   
869 See 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 237. 
870 See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Christopher S. Yoo, The Unitary Executive 
During the First Half-Century, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1451, 1492 (1997).   
871 See 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 237. 
84 St. John’s L. Rev. 423 (2010) 
2010] VICE PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY 623 
Vice President Arthur’s deciding vote aided his party in gaining 
control of the Senate in 1881.872  Similarly, Vice President 
Cheney’s vote ensured Republican control of the Senate during 
the first part of the 107th Congress.873  A Vice President has also 
participated in the constitutional amendment process through 
his voting power, an authority not even the President 
exercises.874  At the same time, the authority to preside can be an 
influential position from the standpoint of Senate procedure.  For 
instance, Vice Presidents have played a role in modifying or 
attempting to modify interpretations of Senate rules such as the 
filibuster.875
More broadly, an argument based on the premise that the 
vice presidency is an unimportant position overlooks the 
enhanced profile of the institution over the past several decades.  
There is no gainsaying that the office has risen immeasurably in 
stature to the point where it is among the most prized in the U.S. 
government.
   
876
The high esteem in which the modern vice presidential office 
is held is reflected by its treatment in the courts.  It will be 
remembered that in Cheney v. U.S. District Court the Supreme 
Court itself noted that “[w]ere the Vice President not a party in 
this case, the argument that the Court of Appeals 
[erred] . . . might present different considerations.”
  For instance, there is little doubt that Vice 
Presidents Cheney, Gore, and Mondale all wielded significant 
authority during their tenure.   
877  Further, 
the Court implicitly equated the Vice President with the 
President:  “[S]eparation-of-powers considerations should inform 
a court of appeals’ evaluation of a mandamus petition involving 
the President or the Vice President.”878
 
872 See id. at 236.   
  Elsewhere, the Court 
observed that  
873 See, e.g., Congress A to Z, in CQ ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
(D.R. Tarr & A. O’Connor eds., 2003), republished at CQPress.com, Historic 
Milestones in Congress (2005), http://www.cqpress.com/incontext/constitution/docs/ 
hist_milestones.html.   
874 See, e.g., 1 HAYNES, supra note 309, at 238. 
875 See, e.g., HATFIELD, supra note 318, at 427–28, 442–43, 510–11, 523.   
876 See, e.g., BAUMGARTNER, supra note 647; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 295, at 10–
13; Albert, supra note 315.   
877  542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004).   
878 Id. at 382.   
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[t]he discovery requests are directed to the Vice President . . . .  
The Executive Branch, at its highest level, is seeking the aid of 
the courts to protect its constitutional prerogatives . . . .  
[S]pecial considerations control when the Executive Branch’s 
interests in maintaining the autonomy of its office and 
safeguarding the confidentiality of its communication are 
implicated.879
The Court also noted in the decision that “constitutional 
responsibilities and status [are] factors counseling judicial 
deference and restraint.”
   
880
Finally, there is no indication that the Constitution 
prioritizes one set of enumerated duties over another.  Simply 
because certain clauses are not often triggered does not mean 
they are not important.  The example of the impeachment power 
comes to mind.  Certainly this power is not a small one even 
though it is infrequently invoked.
  In this regard, the Court’s 
appreciation for the Vice President’s prominence in the 
government played a role in its reaching the result it did.  While 
the judicial equation of the office with the presidency is 
conceptually problematic, it certainly conveys the perceived 
importance of the modern day vice presidency.   
881
Ultimately, the argument that the Vice President’s duties 
are ostensibly modest should not be a compelling rationale for 
denying the office its own constitutional privilege.   
 
G. The Rule Against Creating New Privileges 
Another counterargument against the existence of VPP is 
the legal principle that new privileges should not be fashioned 
unnecessarily.  This view has been acknowledged by the courts 
on numerous occasions, including by the Supreme Court in Nixon 
I.  There, the Court stated that “exceptions to the demand for 
every man’s evidence are not lightly created nor expansively 
construed, for they are in derogation of the search for truth.”882
 
879 Id. at 385 (emphasis added).   
  
The D.C. Circuit elaborated on this principle in In re Sealed 
Case, in which it noted the importance of transparency in 
880 Id. (quoting Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 753 (1982)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
881 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 n.5 (1986).   
882 United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see also Kaye, 
supra note 181, at 546 n.98 (listing further authorities).   
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government:  “The argument for a narrow construction is 
particularly strong in cases like this one where the public’s 
ability to know how its government is being conducted is at 
stake.”883
During the Clinton administration, the courts showed little 
enthusiasm for embracing a novel form of executive branch 
privilege, the protective function privilege.  As noted earlier, the 
Clinton administration asserted that this doctrine prevented 
secret service agents from testifying about the President and that 
the privilege was controlled by the Secretary of the Treasury—a 
position that was rejected by the D.C. Circuit.  In this regard, the 
rule of construction has limited the efforts of Cabinet officers to 
invoke novel privileges.   
   
Certainly, interpreting the Constitution to recognize that the 
Vice President has his own privilege would be counter to the 
legal doctrine against creating new privileges and against the 
democratic ideal of openness and governmental accountability.  
That said, this rule of construction has not been applied so 
strictly that it has prevented other constitutional officers from 
exercising their own privileges.  Courts have held that 
Presidents884 and federal lawmakers885 enjoy their own authority 
in this regard.  Federal judges would appear to as well.886  
Cabinet members, however, do not.887  The distinction between 
constitutional officers on one hand—the President, Vice 
President, federal lawmakers, and federal judges—and 
nonconstitutional officers—Cabinet members—on the other 
would seem to be the path between these competing lines of 
judicial precedent that acknowledge constitutional privileges in 
some cases888 but not others.889
 
883 121 F.3d 729, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1997).   
  It also dovetails with Nixon I’s 
admonition that privileges be related to “enumerated 
constitutional powers,” which Cabinet officers do not exercise on 
884 See supra Part II.  
885 See supra Part III.   
886 See supra Part IV.  
887 See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 1 998).  
888 See United States v. Nixon (Nixon I), 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974); United States 
v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 2007); In re Certain 
Complaints Under Investigation by an Investigating Comm. of the Judicial Council 
of the Eleventh Circuit, 783 F.2d 1488 (11th Cir. 1986). But cf. Turley, supra note 7, 
at 677 n.159. 
889 See In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d at 1077.   
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their own.890
It also bears repeating that the argument in favor of VPP 
entails only a narrow privilege, encompassing as it does merely 
his authority to preside over the Senate and break ties, to 
prepare for and help make a determination about presidential 
inability, and to prepare for succession.  As the rapporteur for the 
Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Vice Presidency, 
Professor Michael Nelson, has written, “[c]onstitutionally, the 
vice-presidency . . . [has] clear boundaries defining both the 
range of activities it can perform and the extent of influence in 
government it can achieve.”
  Thus, this approach would seem to permit Vice 
Presidents to exercise such a constitutional authority.   
891
 
890 The argument could be made that, since Cabinet members are given an 
explicit role in determining presidential inability by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 
they too should be granted a constitutional privilege akin to that discussed in this 
Article. See Turley, supra note 7, at 677 n.159. The Vice President’s status under the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment is, of course, different from that of the Cabinet. First and 
foremost, despite the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Cabinet secretaries remain 
creatures of statute, not the Constitution. See Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs. (Nixon 
II), 433 U.S. 425, 508 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (“[E]xecutive power was 
vested in the president; no other offices in the Executive Branch, other than the 
Presidency and Vice Presidency, were mandated by the Constitution. Only two 
Executive Branch offices, therefore, are creatures of the constitution; all other 
departments and agencies . . . are creatures of the congress . . . .”). The vice 
presidency is a position established by the Constitution.   
  These “clear boundaries” 
accordingly limit the scope of the privilege.  In this respect, VPP 
would only reflect a minor “derogation of the search for truth” 
Second, aside from being a constitutional officer under Articles I and II, the Vice 
President is the indispensable man in the inability determination process. See 111 
CONG. REC. S15,383 (1965) (“The Vice President must be a party to the decision.” 
(quoting amendment sponsor, Senator Bayh)); THOMAS H. NEALE, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY: AN OVERVIEW 5 (1999) (“[T]he Vice President is 
the indispensable actor in section 4: it cannot be invoked without his agreement.”). 
The Cabinet is empowered to participate in the inability determination process with 
the Vice President, but it may be replaced by another entity established by 
Congress. See 111 CONG. REC. S15,385 (“[I]f Congress specifies another body . . . it 
will do so because it wants another body to replace the Cabinet, which would have 
the primary responsibility until Congress precribed [sic] another body.” (quoting 
amendment sponsor, Senator Bayh)). The Vice President, therefore, is distinct from 
the Cabinet in that he cannot be removed from the decisionmaking process. Id. at 
S15,379 (contending that the amendment makes it “crystal clear that the Vice 
President must be a party to any action declaring the President unable to perform 
his powers and duties” (quoting amendment sponsor, Senator Bayh)); id. at S15,383 
(“The Vice President would have to act with either body.” (quoting Senator 
McCarthy)); id. (“The Vice President must make a separate determination with 
either the Cabinet or another body.” (quoting Senator Bayh)). For these reasons, 
Cabinet secretaries cannot be equated with the Vice President.  
891 TASK FORCE, supra note 318, at 62. 
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and would seem to properly balance the competing concerns of 
promoting intra-governmental candor with dissemination of 
information about the functioning of the vice presidency.   
H. VPP Represents an Anti-Originalist Position 
Finally, it could be posited that VPP represents a position 
that contradicts the views of the Framers.892  Earlier discussion 
reflects that neither Adams nor Jefferson made any reference to 
the Vice President enjoying his own privilege.893
First, the views of the original Framers carry much less 
weight with respect to the vice presidency than the presidency 
because the original clauses governing the Vice President have 
been amended on several occasions.  As noted above, in 1804, the 
Twelfth Amendment changed the election process for the Vice 
President, making him politically subordinate to the President.  
In 1933, the Twentieth Amendment clarified the incoming Vice 
President’s authority to become President should misfortunate 
befall the incoming President.  Finally, in 1967 through the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment the Vice President’s status was 
elevated by his explicit inclusion in the process for determining 
presidential inability.  The amendment also clarified his standing 
following the death or resignation of the President or the 
occurrence of a presidential vacancy.  Further, it acknowledged 
the increasing executive branch role the Vice President had come 
to play during the previous few decades and at the same time 
raised his constitutional stature.
  In fact, both 
took positions that would seem inconsistent with VPP.  While 
there may be some initial appeal to this counterargument to 
supporters of Originalism, this view suffers from two significant 
shortcomings.   
894
 
892 See DUBOSE & BERNSTEIN, supra note 338, at 13 (stating that Cheney’s 
“privilege argument is so novel that its antecedents won’t be found in 
any . . . foundational texts,” such as The Federalist Papers); Turley, supra note 7. 
This counterargument, of course, presupposes that Originalism should govern 
separation of powers disputes, a view not all would share. 
  Since the Twenty-Fifth 
Amendment is a major part of VPP, this aspect of the Vice 
President’s privilege would not be governed by the Founding 
893 See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.   
894 See, e.g., supra note 315. 
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Generation.895  Thus, since the authority of the Vice President 
and his relationship to the President have been modified several 
times through the amendment process,896
Second, it merits noting that none of the early Vice 
Presidents appears to have been engaged in a contest for 
information while presiding over the Senate.  In this regard, it is 
hard to say definitively that the other half of VPP would have 
been beyond the pale to the Framers.  The views of the Founding 
Generation are therefore far from clear on this score.  In sum, the 
argument that VPP is an anti-Originalist conception is 
unpersuasive.   
 the views of the 
original Framers have less bearing than in other contexts.   
CONCLUSION: WEIGHING THE MERITS OF VPP 
Whether the Vice President holds his own constitutional 
privilege is a novel question; one that sheds light on both the 
growing power of the office and on the unique role the Vice 
President plays in American government.  While constitutional 
text is silent on the explicit question, broader structural 
considerations counsel in favor of such an authority to the extent 
the Vice President is carrying out his own constitutionally 
assigned responsibilities to preside over the Senate and break 
ties, to prepare for and help make a determination about 
presidential inability, and to prepare for succession.  Since the 
President, members of Congress, and federal judges each enjoy a 
constitutional privilege to shield their internal deliberations from 
outside scrutiny, logically so should the Vice President.  This is 
because the Constitution has been interpreted to protect the 
quality of internal decisionmaking by constitutional officers.  
This includes ensuring that Presidents, national lawmakers, and 
federal judges can gather the information they need to make 
decisions properly; they can make decisions without fear they 
will incur civil liability for their official duties; and they can have 
candid discussions with their subordinates and among their 
peers.  Although the Vice President’s constitutional 
decisionmaking is limited to two narrow spheres, there is no 
reason it should not receive the same protection from outside 
 
895 See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 167 (“[The Twenty-Fifth Amendment] 
articulates a new constitutional vision of the vice-presidential office, a far grander, 
more optimistic conception than the founders dared advance.” (citations omitted)).   
896 See Albert, supra note 315. 
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interference as that of any other constitutional officer.  This is 
particularly so when compared to federal judges.  Members of the 
judiciary would seem less in need of a privilege than the Vice 
President since they have life tenure.     
VPP is, in effect, a composite of two separate constitutional 
privileges: (1) an Article I privilege, stemming from the Speech or 
Debate Clause and from structural and historical considerations;  
and (2) a Twenty-Fifth Amendment privilege.897
With respect to the Vice President’s preparation for 
succession or involuntary replacement of the President, a 
persuasive argument in favor of a qualified VPP could be made 
based upon the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.  The President’s 
authority under Article II cannot be read in isolation from the 
rest of the Constitution.  It must be interpreted in light of the 
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
  The former part 
of VPP could only be invoked pursuant to the Vice President’s 
presiding over the Senate and breaking ties and the latter only 
when matters involve immediate or specific questions of 
presidential succession or inability.  Although obviously not a 
Senator, the Vice President under the Constitution is President 
“of” the Senate: a part of that body while chairing proceedings in 
the upper chamber.  Thus, it would seem that in this capacity he 
could exercise the privileges that may attach to the legislative 
branch, especially since congressional staff enjoy such protection.  
In this respect, he may claim the benefit of some measure of 
absolute privilege radiating from the Speech or Debate Clause, or 
something akin to it, under the generalized legislative privilege.  
In addition, he would have to comply with Senate rules regarding 
nondisclosure of information revealed in secret sessions over 
which he presided, although enforcement of such confidentiality 




897 These potential privileges, taken together, could also overlap. Conceivably, 
the Vice President could preside over the Senate while the body considers inability 
matters pursuant to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Both aspects of VPP, therefore, 
could involve the Vice President resisting civil discovery and a nonimpeachment 
House investigation.   
  To the extent the Vice President is 
preparing to immediately take the reins of power—either 
898 See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68–69 (1904) (“If there be any 
conflict between these two [constitutional] provisions, the one found in the 
Amendments must control, under the well understood rule that the last expression 
of the will of the lawmaker prevails over an earlier one.”).   
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permanently or temporarily—it would seem his relevant internal 
communications would be privileged based on his own 
constitutional authority, with his deliberations after assuming 
the presidency being governed by traditional executive privilege.  
Further, routine discussions among vice presidential aides 
specifically regarding presidential inability and succession would 
appear to be privileged as well.  Invocation of such a privilege, 
like that of executive privilege, would of course be suspect in the 
context of a criminal investigation.   
Past investigations involving the vice presidency reflect that 
occupants of the office have been presented with numerous 
opportunities to assert a constitutional privilege of some sort but 
have never formally done so.  However, none of the past inquiries 
involved the Vice President’s role in presiding over the Senate, 
only one entailed the Vice President’s preparation for the 
presidency, and none involved presidential inability 
determinations.  These episodes involved either allegations of 
malfeasance or maladministration unrelated to vice presidential 
duties (Tompkins, Calhoun, Colfax, Agnew, Rockefeller—as 
Governor—and Gore) or the exercise of authority delegated by 
the President (Wallace, Humphrey, Rockefeller, Bush, Quayle, 
and Cheney).  On the other hand, generalized allusions to a vice 
presidential privilege were made during the tenures of 
Humphrey, Agnew, Rockefeller, and Cheney, all of which imply 
that such a power exists.  In addition, no Vice President has ever 
been compelled to appear against his will before a congressional 
committee and Vice Presidents have successfully resisted such 
oversight efforts in the past (Humphrey, Quayle, and Gore).  
Thus, to some extent, these historical precedents can be read to 
support a vice presidential privilege.   
Furthermore, dicta from the Supreme Court in Cheney v. 
U.S. District Court and from a lower court in Walker v. Cheney 
also buttress the position that the Vice President should be 
treated with some deference in contests over the release of 
information.  The facts underlying the two former decisions are 
not completely on “all fours” as to vice presidential privilege but, 
by definition, unprecedented legal questions have no exact legal 
precedent.  Dicta from these opinions therefore constitute the 
only judicial pronouncements closely related to VPP.  While the 
two decisions tend to combine the President and Vice President 
together in an unsatisfying manner and do not involve an actual 
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assertion of constitutional privilege, the overall tenor of the 
opinions and of the dicta are unmistakable.  The courts have 
therefore shown a healthy respect for the asserted needs of the 
Vice President to carry out his duties with a fair measure of 
confidentiality, even if he is only exercising presidentially 
delegated duties.  There is little reason to think that the Vice 
President would receive any less deference from the courts if he 
were exercising his own constitutional powers and if he actually 
made a formal claim of constitutional privilege.  The judicial 
equation of the President and Vice President also reflects the 
latter’s constitutional status and further underscores the 
likelihood that a court would ultimately recognize a vice 
presidential privilege since the President obviously enjoys his 
own authority in this realm.  Dicta from Nixon I and a host of 
other judicial opinions tying privilege to enumerated 
constitutional responsibilities provide further reinforcement for 
the notion of VPP.  To varying degrees, structural arguments, 
case law, and history are all therefore supportive of such a 
doctrine.   
The argument in favor of VPP, while persuasive, is not 
wholly unassailable, however.  There are arguments against its 
existence that are not without some merit.  Still, the better view 
is that the Vice President may withhold communications from 
outside parties if such materials relate to his narrow authority in 
the Senate and as potential successor to, or temporary 
replacement for, the President.  
In sum, should the issue arise as to whether the Vice 
President may withhold materials, even if the President opposes 
his efforts, it would appear that the Vice President would indeed 
enjoy such a constitutional privilege, provided the matter in 
question falls within the latter’s own areas of constitutional 
responsibility.  This would seem to be the most acceptable 
outcome for a governmental structure premised in part on 
encouraging all its constitutional officers to have the benefit of an 
effective decisionmaking process.  It would also be very much in 
keeping with the rising stature of the vice presidency in 
American government that has taken place over the past several 
decades.   
 
 
